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Svenja Möller who has always been the most supportive and loyal friend to me.
I am indebted to my parents Cornelia and Rüdiger Deversi and my twin sister Sandra
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Preface
e neoclassical model of economic behavior is based on the assumption of rationality.
It models human decision-making as if individuals maximize their egoistic preferences
and correctly form beliefs. In contrast to this approach, the behavioral economics model
views human decision-making as neither fully rational nor solely driven by selsh con-
siderations. Instead, it incorporates insights from human psychology such that fallible
judgment, social concerns, and mistakes in belief formation play an eminent role (Rabin,
2002).
Behavioral economics originated in the seminal papers of Simon (1955), Kahneman and
Tversky (1979), and aler (1980). In its infancy, it focused on detecting and describ-
ing systematic deviations of human behavior from the neoclassical assumptions. Early
work revealed and documented such “behavioral anomalies” in uncontrolled happen-
stance data. e increasing use of laboratory experiments allowed researchers to iden-
tify the causes of such anomalies in controlled environments (Falk and Heckman, 2009).
is evidence inspired various models of nonclassical preferences (e.g., Fehr and Schmidt,
1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Laibson, 1997) and beliefs (e.g., Eyster and Rabin, 2005;
Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006) that found their way into many subelds of economics pre-
viously shaped by the neoclassical paradigm. Among others, behavioral modeling has
been applied to game theory (Camerer, 1997), organizational economics (Camerer and
Malmendier, 2007), industrial organization (Heidhues and Kőszegi, 2018), or public eco-
nomics (Bernheim and Taubinsky, 2018).
Nowadays, many of these models are explicitly tested in eld environments. Public as
well as private organizations all over the world team up with researchers to use insights
from behavioral economics models and tackle important real-world problems. Such col-
laborations range from eld experiments on worker incentives (Hossain and List, 2012),
performance evaluations (Swi et al., 2013), and price disclosure (Dertwinkel-Kalt et al.,
2019) to retirement savings (aler and Benartzi, 2004) and tax collection (Hallsworth et
al., 2017). ey add external validity to phenomena discovered previously in controlled
laboratory environments (Levi and List, 2007; DellaVigna, 2009).
1
Preface
Combining insights from behavioral models and the advantages of experimental meth-
ods yields important synergies for researchers as well as policymakers and practitioners.
Experimental methods allow decision makers to rigorously evaluate existing policies. Be-
havioral models provide the structure to put results of such evaluations in perspective and
thereby design (and test) appropriate new policies. is process results in evidence-based
policy advice (as coined by Roth (1986) researchers can “whisper in the ears of princes”
(p. 246)) and allows for a profound discussion of welfare implications of dierent policies
(Chey, 2015). Further, experimental investigations of policy-oriented research questions
yield important indications for necessary renements of behavioral economics models.
For example, evidence from eld experiments may help to identify important contextual
factors that render behavioral phenomena more or less likely to evolve.
e main reason for the intensifying exchange of behavioral economists with policy-
makers and practitioners is that they share a common interest in “actual” behavior of
humans, may it be students, employees, or other market participants. In this spirit, my
dissertation presents four essays that examine the implications of human psychology for
economic policy and management practice. All four essays follow a common approach.
I combine lessons from behavioral economics models with experimental methods to re-
veal important insights for the research community as well as for practitioners. Building
on the behavioral economics approach, I acknowledge that preferences are not necessar-
ily selsh, that beliefs are oen not correctly formed, and that decision-making can be
erroneous. Further, I exploit the advantages of, both, laboratory and eld experiments.
I use this approach in the context of companies and markets as well as political contexts
such as regulation and taxation. In the rst two chapters, I look at the extent to which
behavioral insights on non-selsh preferences can be applied in companies. Doing so, I
investigate two main questions: What are the nancial and non-nancial consequences
of behaving cooperatively in companies? And how can companies promote cooperation
among employees? While in the rst two chapters I study rms from the inside perspec-
tive, in the third chapter I examine communication strategies of rms in markets. I ask
how communication needs to be regulated in order to prevent exploitation of consumers
that hold wrong beliefs about product quality. In the fourth chapter, I study taxation as
another relevant policy domain. I examine the consequences of complex tax ling policies
and the appropriation of taxes on compliance of non-rational, non-selsh taxpayers.
In the following, I provide a brief summary of each chapter. e chapters are self-contained
and can be read independently. e respective appendices as well as the bibliography can
be found at the end of this dissertation.
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Chapter 1 is based on joint work with Martin Kocher and Christiane Schwieren. It starts
with the observation that cooperation is vital in most production processes within com-
panies. However, many companies employ incentives or reward institutions that foster
selsh behavior (Graon, 2009). In this chapter, we analyze cooperation within a com-
pany seing in order to study the relationship between cooperative aitudes and nancial
as well as non-nancial rewards.
In total, 910 employees of a large soware company participate in an incentivized online
experiment in which we elicit cooperative aitudes using a modied linear public goods
game (based on Fischbacher et al., 2001). We link the experimental measure to record data
on nancial and non-nancial rewards of employees as well as to survey data on other
non-nancial outcome variables like team cohesion or work satisfaction.
First, we observe high levels of cooperation and the typical conditional contribution pat-
terns in the public goods game. Second, when linking experiment and company data, we
nd that cooperative aitudes of employees do not pay o in terms of nancial rewards
within the company. In stark contrast, cooperative employees receive signicantly lower
wage increases and nancial award payments than their more selsh colleagues. ird,
as opposed to nancial award paerns, cooperative employees receive non-nancial ben-
ets such as recognition or friendship as the main reward medium. ey also report a
higher average work satisfaction.
In contrast to most studies in the experimental laboratory (e.g., Fischbacher and Gächter,
2010), sustained levels of cooperation in our company seing relate to non-nancial val-
ues of cooperation rather than solely to nancial incentives. is suggests that the com-
pany achieves high levels of cooperation despite nancial disincentives by providing em-
ployees with non-nancial compensating dierentials. Our ndings give rise to various
management recommendations for companies that want to foster cooperation among
their employees.
e evidence in Chapter 1 highlights the importance of non-nancial management prac-
tices for the cooperative culture in companies. It remains open whether companies can
promote cooperation by using dedicated nancial incentives. Chapter 2 addresses this
question. Behavioral economists and management scholars have argued that the scope
of incentives to increase cooperation in organizations may be limited (e.g., Sliwka, 2007;
Bowles and Polanı́a-Reyes, 2012). One main idea builds on the intuition that condition-
ally cooperative employees may interpret the provision of incentives as a signal about the
prevalence of selsh employees in the organization and thus behave less cooperatively
themselves (e.g., Van der Weele, 2012).
3
Preface
I test this hypothesis experimentally using a sample of managers and employees (N =
448) from the soware company. In the experiment, employees face a social dilemma
situation in which they have a dominant strategy to free-ride on the cooperative eorts
of their colleagues. e managers benet from high cooperation levels among employees
and can counter free-riding by seing an incentive that is however costly for them. I
exogenously vary whether managers are informed about prevailing cooperation levels
among employees, before they can set the incentive to promote cooperation.
Comparing informed versus uninformed incentive choices, the data reveals strong pos-
itive eects of incentives that are unaected by the hypothesized signaling eect. e
absence of such eect can be explained by the employees’ perception of their managers’
intentions. Employees presume that managers choose incentives based on pro-social con-
siderations rather than based on individual prot maximization. Hence, the inference
logic that incentive provision indicates low cooperation levels is oset. is mitigating
factor has not been explored in the literature so far but entails relevant implications for
the optimal design of incentives in organizations. In particular, it gives rise to potential
management strategies to prevent the signaling of incentives.
e rst two chapters analyze cooperation in the context of rms. Chapter 3, which is
based on joint work with Alessandro Ispano and Peter Schwardmann, studies the interac-
tion of rms and consumers in markets. In particular, we investigate why in many market
seings unfavorable news are delivered under the disguise of vagueness. An illustrative
example of such messages can be found on university websites where universities oen
refer to the latest US News Ranking as “ranked top 10” rather than as “ranked number
10”. ese vague messages are not outright lies, but merely put a positive spin on unfa-
vorable news. An open question is whether people are suciently naive to be fooled by
such positive spin.
We use a theoretical model and a laboratory experiment to study the strategic use of
vagueness in a voluntary disclosure game. Consider a sender who aims at inating a
receiver’s estimate of her type and who may disclose any interval that contains her ac-
tual type. eory predicts full information revelation if receivers are fully sophisticated.
When facing a possibly naive receiver, the sender discloses an interval that separates her
from worse types but is upwardly vague.
Senders in the experiment adopt this strategy and some (naive) receivers are systemat-
ically misled. Imposing precise disclosure in an additional treatment condition leads to
less, but more easily interpretable, disclosure. Both theory and experimental data fur-
ther suggest that imposing precision improves overall information transmission and is
especially benecial to naive receivers. Our results have implications for the rules that
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govern the disclosure of quality-relevant information by rms, the disclosure of research
ndings by scientists, and testimonies in a court of law.
While regulation is an important policy domain for which my approach delivers relevant
insights, taxation is another important eld of application. Taxation and tax compliance
are essential for modern societies, yet there is much scope for improvement (Lumer and
Singhal, 2014). Chapter 4, which is based on joint work with Charles Bellemare and Flo-
rian Englmaier, investigates individual compliance behavior when facing complex rules,
for example, when ling income tax returns. We focus on the question whether complex-
ity contributes to self-serving compliance behavior like the underclaiming of benets.
To study this question, we setup a laboratory experiment in which subjects face a com-
pliance decision for which they need to le abstract tax forms of the Canadian province
of ébec. e forms determine what share of a generated income can be kept by the
subjects versus needs to be handed back to the experimenter (the “taxes” in our seing).
In a fully factorial between subject design, we vary the complexity of these forms and for
which purpose the collected taxes are to be used (i.e., the appropriation of tax money).
is allows us to study whether the eects of complexity are linked to self/other-serving
purposes, holding material compliance incentives constant.
Our results show a strong eect of the appropriation of taxes. Subjects are substantially
less likely to comply with the tax rules when taxes are donated to a luxury yacht club
rather than to a deserving cancer charity. We also observe that complexity causes a slight
decrease in compliance. Interestingly, this decrease is particularly evident when taxes are
distributed to the yacht club rather than to the cancer charity.
ere exist at least two relevant explanations for this interaction eect. First, complexity
might serve to alleviate the psychological costs from non-compliance. Second, the usage
of taxes might change the motivation of subjects to comply with rules and hence they are
more sensitive to complexity variations. When analyzing ling eorts and mistakes, we
nd suggestive evidence that is indicative of the rst explanation. But in either case, the
interaction eect of complexity and appropriation on compliance behavior has relevant
implications for governments who jointly design tax rules and redistribute tax money.
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Chapter 1
Cooperation in a Company: A
Large-Scale Experiment
*
1.1 Introduction
Within organizations most processes and production steps entail voluntary cooperation
among employees to realize optimal output. is is particularly true for teamwork, but
also for other daily interactions like helping or knowledge sharing (see Giell, 2000; Fehr,
2018), where cooperation requires solving a social dilemma: those involved are beer o if
everybody provided high levels of eort or lots of time, but due to the individual incentive
to contribute the enforceable minimum, the joint product is provided on a suboptimal
scale, or not at all.
Social dilemmas have been studied extensively in the experimental laboratory (for re-
views see Ledyard, 1995; Chaudhuri, 2011; Fehr and Schurtenberger, 2018) as well as in
the context of governing the commons in the eld (e.g., Ostrom, 1990; Rustagi et al., 2010;
Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011; Gneezy et al., 2016). Interestingly, there is much less empirical
evidence on cooperation within organizations, and, in particular, companies.1 ey oen
have to solve a general tradeo between creating a cooperative culture in order to pro-
vide internal public goods on an ecient level and securing a competitive environment
in order to induce innovation and to be able to select the best employees for promotion.
Striking the balance, given the tension between cooperation and competition, is probably
one of the most dicult management tasks (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002).
A key aspect of cooperation within organizations is that employees and teams oen inter-
*is chapter is based on joint work with Martin Kocher and Christiane Schwieren.
1Notable exceptions are Charness and Villeval (2009) and Burks et al. (2009).
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act repeatedly. While reputation concerns and informal peer sanctioning can reduce the
free-rider problem, they are oen unable to solve social dilemmas fully (e.g., Fischbacher
and Gächter, 2010).2 us, even in repeated interaction and with peer sanctioning mech-
anisms in place, it is essential for companies to establish a cooperative culture in order to
sustain high levels of cooperation over time, avoiding the oen observed decay in coop-
eration.
In this chapter, we exploit a unique seing for studying how nancial and non-nancial
reward instruments within organizations relate to the cooperative culture among employ-
ees. Understanding this relationship entails relevant implications for many organizations.
Our analysis is based on incentivized online experiments with 910 employees of a large
soware company.3 We link data on the level of the employee from these experiments
that measure cooperative aitudes in variants of the public goods game (see Fischbacher
et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010) with reward and context variables from com-
pany records.
Our setup allows for three main contributions. Firstly, we can systematically provide ev-
idence on the association between cooperative aitudes and nancial rewards within the
company, while being able to control for determinants of cooperation whose relevance is
suggested by economic theory. Secondly, we can assess potential non-nancial reasons
for cooperation in a natural environment that have so far almost exclusively been studied
in the experimental laboratory. irdly, our study fullls a methodological purpose by
assessing the external validity for a business context of one of the most frequently applied
laboratory measures of cooperation.4
With respect to our rst contribution, we nd that cooperativeness of employees does
not lead to higher individual nancial rewards. In stark contrast, our estimates show that
within our study period from 2016 to 2018, cooperative employees received on average
29% lower annual wage increases and 15% lower nancial award payments than their
more selsh colleagues. Being cooperative is not rewarded but rather punished in terms
of remuneration.
Regarding our second contribution, we observe that a large fraction of employees ex-
2Among other reasons, decreasing cooperation levels in repeated interaction result from contractual incom-
pleteness of cooperative behavior (e.g., Holmstrom, 1982; Itoh, 1991), the existence of imperfectly condi-
tional cooperators (see Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Ambrus and Pathak, 2011) or imperfect sanctioning
mechanisms (Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; Houser et al., 2008; Nikiforakis, 2008).
3Following the typology of Harrison and List (2004) our experiments can be referred to as an “artefactual
eld experiment”. Alternatively, one could call it a “lab-in-the-eld experiment” (Gneezy and Imas, 2017).
4ere is an active methodological discussion about the generalizability/external validity of standard labo-
ratory measures (see Levi and List, 2007; Falk and Heckman, 2009; Burks et al., 2016; Gneezy and Imas,
2017).
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hibits comparatively high levels of cooperation, despite the nancial disincentives and
the existence of selsh employees. Hence, in contrast to laboratory experiments, in which
opportunistic cooperation is usually observed by selsh players in repeated cooperation
that leads to a quick decay of contributions over time, we observe a potentially stable
paern of cooperation in the company. Consequently, behavior in the eld experiment
and observational data form the company together suggest that there must be substantial
non-nancial rewards of cooperation for the cooperators. Otherwise, cooperation should
break down over time. While our online experiment features a one-shot interaction and
thus cannot observe contribution dynamics, the high share of perfect conditional coop-
erators and the substantial number of unconditional cooperators provide the basis for
stable cooperation.
We nd supportive evidence for this interpretation when linking experimental data with
record data from a non-nancial recognition tool that employees can access via the com-
pany’s intranet. Cooperative employees receive 51% more recognition awards from their
colleagues. In a similar vein, we nd that cooperative employees and teams comprised of
a larger share of cooperative employees report stronger team cohesion and higher work
satisfaction in our post-experimental survey, which is again a sign for non-nancial re-
ward components of a cooperative environment.
Regarding our third contribution, we document that cooperative employees send more
than twice as many recognition awards than selsh employees. is correlation corrobo-
rates the external validity of cooperative aitudes measured in our experiments as send-
ing an award requires some individual cost to write a justication and induces a positive
externality on a co-worker.
Overall, our data is indicative of the idea that the company positively aects levels of
cooperation through supplying non-nancial compensating dierentials to cooperative
employees.5 is is our preferred interpretation of the data, because it provides a joint
mechanism for (i) high levels of cooperation, (ii) a negative nexus between nancial re-
wards and cooperativeness, and (iii) a positive nexus between non-nancial rewards and
cooperativeness. We also investigate three other mechanisms that are likely to be present
in our seing, but that are unlikely to be the sole driver of our three ndings: an omit-
ted variable bias related to performance or skills that are specic to cooperative aitudes
(Bowles et al., 2001; Barr et al., 2009; Leibbrandt, 2012), selection based on cooperative
aitudes (Falk and Heckman, 2009; Dohmen and Falk, 2011), and context-dependent pref-
5is interpretation is in line with a strand of literature that emphasizes an intrinsic value of cooperation
beyond its nancial consequences (Hamilton et al., 2003; Bandiera et al., 2005, 2011, 2013; Ru and Fehr,
2014).
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erences (Bowles, 1998; Levi and List, 2007; Cohn et al., 2014).
e remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. We rst relate our study to the
literature on artefactual eld experiments to study cooperation in the eld. In Section
1.3, we outline the company seing at hand. In Section 1.4, we describe our experimental
setup and the data for our analysis. en, we report the correlation between cooperative
aitudes and relevant outcome variables from the company context in Section 1.5. Sec-
tion 1.6 discusses the main ndings and potential underlying mechanisms. Section 1.7
concludes the chapter.
1.2 Related Literature
It is impossible to do justice to the large experimental literature on cooperation, even if
one restricts aention to (artefactual) eld experiments and lab experiments predicting
prosocial behavior outside the laboratory (for a survey see Galizzi and Navarro-Martı́nez,
2019). Examples for eld experiments on cooperation are List and Lucking-Reiley (2002),
Cardenas (2003), Frey and Meier (2004), Alpizar et al. (2008), Benz and Meier (2008), Burks
et al. (2009), Carpenter and Seki (2011), Croson and Shang (2008), Rustagi et al. (2010), Fehr
and Leibbrandt (2011), Voors et al. (2011, 2012), Stoop et al. (2012), or Gneezy et al. (2014,
2016). People have studied charitable giving, shermen, truck drivers, visitors of national
parks and many more. However, there is very lile evidence on company seings.
Regarding our main research interest, the nancial and non-nancial rewards of cooper-
ative aitudes of employees in a company there is particularly scarce existing empirical
evidence from the eld. is is despite an abundance of case studies and anecdotical evi-
dence on rms that must balance cooperative and competitive elements in their incentive
schemes or that must foster cooperation within teams to be successful (e.g., Dirks, 1999;
Dirks and Ferrin, 2001; Graon, 2009, 2011; Grant, 2013). Beersma et al. (2003) discuss
the relevant management literature and provide a study on the cooperation/competition
tradeo, including personality dierences and task characteristics.
In the following, we provide an upshot of the existing literature on our three main con-
tributions. Our rst contribution is on the association between cooperative aitudes and
nancial rewards within the company. Burks et al. (2009) use a naturally occurring social
dilemma among bicycle messengers in Switzerland and the United States. eir focus is
on the selection of messengers into companies based on incentive schemes. Workers in
companies that pay for performance show less cooperation than workers in companies
that pay xed hourly wages or that are members of cooperatives.
ere is more closely related literature in other than a standard workplace domain (or
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using other paradigms than the standard public goods game) that can still inform our
setup. Leibbrandt (2012) compares behavior of professional shrimp sellers in a labora-
tory public goods game with natural market outcomes. He nds a positive relationship
between cooperativeness and market success as measured by achieving higher prices for
shrimps and establishing longer lasting trade relations. He argues that the detected corre-
lation is driven by cooperative employees being able to signal trustworthiness. Similarly,
Essl et al. (2018) study the trustworthiness of sales employees of an Austrian retail chain
using a modied trust game and relate behavior in the game to individual sales perfor-
mance data. e authors nd that higher trustworthiness is associated with lower sales
per day, but with higher revenue per customer. Cardenas and Carpenter (2005) look at
experimental measures of cooperation and link them to household expenditures in Viet-
nam and ailand, showing that more cooperative individuals are beer o. Likewise,
Barr and Serneels (2009) provide evidence that experimentally elicited trustworthiness is
positively related to wages of manufacturing workers in Ghana.
Regarding the relationship between cooperative aitudes and non-nancial rewards –
our second contribution – there again exists limited evidence. Ru and Fehr (2014) sum-
marize evidence from laboratory FMRI studies that indicate “[…] an experienced value of
cooperation per se that might bias individuals to display cooperative behavior” (p. 557).
In the eld, Hamilton et al. (2003) show that workers at a garment plant voluntarily select
into a team-based work organization despite nancial losses as compared to performing
sewing tasks individually. ey argue that such selection behavior is likely driven by non-
nancial reasons such as hedonic benets from team work. In a similar vein, Bandiera et
al. (2005, 2011, 2013) nd that UK fruit pickers increase eorts or forgo nancial benets
due to social ties to co-workers.
Our third contribution relates to the external validity of experimentally elicited coopera-
tive aitudes. While we know quite a lot on the external validity of dierent measures on
uncertainty preferences (risk and ambiguity) and time preferences, we know much less
on the external validity of standard measures of cooperative aitudes. Existing studies
that provide evidence of the external validity of the standard linear public goods game,
i.e., the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM), are mainly linked to the problem of
the commons. Rustagi et al. (2010) elicit cooperative aitudes of members of 49 forest
user groups in Ethiopia in an artefactual eld experiment seing. ey link cooperative
aitudes to natural forest commons outcomes and nd that groups that are comprised of
a larger number of conditional cooperators are doing a beer job in managing the forest
commons. In a similar vein, Gneezy et al. (2016) study Brazilian shermen who are orga-
nized dierently in dierent places regarding the need for team work. Fishermen at the
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sea who are forced to work in teams cooperate and trust more than their counterparts
at lakes who mostly work individually (see also, for instance, Carpenter and Seki, 2011;
Fehr and Leibbrandt, 2011; Stoop et al., 2012; Voors et al., 2011, 2012).
Evidence for contexts, apart from common pool management, is provided by Burks et
al. (2016) who conduct prisoner’s dilemma experiments with truck drivers. More coop-
erative truck drivers are found to send satellite uplink messages from their trucks more
frequently (messages are costly but benet an anonymous colleague). Englmaier and
Gebhardt (2016) perform a lab-eld comparison by inviting student participants to a lab-
oratory public goods game and to a natural work seing (registering books in a library
database) in which incentives condition on team outcomes. From the positive correlation
of behavior in the laboratory and in the natural work task, the authors conclude that
the laboratory public goods game captures important aspects of structurally equivalent
situations outside the laboratory.6
Our study adds the novel elements of a work team and company seing and the link of
nancial as well as non-nancial outcome data with behavioral data from incentivized
experiments to the existing literature in economics and management.
1.3 e Company Setting
We conduct our study in partnership with a large, multinational soware company. About
40% of the employees work as soware developers, 40% work in the sales and consulting
area, and the remaining 20% work in more general service areas like Human Resources,
Accounting & Finance or Marketing. Several institutional features are important to un-
derstand how the company and its reward systems operate.
Business Models. Most individual and teamwork tasks in the company are mainly tak-
ing place in either a customer business model or cloud business model. e customer
model uses servers that are on the premise of the client and that are serviced by com-
pany employees, whereas the cloud business model uses internet cloud solutions that
concurrently apply to many clients. According to our discussions with managers of the
company before conducting the study, the laer model requires more cooperation among
workers at the soware producer than the former; in other words, it entails a production
function with much more pronounced complementarities (for instance, between soware
6As in our study, Charness and Villeval (2009) deploy a linear public goods game in actual companies, but
they focus on the dierence in behavior of junior and senior employees. e main nding is that senior
employees are more cooperative than junior employees. Von Bieberstein et al. (2020) analyze student per-
formance in math exams and partner work assignments at university using public goods game measures,
however, they nd no correlation (but free-riders are performing beer in the exam).
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development and consulting).7 Interestingly, due to the cloud model connecting several
soware products on an interface, sales employees also have sales bags that are comprised
of items that, if sold, positively aect the performance of their sales team, i.e. other team
members.
Pay Schemes. Employees are enrolled in one of two co-existing pay schemes: either the
company performance or the individual performance pay scheme. Both schemes involve
a xed component and a variable pay component. ey dier in how the variable pay
component is determined. In the company performance pay scheme, employees receive
bonus payments that are determined by the overall company performance. Under the
individual performance pay, bonuses depend on individual performance assessments.
Enrollment in either of these schemes is tied to job roles such that selection is only
possible via job choice. While all developers and employees in the service areas work
under the company performance pay, most sales employees work under individual per-
formance pay. Consultants are equally likely working in either of the schemes depending
on whether they are in-house or outgoing consultants.
Wages. e employees’ target wage consists of a base wage and the bonus conditional on
full target achievement (either company or individual target). is means that the target
wage does not necessarily correspond to the actual wage payed. However, analyses by
the company show that the target wage is a good proxy for actual wages, hence, we refer
to them as wages.8 Cross-sectional variation in wages is mainly due to jobs at dierent
career levels or in dierent functions. Variations in the wage levels over time reect job
trajectories. For example, this includes promotions or other internal job changes that
relate to a dierent pay mix. In addition, managers have a budget for merit increases
paid to their employees to be decided upon on a yearly basis.
Financial Awards. Another important reward instrument of managers is the conferral of
nancial awards. At the end of a year, every manager can allocate nancial awards that
consist of shares of the company among employees in his/her team. An award conferred
in a particular year is paid out in three tranches in the subsequent years. e budget
is xed for each year for the whole company and on team levels. e award guidelines
7For validation, we ask all participants how important cooperation is to successfully fulll their individual
and teamwork tasks on a standard Likert scale in an online survey. We detect a strong correlation between
the business models and responses to the survey question (Spearman correlation: −0.214, p < 0.001).
While 42% of employees state that teamwork is of high importance in the cloud business model only 24%
do so in the customer business model (t-test, p < 0.001).
8In the company performance scheme, there was full target achievement over the relevant years; hence,
target wages equal the wages payed. In the individual performance pay, target wage is a noisier measure of
the actual wage payed. While on average there are very high target achievement rates (on average, above
100%), there is a higher standard deviation.
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handed out to the managers specify the idea of a nancial award as recognizing employees
that are important for the success of the company and as an instrument for employee
retention. e guidelines apply to all departments, job positions and both pay schemes.
Recognition Awards. Furthermore, there exists a non-nancial recognition system that
every employee can easily access via the company’s intranet. e program is an institu-
tionalized way to thank a colleague for several desired behaviors including, for example,
cooperation, promise keeping, or embracing diversity. If an employee receives an award,
he/she is notied via e-mail. e e-mail prominently shows a slogan such as “ank you
for being cooperative!” (or the relevant other award justication). It also contains a mes-
sage from the sending employee and his/her name. e receiving employee’s manager
can see every award and the total number of awards received for each team member. e
role of the manager is also to prevent employees from sending awards back and forth.
ere are no direct nancial consequences related to a recognition award, neither for the
sending nor for the receiving employee. However, sending an award requires some eort
as it must be justied in a text of at least 150 characters.
1.4 Experimental Setup and Data
Our analyses are based on data from three dierent sources. First, we collect data from
an incentivized online experiment. Second, in a subsequent survey module, we elicit
a variety of control variables such as socio-demographic characteristics or behavioral
measures that relate to cooperation. e gathered data is then merged with reward and
context variables from the company records on the individual level. An overview of all
collected variables can be found in Appendix A.1.
1.4.1 Behavioral Measure of Cooperative Attitudes
e rst part is a public goods experiment according to the “ABC-framework of coop-
eration” (Gächter et al., 2017).9 It uses the design of Fischbacher et al. (2001), including
the elicitation of beliefs. In a VCM seing, we elicit an unconditional contribution to a
public good, a full contribution schedule contingent on average contributions of other
group members, and subjects’ beliefs about others’ average unconditional contributions.
Participants are randomly assigned to groups of three. Every participant knows that all
other participants are randomly selected employees of the company. Each group member
9e instructions of the public goods game can be found in Appendix B.2. e full experimental material
provided to employees can be found in the Online Appendix.
14
Cooperation in a Company
receives an initial endowment of 10 Tokens to be allocated to a private account or to
be contributed to a public account. One Token equals AC1. e invested amount ci ∈
{0, 1, ..., 10} is referred to as the unconditional contribution. e sum of all contributions
to the public good is multiplied 1.5 in our case, and divided equally among all n = 3 group
members. is leads to the following payo function for subject i:
πi = 10− ci + γ
n
∑
j=1
cj (1.1)
which is linear in the public good contribution and where ci denotes the contribution of
group member i. e marginal per capita return (MPCR) from investing in the public good
is 1/n < γ = 0.5 < 1. From an individual perspective, free-riding (i.e., ci = 0) is a dom-
inant strategy. Since the sum of marginal returns is larger than 1, however, contributing
the entire endowment (i.e., ci = 10) is the optimal choice from a collective perspective.
e decision is made only once and anonymously. us, there are no incentives and no
possibilities to build a reputation.
Participants do not receive any feedback aer indicating an unconditional contribution.
Subsequently, participants are asked to ll in a contribution table indicating their con-
tribution for each possible average contribution of the other group members, rounded
up to integers. e conditional contributions from the contribution table allow us to
classify three distinct cooperative aitudes. We depart from the existing literature for
expositional reasons; the interpretation of our analysis is simplied when using the three
categories. Fischbacher et al. (2001) and many follow-up papers classify free riders (zero
contributions, regardless of the average contributions of others), conditional cooperators
(increasing contributions with increasing average contributions of others), and hump-
shaped contributors (increasing contributions with increasing average contributions of
others up to a certain contribution level, and above decreasing contributions with in-
creasing average contributions of others). Since we additionally observe a signicant
number of perfect conditional contributors (those who match the average contributions
of others perfectly) and even some unconditional full contributors (contributing the max-
imum amount of ten Tokens regardless of the average contribution of others), we use the
following classication:
• Net-Taker: We classify an employee whose average conditional contribution is sma-
ller than ve Tokens as a Net-Taker. is means that the employee, on average, free-
rides (at least partially) on the contribution of others to the public good (mainly free
15
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riders, conditional cooperators with a self-serving bias10).
• Net-Giver: An employee that contributes more than ve Tokens is dened as a Net-
Giver. e employee, on average, contributes more than the two others (mainly
conditional cooperators with an other-serving bias, unconditional full contribu-
tors).
• Matcher: An employee who, on average, exactly matches the average contribution
of the two other members is considered a Matcher (almost equivalent to perfect
conditional cooperators).11
To make both the unconditional and the conditional contributions incentive-compatible,
we use the mechanisms described in Fischbacher et al. (2001). at is, for one randomly
selected subject the conditional contributions are payo-relevant, whereas for the two
remaining subjects the unconditional contribution is to determine the average contri-
bution of other group members. We also elicit expected contributions of others in an
incentivized way. Following Gächter and Renner (2010), participants are asked to guess
the average unconditional contribution of the other group members and receive AC5 if
they are correct, otherwise they receive AC0.
1.4.2 Survey and Company Variables
Aer the incentivized parts, we elicit additional variables that are relevant for the anal-
ysis of the determinants and the context of cooperation without using monetary incen-
tives. Importantly, we ask whether an employee’s individual and teamwork tasks are
mainly related to the customer or the cloud business model. In addition, we capture
personality traits (a short form of the Big Five; Rammstedt et al. (2013)), and survey mea-
sures of related social preference concepts like negative/positive reciprocity (Falk et al.,
2018) and trust (Anderson et al., 2004). We also elicit a measure of individual competitive
aitude (i.e., the competitiveness index as introduced by Newby and Klein (2014)) and
basic socio-demographic variables (such as nationality, education, and number of kids
and friends). Furthermore, variables with respect to perceived team cohesion (Ashforth
and Mael, 1989), team stability, and work-related stress (Schulz and Schlotz, 1999) are
elicited.12
10ese are conditional cooperators that have an increasing contribution schedule, but they, on average,
contribute less than the average of other members.
11Our main results are robust to using dierent denitions of cooperative aitudes. Details are provided in
the results section and in the Appendix.
12Aer the main public goods game, we also use incentivized coordination games and short social dilemma
vignees to elicit the shared perception of cooperative norms that prevail in the company (compare to
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We combine the elicited data with a rich data set from the company. On the employee
level, this includes age, gender, seniority (years employed at the company), career levels,
and personal leadership responsibilities. Using a work team identier, we can also in-
fer information about team compositions (for example, with respect to gender and age).
Regarding reward institutions, we have individual level information on the employees’
pay scheme, his/her wage level, and the value of nancial award payments. Observing
employees’ wage levels over time allows us to calculate annual wage increases. We addi-
tionally observe the numbers of recognition awards received and sent for each employee.
1.4.3 Procedures
We conducted the described experimental and survey modules online.13 Eligible employ-
ees received a personalized participation link. Every respondent knew that he/she can
complete the experiment within a two-weeks period. ere were two roll-out phases
with dierent employees, the rst in November 2017 and the second in February 2019.
Employees could participate during regular work hours. e total completion of the ex-
periment and the survey took about 30 minutes and could be interrupted at any time.
e online experiment did not require participants to simultaneously make decisions.
Participants were informed that groups were assembled randomly ex post. Since nobody
received feedback during the experiment, such a procedure is equivalent to simultane-
ously entered decisions. Participants could use their personal ID code to login aer the
roll-out phase had ended to get feedback on the results. We asked participants to perform
the online experiment individually. e random and anonymous allocation to groups
made sure that coalition formation among group members when lling in the online ex-
periment was impossible.14
Before a participant could decide about the public good contributions, he/she needed to
answer comprehension questions on the game. If an answer was wrong, the participant
was notied and was shown the correct answer to be re-entered in the respective input
box. We set up a telephone hotline and an e-mail address for potential questions during
Burks and Krupka, 2012). is provides us with a beer understanding of the “cooperative culture” in the
company. For an extensive discussion of these norm elicitations and the respective empirical results refer
to Deversi et al. (2020b).
13Our study represents one of many studies and surveys that employees ll out at the company. e company
even has its’ own survey team. Hence, asking employees to participate in an online study while being at
their workplaces is nothing unusual, although the incentivized experimental part was of course somewhat
special to most employees.
14It was extremely unlikely that (matched) participants would be siing in a shared oce. Analyses of the
participants’ start and end times suggest that there was no communication or coordination of employees
of a work team (for the analysis see Appendix A.3).
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the experiment. We received very few calls and messages.
In the rst roll-out phase in 2017, we implemented an unexpected donation option at the
end of the experiment as a control for social desirability concerns. In 2019, we included an
additional public goods game (administered in a within-subject fashion) that varied the
MPCRs (either very high, 1.2, or very low, 0.3) to check whether participants would react
to changes in the the social dilemma characteristics. Notice that an MPCR of 1.2 makes
it individually optimal to contribute, whereas an MPCR of 0.3 makes it both individually
and social optimal not to contribute.
Individual data from the company was de-identied before linking it to our elicited data.
e data collection and storage were facilitated through altrics. ere exists a data
protection agreement between the company and altrics; and a research agreement
(including data protection) between the company and the research team. Data protection
units at the company, at University of Munich and University of Heidelberg supervised
the study. e company did not receive individual-level data, and all participants were
informed about the full pseudonymization of their responses before the experiment. e
data protection at the company was only to be involved in determining the exact proce-
dures, not in handling the linked data. We made sure that the pseudonymized nal data
set was only stored on the computers of the researchers involved in this project within
university re-walls.
Employees were aware of the data protection procedures and provided informed con-
sent before participating in the study. Ethics approval by the University of Munich was
granted in September 2017. e study was pre-registered at the AEA registry (AEARCTR-
0002596). e respective pre-analysis plan was slightly updated and re-submied before
the second round of experiments took place in 2019.
1.4.4 Sample and Selection
We invited 2,799 employees from 371 work teams to participate in our study.15 is in-
cludes 1,297 employees invited in 2017 and 1,502 employees invited in 2019. We randomly
selected teams that had between 8-20 team members of which more than 70% were based
in the German-speaking area.
15In 2019, we excluded working students and temporarily employed consultants from invitations. Also, in
2017, we slightly oversampled employees from the individual performance pay scheme to have a larger
comparison group. ere was limited record data availability for these employees in 2017. Working stu-
dents and external employees were not eligible to participate in award programs and worked under special
xed wage contracts. Hence, we decided to exclude these groups of employees from the second round of
experiments in 2019.
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Overall, 910 employees from 299 teams participated.16 is corresponds to a participa-
tion rate of about 32.5%. e characteristics of the participating employees are mostly
representative for the employee population at the company (conditional on the invita-
tion requirements) as can be seen in Table 1.1. ere does not seem to be any selec-
tion bias into the experiment based on observable characteristics. However, compared
to non-participating employees, participating employees less frequently work under the
individual performance pay scheme (26% versus 22%). Almost all participating employees
are placed in the German-speaking area (99% versus 98% in the invited sample). We did
not receive wage data for 57 participating employees. ese data were either secret, from
working students or external employees, or were not available to the company’s German
human resources department that we worked with to retrieve the data from the records.
More generally, one might expect sample selection according to the unobserved level of
cooperativeness of employees. Cooperative employees could more frequently volunteer
to participate in surveys/experiments, which could bias our results and interpretations.
First, this is not so much of a concern, given that we are not interested in the level of
cooperation, but in the link between cooperation and company outcomes. Second, as a
robustness check, we show in Section 1.5.2 that given a high correlation between, for
example, recognition award sending and cooperativeness, we do not nd any evidence
for the systematic selection into our experiments based on cooperative aitudes. e
signicant correlates of cooperativeness are statistically indistinguishable between par-
ticipating and non-participating employees.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Cooperative Attitudes
About 24% (N=201) of the employees can be classied as Net-Takers, i.e., they contribute
on average less than ve Tokens (mean of 2.51 Tokens) in the conditional contribution de-
cisions. We classify 35% (N=345) as Net-Givers who contribute on average more than ve
Tokens (mean of 7.23 Tokens). Around 41% (N=364) of the employees exhibit a contribu-
tion paern best described by Matcher behavior, which implies an average contribution
of exactly ve Tokens.17
16We count an employee’s response as a full response if more than 90% of the questions were answered. Here-
with we exclude 414 employees that answered on average only 9.8% of the questions – which corresponds
to the rst screen of the public goods game instructions.
17We observe similar distributions of cooperative aitudes comparing the experimental waves in 2017 and
2019 (Komoglorov-Smirnov Test, p = 1.000). is also holds for the other public goods game variables.
Hence, for the period of our study, we regard the cooperation paern in the company as stable and pool
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Non-Participating Employees Participating Employees
Count Mean SD Count Mean SD P-Value
Socio-Demographics
Female 1889 0.30 0.46 910 0.30 0.46 0.965
Age 1889 45.09 8.95 910 44.48 9.31 0.276
Company Controls
Seniority 1889 14.33 7.34 910 14.03 7.47 0.292
Team Size 1889 13.60 3.54 910 13.78 3.48 0.264
Leader 1889 0.09 0.29 910 0.10 0.30 0.571
Career Level
Low 231 0.12 0.33 111 0.12 0.33 0.993
Medium 1430 0.76 0.43 683 0.75 0.43 0.762
High 228 0.12 0.33 116 0.13 0.33 0.686
Indv. Performance Pay 1772 0.26 0.44 866 0.22 0.41 0.031
German Area 1889 0.98 0.01 910 0.99 0.01 0.041
Outcome Variables
Recognition Awards
Reception 1892 0.29 0.89 910 0.26 0.61 0.823
Sending 1892 0.21 1.51 910 0.22 1.19 0.623
Wage 1779 . . 853 . . 0.217
Wage Increase 1774 0.044 0.078 846 0.045 0.086 0.154
Financial Awards 1774 0.058 0.057 873 0.061 0.055 0.150
N 1889 910
Table 1.1 Sample Selection
Notes: P-values rely on two-sample Mann-Whitney-U tests for continuous variables or χ2-tests for cate-
gorical variables. For reasons of discretion, we do not provide wage level statistics here. However, there
is no signicant dierence in wage levels between participants and non-participants. Career levels sub-
sume several actual categories in each presented category. Financial awards are denominated in percent of
wages.
Table 1.2 presents an overview of the collected public goods measures for each of the three
cooperative types. Overall the unconditional contribution decisions reveal very high co-
operation levels (79% of the endowment), despite the existence of Net-Takers. Net-Takers
contribute signicantly less unconditionally than Matchers and Net-Givers (5.44 versus
8.41 and 8.77, respectively; Mann-Whitney-U (MWU) tests, both p-values < 0.001). ey
also expect lower unconditional contributions from their colleagues (4.54 versus 7.30 and
7.32, respectively; MWU tests, both p-values < 0.001). Dierences between Matchers
and Net-Givers are not statistically signicant (MWU tests; unconditional contributions,
p = 0.876; beliefs, p = 0.436).
Following Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), we estimate each employee’s slope parameter
from a linear regression of the conditional contribution and the contribution schedule.18
the data whenever possible.
18If the slope parameter is equal to 1, all contributions of the employee coincide with the average contribution
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All Net-Takers Matchers Givers
(N=910) (N=201) (N=364) (N=345)
Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd
Unconditional contributions 7.89 2.93 5.44 3.54 8.41 2.58 8.77 1.96
Belief about others’ contributions 6.70 2.78 4.54 2.79 7.30 2.57 7.32 2.34
Mean conditional contribution 5.30 2.25 2.51 1.76 5.00 0.00 7.23 1.77
Slope parameter 0.71 0.43 0.46 0.43 0.95 0.24 0.59 0.45
Table 1.2 Overview of Public Goods Game Variables by Cooperative Aitudes
e average slope parameter is 0.71, which reects a tendency to conditioning own con-
tributions on others’ contributions. e Net-Takers’ average slope parameter equals 0.46
and is lower than the parameters of the other two aitude types (MWU tests, both p-
values < 0.001). While the Matchers’ slope parameter is almost 1 (mean of 0.95), reect-
ing that most of these employees are perfectly conditionally cooperative, the Net-Givers
have a slope parameter of 0.59, which lies between the other two aitude types (MWU
tests, all p-values < 0.001).19
1.5.2 Recognition Awards and Cooperative Attitudes
Figure 1.1 relates the number of received (le) and sent (right) recognition awards per em-
ployee to cooperative aitudes. We observe that Net-Givers act more cooperatively and
are also recognized as such. ey sent more than 2.5 times as many recognition awards
and receive about 40% more than their colleagues (MWU tests, pooling Net-Takers and
Matchers, p = 0.057 and p = 0.039, respectively). e dierence between Net-Givers
and Matchers in sending behavior is statistically signicant (MWU test, p = 0.012), and
the dierence between Net-Givers and Net-Takers in reception levels is as well (MWU
test, p = 0.053).
of the other two group members, i.e., there is a perfect linear relationship between their contribution and
the contributions of the others (perfect conditional cooperation). If the parameter decreases the relationship
becomes weaker, such that a value of 0 means that contributions are independent of the others’ average
contribution.
19In Appendix A.4, we show in more detail how our cooperative aitudes are related to the cooperation types
proposed by Fischbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010). In Appendix A.5, we provide
an extensive multivariate analysis that characterizes cooperative aitudes in terms of the employees’ per-
sonal, behavioral and work-related characteristics. We observe a positive relationship between age and
cooperativeness, and interestingly that female employees are less cooperative than male employees. In
terms of the behavioral survey measures, we document that employees are more likely to be Net-Takers
the more competitive, distrusting, negatively reciprocal, extroverted and neurotic they are. Besides, we
nd that employees in the individual performance pay scheme are more likely Net-Takers than Matchers
as compared to employees in the company performance scheme. ere are no signicant dierences in
the distribution of cooperative aitudes with respect to career levels, leadership responsibility, seniority,
or business model.
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Figure 1.1 Recognition Awards and Cooperative Aitudes
Notes: e graph bar contains data on recognition awards from 2017 for participants in the experiments in
2017 and data from 2018 for participants in 2019. Bars show sample means for each cooperative aitude.
Vertical caps show the 95%-condence interval that is calculated based on a Poisson distribution.
We model the number of received (Rr) and sent (Rs) recognition awards as
E(R(r,i)|Xi) = exp (α + β′(r,1)Ci + β
′
(r,2)Xi + β3yeari) (1.2)
E(R(s,i)|Xi) = exp (α + β′(s,1)Ci + β
′
(s,2)Xi + β3yeari) (1.3)
where C is the vector of dummies for Matchers and Net-Givers using Net-Takers as the
base category. e covariate vector X consists of socio-demographics and company con-
trols, including the career level and job role as dened by the department (e.g. soware
development). e variable year absorbs dierences between 2017 and 2018.
e respective multivariate Poisson regression estimations presented in Table 1.3 are in
line with the preceding non-parametric analyses. Net-Givers receive 51% more awards
and send more than twice as many awards as Net-Takers, when including socio demo-
graphics and company controls (see columns (3) and (6)). Due to relatively low number
of employees sending awards (about 11% sent at least one award), these estimates are
less precise then the estimations for the reception paerns. Notably, we also observe that
Matchers receive and sent signicantly fewer awards than Net-Givers.
We take the comparatively high number of sent recognition awards by Net-Givers as ev-
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# Awards # Awards # Awards # Awards # Awards # Awards
Received Received Received Sent Sent Sent
Net-Taker 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Matchers -0.012 -0.009 -0.060 -0.358 -0.377 -0.445
(0.214) (0.214) (0.224) (0.405) (0.407) (0.388)
Net-Giver 0.403** 0.429** 0.413** 0.807* 0.789* 0.807**
(0.191) (0.194) (0.195) (0.431) (0.433) (0.379)
Constant -1.829*** -1.892*** 24.40** -2.332*** -3.207*** 28.89**
(0.363) (0.504) (10.32) (0.657) (0.878) (13.74)
b[Matchers] p=0.016 p=0.013 p=0.013 p=0.001 p=0.001 p=0.002
- b[Net-Givers]
Socio Demographics X X X X X X
Company Controls X X X** X X X**
Career Dummies X X X*** X X X***
Dep. Dummies X X X*** X X X***
Observations 910 907 842 910 907 842
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.048 0.080 0.056 0.063 0.157
Model Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson
Table 1.3 Regressions of Recognition Awards on Cooperative Aitudes
Notes: Standard errors clustered on team-level in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01;
Asterisks for the control variables show the test result from an F-Test, testing the joint dierence from
zero. Alternative estimations using zero-inated poisson models yield qualitatively very similar results.
idence for the external validity of experimentally elicited cooperation levels. Sending an
award induces a positive externality on a co-worker and requires writing a justication
for the award, i.e., it represents a costly pro-social act similar to public goods game con-
tributions. e externality may involve positive emotions on the recipient’s side, but also
potentially some indirect monetary value. Remember that managers observe awards;
hence, monetary consequences could include nancial awards and merit increases, re-
spectively. Moreover, recognition awards seem to be unrelated to a strong reciprocity
concern as Matchers, who exhibit strong reciprocity through their contribution sched-
ule, receive and send signicantly fewer awards than Net-Givers.
1.5.3 Financial Rewards and Cooperative Attitudes
Figure 1.2 shows the mean annual wage increases and the nancial award allocation
by cooperative aitudes and pay schemes. A similar paern arises for both variables:20
When pooling data from both pay schemes, Net-Takers receive a higher nancial appre-
20e Spearman correlation coecient between wage increases and nancial awards is rather weak at 0.081,
but still statistically dierent from zero at the 5% level (p = 0.019).
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Figure 1.2 Financial Rewards and Cooperative Aitudes
Notes: Bars show sample means for each cooperative aitude. Vertical caps show the 95%-condence in-
terval that is calculated based on a standard normal distribution. (Top) e graph bars contains data from
2016-2018 for participating employees. (Boom) e graph bars contain data from 2017 for all participating
employees.
ciation than their colleagues (MWU tests, wage increases, p < 0.001; nancial awards,
p = 0.077). Focusing only on company performance pay, we detect no heterogene-
ity with respect to cooperative aitudes (MWU tests, lowest p-value= 0.534). Focus-
ing only on individual performance pay, Net-Takers receive signicantly higher nan-
cial rewards than other employees (MWU tests, pooled, for both outcomes p < 0.001).
is also holds when comparing Net-Takers with Net-Givers (MWU tests, wage increase,
p < 0.001; nancial awards, p = 0.009) and Matchers separately (MWU tests, wage
increase, p = 0.037; nancial awards, p < 0.001).
We model the nancial appreciation variables using linear regressions. Wage increases
( wtwt−1 ) are measured in percent of the base year (either 2016 or 2017 depending on the
year of participation). Financial award payments ( f ) are measured in percent of the wage
in 2017. (
wt
wt−1
)
= α + β′(1Ci + β
′
2Xi + β3yeari + εi (1.4)(
f
w2017
)
= α + β′1Ci + β
′
2Xi + εi (1.5)
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In model (4), we use the same covariates as described in model (2).21 In model (5), we
drop year dummies as we include data on nancial award payments from 2017 only.
Table 1.4 shows estimated coecients from OLS regression models. Columns (2) and
(6) contain estimated dierences between cooperative aitudes, while controlling for
socio-demographic and company covariates. We observe that Net-Givers’ wage increases
are 29% (1.5%-points) and nancial award payments are 15% (1%-point) lower than Net-
Takers’ appreciation, respectively. As already suggested by Figure 1.2, this dierence is
only relevant in the individual performance pay scheme. Here, Net-Givers receive about
48% (4.4%-points) lower wage increases and 32% (2.7%-points) lower nancial award pay-
ments than Net-Takers (see columns (4) and (8), respectively). We observe no dierential
nancial appreciation between Matchers and Net-Givers and no dierences in the com-
pany performance pay scheme.
One can also look at whether cooperative aitudes and observables determine wage lev-
els instead of wage increases. e results of the analysis are provided in Appendix A.8.
Controlling for relevant Career and Department Dummies as well as socio-demographic
and company control variables, only age is a signicant determinant of overall wage lev-
els. ere is no signicant interaction eect with the incentive scheme, either. Obviously,
short-term changes in the wage levels are much more responsive to cooperative aitudes.
We know that these variations might change with age, with incentive schemes, and with
other inuences. Together with potential long-term selection eects into dierent ar-
eas or jobs within and outside the company and leveling eects of collective bargaining
agreements over time that maer for the overall wage levels, regressions that use wage
levels as dependent variable are probably not that informative for our setup. Hence, the
results based on wage levels should be interpreted carefully; we would have needed a
much more exible wage determination environment (e.g., top-level management) to de-
tect a potential relationship between cooperative aitudes and wage levels.
1.6 Analysis of Potential Mechanisms
How can a company achieve high levels of cooperation despite nancial disincentives
to cooperate? According to Rosen (1986), teamwork at the workplace (and cooperation)
involves other, non-nancial returns for employees such as less boring work or hedonic
benets from social interaction. In the context of our study, such non-nancial returns
(e.g. measured by the number of received recognition awards) are likely to act as equaliz-
21In Appendix A.7, we include the change in part-time shares for years 2016/2017 and 2017/2018 as a co-
variate for wage increases. is allows us to control for employees that moved to parental leave or partial
retirement during the period of our study. e results remain largely robust.
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ing or compensating dierentials against the nancial disincentives that may arise from
cooperation when wage increases or merit-based awards are lower than for those who
cooperate less.
In the following, we consider this mechanism and further plausible mechanisms that may
be prima facie in line with our main results. In discussing alternative mechanisms, we
do not necessarily assume that our three main results, (i) high cooperation levels, (ii) a
negative nexus between cooperative aitudes and nancial rewards, and (iii) a positive
nexus between cooperative aitudes and non-nancial outcomes, are connected. Obvi-
ously, only exogenous variation in some variables can provide a nal answer on the sole
driver of our results. However, some variables will never be varied exogenously in a
meaningful way such as wage levels or wage increases. ere is always a tradeo be-
tween searching under the lamppost (and accepting that one studies very special setups
that allow for exogenous variation) or using real-world environments that limit opportu-
nities to exogenous variation. Nonetheless, we can provide heterogeneity analyses and
robustness checks to shed light on the potential relevance of various mechanisms for our
seing and for being in line with our main results.
1.6.1 High Levels of Cooperation
Our measures of cooperation are qualitatively comparable to the standard conditional
contribution paerns documented in the behavioral economics literature; yet they ap-
pear higher (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010; Kocher et al.,
2015).22 To what extent cooperation rates in our seing reect a general high level of
cooperativeness of employees or rather a stronger role of a potential social desirability
bias in our setup is a question that deserves further aention.
Within the framework of our study, we implemented an unexpected option to donate the
experimental income at the end of the experiment in 2017. Participants could choose be-
tween receiving their income from the experiments in their personal bank account and
donating it to one of ve charities of their choice. At this point, participants did not know
their income yet. We nd a positive but insignicant relationship between donations and
22With respect to other non-student samples, Charness and Villeval (2009) observes that employees in the
manufacturing industry contributed between 32% and 38% of their endowment to a three-person public
good. Another example is Burks et al. (2016), who classify 24% of truck drivers in the same company as
free-riders using a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Algan et al. (2013, 2014) conducted public goods games with
programmers at Sourceforge.net (an open source soware platform) and users that contribute to Wikipedia,
respectively. In both samples, subjects have already selected in a voluntary contribution platform; still,
they are less cooperative, on average, than employees in our company (the 850 Sourceforge.net users un-
conditionally contribute 64% of their 10 tokens; the 1,194 Wikipedia users are less likely unconditional
contributors and more likely free-riders than employees in our seing).
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Donation Donation Donation Donation
Uncond. Contribution 0.0235
(0.0205)
Belief About Others’ -0.00976
Uncond. Contribution (0.0213)
Mean Cond. Contribution 0.0290
(0.0275)
Net-Taker 0
(.)
Matcher 0.156
(0.160)
Net-Giver 0.259
(0.161)
Constant -0.283 -0.0318 -0.250 -0.259**
(0.173) (0.155) (0.157) (0.128)
N 438 438 438 438
Pseudo R2 0.002 0.0003 0.002 0.004
Model Probit Probit Probit Probit
Table 1.5 Regressions of Donations on Public Goods Game Measures
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions are based on employees participating in the
experiments in 2017; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
our public goods game variables (contributions and more cooperative types). is holds
regardless of whether we use unconditional, conditional contributions or cooperative at-
titudes as regressors (see Table 1.5). us, donations seem to draw on a distinct concept
than cooperative aitudes and cooperation. We consider this suggestive evidence that
social desirability is not too much of an issue in our setup. Donation behavior (or dicta-
tor game giving more generally) is oen thought of as being heavily aected by social
desirability concerns. If cooperation in the public goods game was aected by social de-
sirability concerns as well, we would observe a signicantly positive correlation between
the two sets of decisions.
In 2019, we implemented an additional public goods game aer the main experiment in
which the MPCR was set to either 0.3 or 1.2. Participants that are driven by social de-
sirability concerns should be less likely to adjust their unconditional contribution to the
reduction in the MPCR from 0.5 to 0.3, because they might want to signal cooperativeness.
Responses to the increase of the MPCR to 1.2 should reect mainly a sound understand-
ing of the game’s incentives. We elicited unconditional contributions, beliefs, and con-
ditional contribution schedules for both alternative MPCRs, using the strategy method.
We observe strong reactions to the two variations. Subjects signicantly decrease uncon-
ditional contributions, beliefs, and conditional contributions when the MPCR decreases
to 0.3 (means: 3.71, 2.91, 3.82, respectively, using Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks tests in com-
parison to the standard MPCR of 0.5; all p-values< 0.001). e reverse happens when
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the MPCR increases to 1.2 (8.82, 8.53, 8.37, respectively, using Wilcoxon Signed-Ranks
tests in comparison to the standard MPCR of 0.5 all p-values< 0.001). We conclude that
neither social desirability nor confusion are convincing explanations for the high levels
of cooperation that we observe.
1.6.2 Negative Nexus Between Cooperative Attitudes and Finan-
cial Rewards
Following Bowles et al. (2001) and Barr and Serneels (2009), the correlation between co-
operative aitudes and nancial rewards could also be explained by an omied variable
bias with respect to skills that are specic to cooperative aitudes and related to per-
formance dierences. For example, Net-Givers could have a comparative advantage in
networking or socializing and Net-Takers could be more strategically sophisticated. Ta-
ble 1.6 shows OLS regressions of nancial rewards on cooperative aitudes estimated
for the two business models that exist in the company. As cooperation is more impor-
tant in cloud-related jobs, we expect Net-Givers to perform beer than Net-Takers in
such jobs and thus receive higher wage increases or nancial awards. However, Net-
Takers receive signicantly higher nancial rewards than Net-Givers and Matchers (see
columns (1) and (2) and column (5) and (6), respectively). is relationship does not exist
in customer-related jobs (see columns (3) and (4) and columns (7) and (8), respectively).
us, even if Net-Givers work on tasks with complementarities for which they should
have the more appropriate cooperative aitude, Net-Takers get 2.1%-points higher annual
wage increases and 2.5%-points higher award payments. e result indicates that there
are no strong comparative skill and performance dierences between aitudes; however,
it might still be the case that Net-Takers have an absolute skill advantage. However, this
would require Net-Takers, i.e. less pro-social types, to have, in general, higher levels of
skill.
Another potential mechanism could be related to selection based on cooperative aitudes.
Net-Takers could select into jobs with higher nancial rewards, while Net-Givers could
select into jobs with higher non-nancial rewards (Falk and Heckman, 2009; Dohmen
and Falk, 2011). Conversely, along the lines of Bowles (1998) and Levi and List (2007),
nancial and non-nancial rewards could also shape cooperative aitudes. Pay scheme
specic norms could render selsh behavior in the individual performance scheme and
pro-social behavior in the company performance scheme more appropriate and hence
employees that comply with the norm get nancially rewarded.
In line with both explanations, Appendix A.5 shows that employees in the individual per-
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formance pay scheme are signicantly more likely to be Net-Takers than employees in
the company performance pay, which goes with conventional wisdom. Individual per-
formance incentives do not foster pro-self behavior or they do not seem to aract more
pro-social employees. Also, our survey analysis conrms that employees in the individual
performance pay consider cooperation to be less important to fulll their tasks success-
fully. If this observation is due to the idea that incentives shape preferences, we would
expect that employees who already work for several years in the company and presum-
ably in the same pay scheme exhibit pay scheme specic norms more strongly. us, we
expect that employees get less cooperative the longer they work in the individual perfor-
mance pay scheme. Table 1.7 shows results from an OLS regression assessing the eect of
seniority on the relationship between cooperative aitudes and pay schemes. While the
signicant dierence in mean conditional contributions between pay schemes remains,
we nd no signicant interaction eect with seniority. is evidence suggests that there
is a potentially stronger role for selection.
Mean Cond.
Contribution
Ind. Perf. Pay -0.906**
(0.407)
Seniority 0.012
(0.0172)
Ind. Perf. Pay * -0.003
Seniority (0.0280)
Age 0.006
(0.0131)
Stability 0.037
(0.127)
Constant 4.704***
(0.804)
Socio-Demographics X
Company Controls X
Career Dummies X
Dept. Dummies X
Observations 857
R2 0.036
Model OLS
Table 1.7 Regressions of Cond. Contributions on Pay Schemes and Seniority
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Asterisks for the
control variables would show the test result from a F-Test, testing the joint dierence from zero. For none
of the variables the joint dierence from zero can be rejected at conventional signicance values. e
variable stability capture the employee’s feeling of team stability that incorporate a survey item on how
long the employee works in his/her job function and hence pay scheme.
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1.6.3 Positive Nexus Between Cooperative Attitudes and Non-Fin-
ancial Rewards
We observe that the positive relationship between cooperative aitudes and sending
awards appears widely insusceptible to context factors like pay schemes and business
models. Based on simple regression similar to those used in Table 1.3, we observe that
Net-Givers send signicantly more recognition awards than their colleagues in the cloud
(means per employee: 0.32 versus 0.12, p = 0.085) and the customer business model
(means per employee: 0.65 versus 0.13, p = 0.002) as well as in the company performance
pay scheme (0.41 per employee versus 0.13 per employee, p = 0.004). We also observe a
similar paern in the individual performance pay scheme that is however not statistically
signicant; admiedly, there is a relatively small sample size for this comparison (0.27 per
employee versus 0.19 per employee, p = 0.492). e existence of the relationship across
dierent company contexts suggests a more general link between recognition awards and
cooperative aitudes, corroborating our external validity argument.
At the same time, we observe strong dierences in reception rates between context fac-
tors. We nd that reception rates are generally higher in the cloud model than in the
customer-based model (0.31 per employee versus 0.21 per employee; p = 0.046) and in
the company performance pay versus the individual performance pay (0.30 per employee
versus 0.16 per employee; p = 0.023). is indicates that the recognition tool is used
more frequently in areas in which teamwork and cooperation is required.
In our post-experimental survey, we elicit further variables that may relate to non-nancial
rewards or non-nancial costs of cooperation. On the individual level, we capture work-
related stress and overall work satisfaction. While our stress measure appears to be unre-
lated to conditional contributions (Spearman Correlation= -0.098, p = 0.438), we observe
a strong positive correlation between cooperativeness of employees and work satisfac-
tion (Spearman Correlation= 0.916, p = 0.014) that is robust to including personal and
company controls. On the team-level, we measure perceived team cohesion and team
stability. In Appendix A.9, we show that there exists no statistically relevant relationship
between team stability and the share of Net-Givers in a team, but teams that perceive
themselves as being more cohesive tend to consist of more Net-Givers.
1.7 Conclusion
is chapter provides novel evidence on how cooperative aitudes of employees are re-
lated to professional behavior and rewards within a large company. We observe high
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levels of cooperation among employees and evidence on the external validity of our ex-
perimental measure of cooperative aitudes for the company seing. In addition, we
document a robust negative nexus between cooperative aitudes and nancial apprecia-
tion, and a positive nexus between cooperative aitudes and non-nancial rewards.
In line with a recent literature that emphasizes the intrinsic nature of cooperation (e.g.,
Hamilton et al., 2003; Bandiera et al., 2005, 2011, 2013; Ru and Fehr, 2014) our analyses
suggest that the company studied here positively aects levels of cooperation – despite
nancial disincentives for cooperators – through providing cooperative employees with
non-nancial compensations. We also document a potential role of selection based on
cooperative aitudes in pay schemes similar to Burks et al. (2009).
Our ndings have implications for the optimal design of incentives and management
practices in companies that want to foster cooperation. A general implication is that
companies should create a work context that allows non-monetary forms of rewards as
values for cooperation to unfold. is might entail the opportunity for employees to
voluntarily select into dierently composed teams or work organizations, or the selection
into organizational units with dierent cooperative cultures (Kosfeld and Von Siemens,
2011). At the same time, our ndings stress the importance of management practices
that operationalize the non-monetary returns of cooperation (like the recognition award
systems used in our company).
We see our study as a rst step and encourage other researchers to study cooperation
in corporations as well. Obviously, we have no way to take rm conclusions regarding
company-specic and more general results, given that our focus is on one company. It
might well be that the specic interplay between incentives and culture at our company
is dierent than in other companies. It might well be that the industry that our com-
pany is operating in has specic characteristics in terms of how cooperation is rewarded.
Given the importance of cooperation in teamwork, it is astonishing that there is not more
research empirically addressing the relationship between corporate culture, nancial and
non-nancial rewards, and cooperation within the company. Although we believe that
the gist of our results will hold more generally, given its systematic paern, our results
at the very least provide a proof of concept: e experimentally elicited measures on co-
operation are systematically related to outcomes in the company. Our tests for external
validity provide promising results.
We have searched for evidence outside the light of a lamppost, in contrast to some other
studies that use more articial designs in the wild to get more powerful inference. Both
approaches seem useful. Next to understanding the causal mechanisms underlying our
ndings, a deeper understanding of the nature of the relationship between nancial and
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non-nancial incentives for cooperative behavior in organizations is required. Can nan-
cial and non-nancial incentives work as substitutes on the individual employee level and,
at the same time, work as complements when regarding the company’s prots? How can
the optimal mix of nancial and non-nancial incentives be characterized? More research
is needed to empirically understand the optimal balance between cooperation-enhancing
and competition-enhancing policies within organizations, probably dependent on coop-
eration culture and workforce composition.
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Cooperation, Free-Riding, and the
Signaling Value of Incentives: An
Experiment in a Company
2.1 Introduction
Complementarities in production render cooperation among employees important for
companies (e.g., Dirks and Ferrin, 2001; Graon, 2009). At the same time, they cause
free-rider problems due to a misalignment of individual prots and collective eciency
(e.g., Giell, 2000; Fehr, 2018). Using monetary incentives is a prevalent strategy of com-
panies to cope with such conict, but their eectiveness is still at debate.1 Recent research
points out that incentives can induce unintended side eects that eventually impede their
original purpose (Gneezy et al., 2011; Bowles and Polanı́a-Reyes, 2012).
One eect that is of particular relevance for the context of cooperation is that incentives
convey information about typical behavior of others (e.g., Sliwka, 2007; Van der Weele,
2012; Bénabou and Tirole, 2011). A manager who introduces incentives to cooperate may
signal that employees would act selshly otherwise. As a result, employees may expect
less cooperative behavior from their colleagues and, in line with evidence on conditional
cooperation (Fischbacher et al., 2001), cooperate less themselves.2 Evidence from the lab-
1Examples include the introduction of manager guidelines that outline cooperative behavior as a require-
ment for promotion and salary increases, or the provision of peer-to-peer recognition tools in which em-
ployees can confer monetary awards to cooperative colleagues. See Graon (2009) and www.blog.bonus.
ly/a-look-at-googles-peer-to-peer-bonus-system for a description of how Google and British
Petroleum implement these tools.
2e term “conditional cooperation” describes that people cooperate if they believe that others cooperate as
well. ere exists ample evidence about the prevalence of conditional cooperators in various samples (e.g.,
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oratory suggests that employees potentially understand the signaling value of incentives
(e.g., Galbiati et al., 2013), but eld evidence is largely missing.
Studying the signaling value of incentives within companies is however dicult. Incen-
tives and information about cooperative behavior held by managers are endogenous, and
whether such information is available to managers might be unknown to employees. is
study exploits a unique eld environment that combines three very rare features that al-
low to overcome these issues. First, it allows for exogenous variation in information
(about the cooperativeness of employees) held by managers when choosing incentives.
Second, employees are well aware of the fact that cooperativeness measures exist. ird,
employees also know whether such measures are (or are not) available to managers when
seing incentives.
I collaborate with a large soware company that relies heavily on cooperative behavior of
their employees and seeks to provide incentives to encourage the laer. To study whether
incentives work as signaling devices, I conduct an artefactual eld experiment (Harrison
and List, 2004) with managers and employees from the company. Employees nd them-
selves in a social dilemma situation in which they have a dominant strategy to free-ride
on the cooperative eorts of their colleagues. Managers benet from high cooperation
levels among employees and can counter free-riding by implementing a costly incentive
that promotes cooperation. Prior to incentive choice, I exogenously vary whether man-
agers are informed about prevailing cooperation levels among employees measured in
a previous study (Deversi et al., 2020a). At the same time, I notify employees that their
manager has been informed before seing incentives. By comparing beliefs and behavior
of employees under informed versus uninformed incentive choices, I am able to isolate
whether the information provided to managers transmits to employees and hence aects
the company’s cooperative culture.
I nd that incentives have strong positive eects on cooperation. ey increase coopera-
tion rates by 24%, and beliefs about cooperative behavior of those working under incen-
tives by 44%. I do not observe dierential increases between the information treatments,
neither in beliefs nor in actual behavior. is indicates that employees do not take into
account the information conveyed by the managers’ incentive choices. Unlike employees,
managers react to the information that is made available to them. In the treatment group,
they update their beliefs and, in line with maximizing their prots, choose incentives to
increase cooperation less frequently.
It appears that the absence of a signaling eect is driven by the employees’ misperception
Gächter, 2007; Kocher et al., 2008).
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of the managers’ decision-making. Employees do not expect managers to choose incen-
tives based on their monetary benets. Instead, they consider managers more likely to
choose incentives when managers expect higher levels of cooperation. Hence, employees
appear to interpret managers’ choices to “reward” cooperation through incentive provi-
sion. An interpretation that relates to an important contextual factor for the eectiveness
of incentives: the general relationship between management and employees.
My ndings relate to a large inuential literature in economics and management science
dealing with the interaction of incentives and social preferences (for a review, see Bowles
and Polanı́a-Reyes, 2012). According to this literature, incentives can crowd out proso-
cial behavior because they provide information about the person who sets the incentive,
such as selsh intentions (e.g., Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; Fehr and List, 2004) or his or
her knowledge about the task (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2003; Bremzen et al., 2015; De-
serranno, 2019). Another channel to which this literature has alluded to is the signaling
of principals’ private information about social norms. In the experimental laboratory,
Danilov and Sliwka (2017) investigate shirking behavior of agents that work on individ-
ual tasks under either xed or variable pay contracts. ey nd an increase in agents’
trustworthiness when the principal is informed about past eort provision and refrains
from implementing a variable pay contract. Cardinaels and Yin (2015) show that the use
of incentives to increase truthful behavior in a reporting task signals that other agents
were likely to report dishonestly before. Both studies dier from my design by analyzing
individual decisions rather than interactions of multiple agents.3 Galbiati et al. (2013)
use a two-agent minimum eort game and vary whether sanctions are endogenously set
by an informed principal or exogenously set by the experimenter. ey nd that en-
dogenous sanctions are more eective in enforcing high eort because they signal high
eort provision in past rounds. My study makes a relevant contribution to this literature
by providing a unique, naturally occurring test environment of signaling eects and their
predicted adverse impact on cooperation. My results on the signaling hypothesis are par-
ticularly informative because they give rise to important contextual factors that render
signaling and crowding out eects more or less likely to occur.
e remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. I rst introduce the experimental
design by describing my eld seing and the experimental game. en, I present the
results in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, I discuss potential explanations for the absence of
the hypothesized signaling eect in my seing. Section 2.5 concludes this chapter.
3is implies that in both studies information about prevalent behaviors must aect agents’ behavior via
conformity preferences (Sliwka, 2007) or social esteem (Bénabou and Tirole, 2011) of agents, rather than
trough reciprocity (Van der Weele, 2012) or eort complementarities (Friebel and Schnedler, 2011) as in my
seing.
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2.2 Experimental Design
2.2.1 Field Setting
is study is conducted in partnership with a large soware company. In most tasks
within the company - reaching from soware development, consulting, sales to service
activities (e.g., human resource management) - cooperation is essential to maximize joint
production output of work teams.4
e management of the company conducted a study to measure the prevailing levels of
cooperation and to subsequently establish new policies that enhance cooperation. is
study is described by Deversi et al. (2020a). It entailed a one-shot, three-person public
goods experiment in which a total of 369 employees participated.5 e data revealed
high levels of cooperation (on average 79% of the endowment) and high expectations
about others’ cooperation behavior (on average 66% of the endowment) that were how-
ever signicantly lower than actual cooperation rates. Further, about 82% of company
employees were conditional cooperators which emphasizes the relevance of beliefs about
others’ behavior for cooperation in the company. Both results together indicate a signi-
cant room for signaling eects to adversely aect the cooperative culture of the company.
If the management was to implement incentives without informing employees about the
results of Deversi et al. (2020a), employees might infer that measured cooperation levels
were low. e experiment of the current study takes place aer the previous study, but
before managers and employees have been informed about the ndings.
2.2.2 Experimental Game
In the experiment, three randomly grouped employees (n = 3) play a public goods game.
Each employee receives an initial endowment of 10 Tokens (worth AC 10) to be allocated
between a private account and a common account. e amount contributed to the com-
mon account is an integer that satises 0 ≤ ci ≤ 10. e sum of contributions to the
common account is multiplied by 1.5 and then divided equally among the three group
members. erefore, each individual group member receives a share of γ = 0.5 of the
total sum of contributions.
4For more detailed information on the company see Deversi et al. (2020a).
5e authors use a linear public goods game - also known as voluntary contribution mechanism. e in-
centives of the game capture a tension between individual payo mazimization and collective eciency
maximization. In the game each player has a dominat strategy to free-ride on others’ contributions to
a public good, deviations from this strategy are usually interpreted as cooperative behavior or as a social
preference more generally (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002).
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In addition, I match one manager to each group of employees. ey earn a xed amount
of 15 Tokens (worthAC 15) and a share of γ = 0.5 from the sum of contributions. ey can-
not contribute. Before employees act, managers decide whether to implement a monetary
incentive to make employees cooperate (termed Additional Payment in the instructions).
If the incentive is chosen, the employee with the highest contribution in the common ac-
count receives an additional payment of three tokens.6 Seing the incentive to cooperate
(a = 1) costs 5 Tokens.
e payo functions of employee i and manager m can be described as follows.
πi = 10− ci + γ
n
∑
j=1
cj + a× (1{ci > c−i})× 3 (2.1)
πm = 15 + γ
n
∑
j=1
cj − a× 5. (2.2)
where c−i is the contribution vector of the other two group members.
If the incentive is not implemented (a = 0), the standard social dilemma equilibrium
arises as 1/n < γ < 1, i.e., it is welfare-ecient if each member contributed his or her
whole endowment but individually optimal to contribute ci = 0. If the incentive is im-
plemented (a = 1), the dominant strategy depends on the expectation about others’ con-
tributions. For expected average contributions E(c−i) ∈ [0, 5), it is payo-maximizing
to contribute k = min{n ∈ N |n > E(c−i)}, i.e., the minimal integer higher than
E(c−i). For E(c−i) = 5, the employee is indierent between free-riding or contributing
5. For E(c−i) > 5, the social dilemma equilibrium emerges again. Overall, the incen-
tive increases the expected payo from contributing into the common account without
aecting the action space of players.
From the managers’ perspective, implementing the incentive can only be payo maximiz-
ing if the expected sum of contributions without the incentive is lower than 20 Tokens
(i.e., 6.67 Tokens per employee). In order for the cost of the incentive to pay o, each
group member must increase contributions in response to the incentive by at least 3.33
Tokens.7
6e tie-breaking rule is specied such that the three tokens are evenly distributed among the participants
that contributed the highest amount. I focus on this particular incentive because it is a policy that the
management discussed to implement aer conducting the analyses in Deversi et al. (2020a). e idea was to
introduce a tournament incentive that rewards the employee with the highest number of received peer-to-
peer recognition awards that can be sent in the companies intranet. Similar relative rewards for cooperation
have been analyzed by Irlenbusch and Ruchala (2008).
7To see this, I compare the manager’s payos πm(a = 1)− πm(a = 0) = γE[∑ cj(a = 1)− ∑ cj(a =
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For both choices of the manager (i.e., using the strategy method), I elicit three decisions
from the employees. First, I elicit their contribution in the common account (uncondi-
tional contribution). Second, I ask for their contributions if the other group members
contributed on average 0/1/2/…/10 (conditional contributions). For one randomly selected
subject in the group the conditional contributions are payo-relevant, whereas for the
two remaining subjects the unconditional contribution is. is ensures that both uncon-
ditional and conditional contribution decisions are incentive-compatible. ird, I elicit
their belief about the average unconditional contribution of the other two players (be-
lief ). Following Gächter and Renner (2010), employees receive AC5 if they hit the correct
average, and AC0 otherwise.
Finally, I ask two further questions that capture employees’ beliefs about managers’ in-
centive choice and their beliefs about managers’ expectation about contribution behavior
of employees. Both questions are incentivized by providing AC1.5 for a correct response.
A full list of elicited variables, including additional survey variables, can be found in Ap-
pendix B.1.
2.2.3 Treatments and Hypotheses
e critical feature of my experiment is the information structure. Generally, there exists
uncertainty about employees’ behavior in the game. I provide information on average
unconditional contributions measured by Deversi et al. (2020a) to managers in Info, but
not in No Info. Prior to incentive choice, they receive the following information.
“Tip for you as a manager: 369 employees have already made their decision to
allocate the 10 tokens between the private account and the common account.
ere was no additional payment for these decisions in place. On average, 2.10
Tokens were paid into the private account and 7.90 Tokens into the common
account.”
On the employee side, the instructions in Info entailed the following statement.8
“What does the manager know before making a decision? e manager received
information about the average contribution decision of 369 other employees.
0)]− 5 ≥ 0. Re-formulation yields E[∑ cj(a = 1)]− E[∑ cj(a = 0)] ≥ 10, hence, 103 per group member.
In addition, as max E[∑ cj(a = 1)] = 30, this yields an upper bound for the expected sum of contributions
without the incentive, i.e., E[∑ cj(a = 0)] = 20.
8For employees in Info, the treatment information was referred to three times: once in the main instruction
text, once on a summary screen with the most important aspects in bullet points, and another time in the
comprehension tasks section where I asked a question on whether the manager has been informed.
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ese employees have already decided on the allocation of the 10 tokens between
the private account and the common account. ere was no additional payment
for these decisions in place.”
Within Subject
No Incentive Incentive
Between
Subject
No Info 205 employees & 23 managers
Info 196 employees & 24 managers
Table 2.1 Treatment Overview
Table 1 summarizes the design. It enables me to observe beliefs and cooperation of em-
ployees under dierent information sets of the managers while holding incentive choices
constant. To derive testable predictions, I assume that both players update their beliefs in
a Bayesian fashion and that managers are individual payo-maximizers whereas employ-
ees are either individual payo-maximizers as well or conditionally cooperative. Condi-
tional cooperators contribute to the common account if they believe that others con-
tribute as well.
Under these assumptions, managers should update their prior beliefs according to the
average contribution rate provided to them in the information condition. ey should
respond to this belief update by choosing the incentive less frequently as measured con-
tribution rates are higher than the critical threshold for choosing the incentives (7.90
Tokens > 6.67 Tokens).
Hypothesis 1: On average, managers update their beliefs according to the information
provided and select the costly incentive less frequently in Info than in No Info.
9
e incentive should steer selsh employees away from free-riding. is should render
employees’ beliefs in others’ cooperativeness more optimistic and further enhance con-
tributions of conditional cooperators.
Hypothesis 2: On average, employees’ beliefs about others’ contributions and actual con-
tributions are higher in Incentive/No Info than in No Incentive/No Info.
Consider employees’ responses in No Incentive/Info versus No Incentive/No Info.
Here, a manager decided not to intervene and the public goods game is played without
the incentive to cooperate. In the Info treatment such choice reects that contribution
levels observed by the manager have been suciently high, as otherwise it would have
9ere also is a equilibrium eect at work such that managers anticipate signaling eects from their incentive
choices and hence choose the incentive even less frequently.
41
Cooperation, Free-Riding, and the Signaling Value of Incentives
been worth to incur the cost to implement the incentive. Conversely, Incentive/No Info
versus Incentive/Info should reect the information that contribution levels observed
by the manager have been suciently low, such that it was worth it to incur the cost to
implement the incentive.10 ese belief updates should aect contribution behavior to
the extent that employees are conditionally cooperative.
Hypothesis 3: On average, employees’ beliefs are more optimistic in No Incentive/Info
compared to No Incentive/No Info and more pessimistic in Incentive/Info compared to
Incentive/No Info.
Hypothesis 4: On average, employees’ contributions are higher inNo Incentive/Info com-
pared to No Incentive/No Info and lower in Incentive/Info compared to Incentive/No
Info if they are conditionally cooperative.
2.2.4 Procedures
is study is part of a larger research agenda taking place in the company such that
the experimental procedures that I used are identical to those described in Deversi et
al. (2020a). Participants were randomly selected from a large population of employees
eligible to participate in experiments that were taking place at the same time.
I conducted the experiment in spring 2019 using the soware altrics.11 Potential partic-
ipants were invited via e-mail and participated through a personalized link. Participation
took place in a two-week time period. Payout calculations and matching of managers and
employees were administered ex post. While there was no feedback during the experi-
ment, participants received payo information aerwards via a website created solely
for this purpose. I asked participants to perform all experimental tasks individually and
groups were randomly allocated to avoid coalition formation. A double-blind data pro-
cedure ensured the anonymity of all managers and employees. Approval of the ethics
commiee at the University of Munich has been granted in January 2019 and my analy-
ses have been pre-registered at the AEA RCT registry (AEARCTR-0003931).
10e manager’s actual decision threshold might be lower, depending on managers’ beliefs and reciprocity
preferences of employees (see Van der Weele, 2012), the upward containment is however unaected by
these other aspects. Hence, I expect employees to infer the positioning of the observed contribution levels
relative to the upper threshold from managers decisions which implies that the empirical distribution of
beliefs should shi.
11e instructions can be found in Appendix B.2.
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Managers Employees
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Female 0.40 0.50 0.33 0.47
Age 43.96 10.05 36.15 8.35
Seniority 11.73 6.97 5.08 3.89
Education
Highschool 0.06 0.25 0.10 0.30
Bachelor 0.04 0.21 0.14 0.35
Master 0.63 0.49 0.60 0.49
Ph.D. 0.21 0.41 0.12 0.32
Other 0.06 0.25 0.04 0.19
Performance Pay
Company 0.70 0.46
Individual 0.30 0.46
Observations 47 401
Table 2.2 Participants’ Characteristics
2.2.5 Sample Characteristics
I invited 1,500 managers and employees to participate in the experiment. A total of 48
managers and 401 employees participated which corresponds to a participation rate of
30%. Table 2.2 shows the sample characteristics.12 Participating managers and employ-
ees are highly educated (only less than 14% have no post-secondary education). ere
are 19 female managers (40%) and 132 female employees (33%). Managers are on average
44 years old and work in the company for almost 12 years. Employees are on average 36
years old and work in the company for around 5 years. Furthermore, 70% of employees
work under a company performance pay scheme in which bonuses depend on the com-
pany’s asset market performance. e other 30% work under an individual performance
scheme in which they receive bonuses based on individual target achievement. Many
managers, especially those high in the hierarchy, have special contracts that can not be
assigned to either of these schemes.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Managers
A general prerequisite for a signaling eect is that managers react to the information
treatment. Figure 2.1 shows the cumulative distribution function of the deviation be-
tween the managers’ expectation and the average contribution level provided in Info. It
becomes clear that managers hold heterogeneous beliefs in No Info that dier substan-
12e balance table is provided in Appendix B.3.
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Figure 2.1 Treatment Eects on Managers’ Posterior Beliefs
Notes: e graph shows the cumulative distribution functions of the absolute dierence between man-
agers’ posterior beliefs about employees’ contributions without the incentive in place and the measured
contribution rate in Deversi et al. (2020a) by treatment.
tially from the provided average, and that managers in the information condition adjust
their priors accordingly. Almost 80% of managers in Info deviate not more than one To-
ken from the provided average value, whereas 20% hold such beliefs in No Info. Hence,
a Mann-Whitney U Test (MWU) rejects that beliefs in both conditions are from the same
underlying distribution (p = 0.001). is belief update should induce less selection of
the incentive for prot-maximizing managers. And indeed, I observe that managers select
the costly incentive less frequently in Info than in No Info (71% versus 91%). However,
as I observe only 47 managers’ decisions, this dierence is only marginally statistically
signicant (MWU, p = 0.078; or one-sided Fisher Exact test, p = 0.078).
Result 1: Managers’ beliefs are signicantly closer to the measured contribution rates in
Info than in No Info, and managers select the incentive less oen in Info than in No Info.
2.3.2 Employees
As described in my hypotheses, beliefs about others’ contributions are a crucial indicator
for the mechanisms driving potential eects in the incentive and information conditions.
Figure 2.2 presents the respective treatment comparisons. Beliefs about others’ uncon-
ditional contributions are higher when the manager selected the incentive as compared
to when it was not selected (7.5 Tokens versus 5.2 Tokens; Wilcoxon Signed-rank Tests
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Figure 2.2 Treatment Eects on Employees’ Beliefs
Notes: Bars show the average belief of employees about the unconditional contribution decision of the other
group members. e 95% condence intervals are based on a standard normal distribution.
(WSR), p< 0.001). is dierence is also statistically signicant when tested in both
treatments separately (WSR, both p< 0.001). Yet, the information treatment has no im-
pact on beliefs, neither under No Incentive (MWU, p= 0.906) nor under Incentive
(MWU, p= 0.236). e individual within-subject dierence in beliefs between the two
incentive states is also not statistically signicant from each other between Info and No
Info (MWU, p= 0.314). is indicates that employees’ beliefs were unresponsive to the
information treatment.13 If anything, we observe a small tendency in the opposite direc-
tion of the predicted eect.
To show a more complete representation of the belief data, Figure 2.3 plots the cumu-
lative distribution functions of the individual belief dierences between Incentive and
No Incentive. If incentive choices work as signaling devices, the dierence in beliefs
should be lower in Info compared to No Info. However, I do not nd an indication for
this eect. Both distributions appear very similar to each other and do not clearly diverge
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test, p = 0.402).
e estimation results in column (1) of Table 1 conrm the non-parametric analyses.
13is null result seems not to be driven by low statistical power. In my ex ante power analysis, I calculated
a required sample size of 368. Considering the nal sample size of 402, my experiments appear slightly
overpowered and still show a null result. In the ex post power calculation, given my sample size and the
measured standard deviations in the belief dierence between the incentive states, I would be able to detect
an eect size of 30% of a standard deviation which is smaller than detected eect sizes in, for example,
Galbiati et al. (2013) or Cardinaels and Yin (2015).
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Figure 2.3 Treatment Eects on Employees’ Beliefs About Incentive Eects
Notes: e graph shows the cumulative distribution functions of the dierence between employees’ be-
liefs about others’ contributions with the incentive in place and versus without the incentive in place by
treatment.
Here, I regress beliefs on treatment dummies. e OLS regression pools all decisions in
the strategy method and uses clusters on the subject level. While the incentive signi-
cantly increases beliefs by 44% (2.1 Tokens) on average, the interaction of the information
treatment and the incentive choice as well as the information dummy alone have only
small positive and insignicant eects.
e null result of signaling eects on beliefs renders potential eects on behavior in the
public goods game unlikely. Still, as beliefs were elicited aer public good contributions,
it might be the case that order eects biased belief updating but not potential eects on
behavior. As presented in column (2) of Table 1, I observe however comparable eects on
unconditional contributions. e incentive decision induces an increase in unconditional
contributions by 23% (1.5 Tokens), but there is no statistically signicant eect of the
information treatment or the treatment interaction. Furthermore, the estimated models
in columns (4) to (6) show that the null eect of the treatment interaction is robust to
controlling for a wide range of employee characteristics including gender, age, seniority,
incentive scheme, career level, and job function.
Result 2: Employees’ beliefs about others’ contributions and actual contributions are sig-
nicantly higher in Incentive than in No Incentive.
Result 3: Employees’ beliefs are not statistically dierent between No Incentive/Info and
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(1) (2) (4) (5)
Belief Uncond. Belief Uncond.
Contribution Contribution
I(Incentive) 2.144*** 1.346*** 2.172*** 1.376***
(0.174) (0.216) (0.179) (0.219)
I(Info) -0.0419 -0.226 -0.0442 -0.168
(0.335) (0.363) (0.339) (0.364)
I(Incentive×Info) 0.300 0.391 0.294 0.329
(0.274) (0.319) (0.283) (0.326)
Constant 5.198*** 6.744*** 4.912*** 6.552***
(0.239) (0.248) (0.494) (0.528)
Controls No No Yes Yes
Observations 802 802 784 784
R2 0.131 0.055 0.156 0.092
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS
Table 2.3 Regression Estimations of Treatment Eects
Notes: For each employee and dependent variable two entries are observed: one entry under the incentive
and one without the incentive. e control variables include gender, seniority, incentive scheme, career level,
and job function. 18 employees are not included in the regressions using the additional controls as some of
these have not been available for those participants. Standard errors are clustered on the subject level and
are shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
No Incentive/No Info. ey are also not statistically dierent between Incentive/Info
and Incentive/No Info.
Result 4: Employees’ contributions are not statistically dierent betweenNo Incentive/Info
andNo Incentive/No Info. ey are also not statistically dierent between Incentive/Info
and Incentive/No Info.
2.3.3 Treatment Heterogeneity
Following Danilov and Sliwka (2017), one may expect that employees that work at the
company for only a short period of time should update their beliefs more strongly because
they have a less precise prior. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.4, I show OLS regressions
for employees whose seniority is above and below the median seniority level, respectively.
For less senior employees, the interaction eect of the incentive choice and the informa-
tion treatment is positive and marginally signicant. I.e., these employees exhibit a small
tendency to infer relatively high cooperation rates from managers seing the incentive.
For more senior employees, the interaction is very close to zero and insignicant.
With respect to cooperation behavior, one may expect hat employees with strong reci-
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Belief Belief Uncond. Uncond.
Contribution Contribution
I(Incentive) 2.329*** 2.000*** 1.369*** 1.393***
(0.235) (0.279) (0.278) (0.331)
I(Info) -0.778 0.453 -0.176 -0.303
(0.498) (0.472) (0.433) (0.667)
I(Incentive) × I(Info) 0.712* -0.014 0.692* -0.468
(0.382) (0.419) (0.412) (0.504)
Constant 6.187*** 6.305*** 6.523*** 6.497***
(1.245) (1.177) (0.573) (1.084)
Subgroup Low Sen. High Sen. Cmp. Pay Ind. Pay
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 384 400 552 232
R2 0.206 0.169 0.120 0.111
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS
Table 2.4 Treatment Eects on Beliefs and Contributions by Subgroups
Notes: For each employee and dependent variable two entries are observed: one entry under the incentive
and one without the incentive. e control variables include gender, seniority, incentive scheme, career level,
and job function. 18 employees are not included in the regressions using the additional controls as some of
these have not been available for those participants. Standard errors are clustered on the subject level and
are shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
procity preferences react more strongly to a belief update. Using data from the previous
study, I observe that employees working under individual performance pay are less likely
to be conditional cooperators than employees under company performance pay (MWU,
p = 0.028). As shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.4, I observe that for employees
in the individual performance pay scheme the coecient of the treatment interaction is
negative whereas for employees in the company performance pay scheme the coecient
is positive and also marginally signicant.
As I will show in the next section, the observation that signaling eects have a small
tendency to work in the opposite direction of my prediction is related with the employees’
perception about how managers make incentive choices.
Result 5: Less senior employees and employees that work under the company performance
pay scheme exhibit a small tendency to infer relatively high cooperation rates frommanagers
seing the incentive.
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2.4 Discussion
Why is there no signaling eect of incentive choices? To begin with, a basic requirement
for a causal treatment eect is that participants paid aention to treatment specic infor-
mation and understood the incentive structure of the game. In this regard, it is armative
that participants in Info took longer to complete the experiment than employees in No
Info (MWU, p = 0.005). Next to reading the additional instructions, this might also en-
tail some time in which employees were thinking about the implications of the managers
being informed when seing incentives. Comprehension questions at the beginning of
the experiment and a telephone hotline through which participants could ask questions
during the experiment aimed at preventing misunderstandings.
Several potential explanations for the null evolve from the complexity of the reason-
ing process required from employees to infer signals from managers’ choices. It should
rst be noted that the strategic sophistication of participants in my sample is arguably
high. Compared to standard student subject pools, employees have a high average edu-
cation level including many employees with a PhD. As math skills are oen found to be
positively related to strategic sophistication (e.g., Czermak et al., 2016), I asked partici-
pants how well they feel described by the statement “I am good at maths” in the post-
experimental survey. I nd that the median response on a scale from 0 (“does not describe
me at all”) to 10 (“describes me perfectly”) is relatively high at 7. I also show in Appendix
B.4 that my main regression results are robust to accounting for this variable. More-
over, it has been argued that using the strategy method to represent managers’ choices
“[…] may signal to agents that the experimenter wants them to infer information from
contract choices” (Cardinaels and Yin, 2015, p. 1012); such a reection eect essentially
limits the strategic sophistication required from participants and makes my null result
even stronger.
Even under the premise of high strategic sophistication, it might still be the case that
stakes involved for employees were too low, i.e., participants did not spent the cognitive
eorts required to process the conveyed information. However, Deversi et al. (2020a) nd
indications that employees from the company cared about similar-sized stakes in a public
goods game. In their experiment, a substantial share of participants reacted to variations
in the marginal per capita return of contributions in the common account. Also, in a
surprise donation option at the end of their experiment most participants decided to keep
the nal payo for themselves rather than donating it to a charity.
I now turn to considering employees preferences and their beliefs about managers’ decision-
making as a potential source of the null. First, it could be that employees are not con-
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ditionally cooperative such that they do not value the potential signals about others’
behavior. Following Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), I estimate an individual reciprocity
parameter for each employee using the conditional contributions in No Incentive/No
Info.14 I nd that the average value of the parameter is 0.7 and that there exists a sub-
stantial fraction of perfectly conditional cooperators among employees (48%) who should
care a lot about information about others’ contributions.
Second, employees might expect managers to be indierent between selecting the incen-
tive or not such that managers’ choices are random and do not signal. Contrary to this
concern, I observe that on average employees expect managers to select the incentive with
a likelihood of around 63% which is signicantly dierent from 50% (WSR, p < 0.001)
and almost identical between treatments (63.3% in Info and 63.4% in No Info; MWU,
p = 0.976).
ird, it would be detrimental to the signaling eect if employees misinterpret the man-
agers’ purpose of providing the incentive. ere is some evidence in line with this ar-
gument. Some employees (21%) expect their managers to expect zero or even negative
incentive eects on contributions. Hence, in Table 2.5, I re-estimate the main OLS regres-
sions from Table 2.3 excluding these employees. Interestingly, I observe that the positive
interaction eects for beliefs and unconditional contributions increase compared to the
full sample estimates. e signaling eect on beliefs is even statistically signicant at
the 5% level. Employees infer high contribution levels from informed managers that se-
lect the incentive which leads to a crowding-in eect on contributions that is marginally
signicant.
What reasoning do employees expect from managers that can explain these observations?
In Figure 2.4a, I correlate the expected likelihood of the managers seing the incentive
with employees’ beliefs about the manager’s expectation of the unconditional contribu-
tion levels.15 If employees perceive the managers as individual prot-maximizers who
tradeo the expected incentive eect against its costs, one would observe a positive re-
lationship between both variables. However, I observe that employees perceive them as
independent (slope parameter in No Info of -0.01, t-Test, p = 0.993). e relationship
turns slightly positive in Info but remains insignicant (interaction eect of 0.91, t-Test,
p = 0.450). Employees appear to not take into account that seing the costly incentive
fullls a selsh purpose. In Van der Weele (2012) or Bénabou and Tirole (2011), for ex-
14If the parameter is 1, there is a linear relationship between an employee’s contributions and the average
contributions of the other two employees in the contribution schedule. e parameter is 0 if the employee’s
and the others’ contributions are independent from each other.
15ere are no signicant dierences in these second-order beliefs between Info and No Info (MWU, p =
0.400) corroborating the null result further.
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(1) (2)
Belief Uncond.
Contribution
I(Incentive) 2.642*** 1.580***
(0.180) (0.238)
I(Info) -0.291 -0.319
(0.340) (0.403)
I(Incentive) × I(Info) 0.563** 0.668*
(0.280) (0.355)
Constant 4.559*** 6.379***
(0.251) (0.277)
Excluded Misperceivers Misperceivers
Controls No No
Observations 640 640
R2 0.220 0.085
Model OLS OLS
Table 2.5 Second Order Beliefs and Treatment Eects on Beliefs and Cooperation
Notes: For each employee and dependent variable two entries are observed: one entry under the incentive
and one without the incentive. 81 employees are not included in the regressions as they do not expect that
their managers expect higher cooperation from seing the incentive (i.e., they misperceive the purpose of
the incentive) . Standard errors are clustered on the subject level and are shown in parentheses; * p < 0.10,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
ample, it is a necessary requirement for a signaling eect that the agents presume their
managers to choose an incentive if it helps them to increase personal prots. Otherwise,
the employees can not infer from incentive provision that contribution levels were low.
e lack of evidence conrming this presumption can hence explain the overall null re-
sult. However, it does not explain the observed crowding-in tendencies in the data.
To analyze this, we need to understand how the presumption of employees about man-
agers’ choices actually looks like. In Figure 2.4b, I correlate employees’ beliefs about
the likelihood of seing the incentive with their beliefs about the managers’ expecta-
tion of the unconditional contribution level without the incentive in place. While one
would expect a downward sloping relationship in line with payo maximization, I nd
the opposite. A standard deviation increase in the belief about the managers’ expecta-
tion increases the belief about the likelihood of incentive selection by 2.5%-points (t-Test
of regression coecient, p < 0.001). It appears that employees expect that managers
reciprocally provide rewards for high expected levels of cooperation. Employees do not
see their managers as selsh prot maximizers. is could be related to past experiences
with managers or a general prosocial relationship between management and employees
in the company. As employees think that managers provide incentives based on high ex-
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pectations about cooperation rates, incentive provision signals high contribution levels
and can explain the belief update observed in Table 2.5.
2.5 Conclusion
e literature suggests that incentives designed to promote cooperation in organizations
may signal that selsh behavior is prevalent. As a consequence, they only have limited
or even counterproductive eects. Contrary to this hypothesis, I nd that seing an
incentive to cooperate signicantly increases cooperation among employees of a large
soware company. is increase is not aected by signals about others’ behavior.
Further analyses suggest that the absence of a signaling eect in my seing is related to
employees’ perception of their managers’ decision-making. ey believe that managers
do not exploit their private information about others’ behavior in an opportunistic man-
ner, but provide incentives if they expect high levels of cooperation. is might explain
why I observe a small tendency in the data that employees infer high cooperation levels
from incentives set by informed managers.
To the best of my knowledge, my study is the rst to analyze whether contract choices
signal social norms in a relevant eld environment. According to Levi and List (2007),
it is oen not possible to generalize ndings from the experimental laboratory to the
eld because contexts dier. Actors in the eld bring internalized social norms or past
experiences and strategies into the game and herewith change outcomes. In my partner
company and probably other organizations alike, reputation appears to be an important
context factor of the functioning of incentives. A more nuanced understanding of this
and other contextual factors, for example, the transparency about superior information
on the side of the principal or the legitimacy of principals’ decision making (Schnedler
and Vadovic, 2011), is required. Another question for future research that arises from my
seing is whether companies can prevent signaling eects of incentives by actively in-
vesting in the general relationship between managers and employees. is might include
establishing pro-social intentions in managers such that their decision making “serves
the employees”, or to create a perception among employees that the management pur-
sues benevolent management strategies.
Finally, it must be noted that in most eld experiments there exists a tradeo between
using more articial designs to discover causal eect mechanisms underlying the data and
more natural designs that allow for bigger picture analyses (Deversi et al., 2020a). is
chapter focused on teasing out the signaling of others’ behavior via incentive choices.
Companies that design incentives to promote cooperation should also take other forms
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of incentive eects, like framing eects or the signaling of other information hold by the
management (Bowles and Polanı́a-Reyes, 2012), into account.
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Chapter 3
Spin Doctors: An Experiment on
Vague Disclosure
*
3.1 Introduction
In many seings, informed parties not only decide whether to disclose veriable private
information, but also enjoy substantial exibility in how information is disclosed. One
way to exploit exibility in disclosure is by means of vague messages. Vague messages are
designed to inate a receiver’s perception of the sender’s type by clearly separating from
worse but not from beer types. ey are not outright lies, which may invite litigation,
but merely put a positive spin on unfavorable news. Consider the following examples.
A college that ranks 10th in the latest US news ranking is likely to call itself a top 10
college rather than referring to itself as the 10th ranked college. A wine whose sole
designation of origin is France is unlikely to come from the Bordeaux region, renowned
for its superior wine. A wine whose sole designation of origin is Bordeaux is unlikely to
come from Pomerol, an especially beloved subregion of Bordeaux. Researchers oen refer
to “signicance at the 5 percent level” when a p-value is just below 0.05, while stating the
exact p-value for a highly signicant result. During legal proceedings, a defendant may
try to convince a jury of her innocence by answering only those questions that are likely
to exonerate her.
Sophisticated receivers understand and can correct for senders’ strategic use of vague-
ness. But if these deceptive practices are deployed on naive receivers, then they result in
systematic misperceptions. We model voluntary disclosure to receivers of heterogeneous
strategic sophistication under both exible language, which facilitates vague messages,
*is chapter is based on joint work with Alessandro Ispano and Peter Schwardmann.
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and precise language. We then test the model’s assumptions and predictions in the exper-
imental laboratory. In doing so, we seek to answer three main questions. How do senders
optimally design messages to exploit receivers’ naivete? Are (some) receivers systemat-
ically fooled by vague disclosure? And can restricting senders’ exibility in disclosure
improve information transmission?
e Model. In order to derive behavioral predictions for the experiment we adopt a
model due to Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Eyster and Rabin (2005) and Hagenbach and
Koessler (2017). To allow us to speak to the model’s policy implications, we derive addi-
tional welfare results.
Consider a voluntary disclosure game in which a privately informed sender decides whether
and how to disclose veriable information about her type to a receiver. e sender’s pay-
o is increasing in the receiver’s belief about the sender’s type, while the receiver’s payo
is increasing in the accuracy of her belief. We distinguish between two language regimes:
in the precise language regime, if the sender discloses, then the message has to reect her
exact type; in the exible language regime a sender may send vague messages, i.e. a
message that is any interval that contains the sender’s true type.
If all agents are rational, in both the precise and the exible language regimes the equilib-
rium features full information revelation (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Grossman, 1981; Mil-
grom, 1981).1 However, the arguments for full information revelation and the irrelevance
of language crucially depend on a high degree of strategic sophistication on behalf of the
receiver. In reality, many receivers may be naive and struggle to be maximally skeptical
in the face of nondisclosure or vague messages. Building on Milgrom and Roberts (1986),
Eyster and Rabin (2005) and Hagenbach and Koessler (2017), our model therefore features
both sophisticated and naive receivers. When a naive receiver encounters nondisclosure,
she estimates that the sender is the average type. When she encounters a vague message,
she estimates that the sender’s type is the average of the sent interval.
e presence of naive receivers drives both nondisclosure (under precise language) and
the exploitative deployment of vague messaging (under exible language). Vague mes-
sages take the following simple form. Senders send an interval that spans their actual
type and the upper bound of the message space.
Moving from the exible language regime to the precise language regime then implies
1In the precise language regime, the highest type discloses because the disclosed information denitely
exceeds receiver expectations. Because nondisclosure now cannot stem from the highest type, the second
highest type is compelled to disclose. An iteration of this reasoning yields full disclosure. In the exible
language regime, the receiver’s belief that a sender’s type is the lower bound of the message sent is self-
fullling.
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a tradeo. ere is more frequent disclosure in the exible language regime and more
precise disclosure in the precise language regime. Sophisticated receivers, who are not
fooled by vagueness, form more accurate beliefs under exible than under precise lan-
guage. Naive receivers form more accurate beliefs under precise language. Importantly,
information transmission, i.e. the average accuracy of receivers’ beliefs, is higher under
precise language, irrespective of the proportion of naive receivers.
e Experiment. e experiment compares a Flexible and a Precise treatment that
reect the distinction between the two language regimes in the model. In both treatments,
a sender’s type is uniformly distributed over the integers from 0 to 5. A sender in the
Flexible treatment can disclose any interval containing her actual type. For example, a
sender with type 2 could disclose that her type belongs to the interval between 2 and 5.
A sender in the Precise treatment can only disclose her exact type or nothing.
e theoretical predictions are borne out in the experimental data. Many senders are apt
spin doctors. In Flexible, they use vague messages and the exact form of the modal mes-
sage we observe is remarkably close to the one predicted by the model. In Precise, sender
behavior reects a threshold equilibrium in which only high types disclose. Senders dis-
close more in Flexible than in Precise and only a minority of senders in both treatments
does not behave according to the theoretical predictions.
Validating the model’s key assumption, we nd evidence for the existence of two distinct
receiver types, i.e. naives and sophisticates. We categorize receivers as either sophisti-
cated or naive on the basis of their guesses and nd that the average naive receiver makes
smaller mistakes in Precise than in Flexible. Instead, depending on the specication, the
average sophisticated receiver makes larger or equally large mistakes in Precise.
In encounters with rational senders, information transmission is signicantly higher in
Precise. When we consider all senders, the treatment eect of precise language on infor-
mation transmission is positive but statistically insignicant because a very small number
of observations in Precise feature a sender making the outlier mistake of not disclosing
the highest type.
Policy implications. e exploitation of naive receivers may not be the only rationale
for the use of vagueness in all eld seings. For example, a sender may resort to vagueness
to communicate that there is uncertainty about her precise type, but not about her be-
longing to some broader category. For this reason, it is crucial that the experimental labo-
ratory allows us to strip the decision-making environment of any confounding drivers of
vagueness and focus on its use in the exploitation of receiver naivite. Moreover, in con-
trast to most eld seings, we can exogenously vary the language at a sender’s disposal
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and characterize the exact nature of receivers’ misinference. Our treatment comparison
can then shed light on how policies that impose precise language on senders aect in-
formation transmission via their dierential impact on sophisticated and naive receivers’
inference.
Such policies are possible for all of our motivating examples and oen feasible where
mandatory disclosure is not (see section 3.5 for a discussion). In some seings, they are
already in place. For example, Germany’s main certier of consumer products, Stiung
Warentest, gives products and services a precise mark and a vague summary category
like “very good”. It imposes precise language by legally requiring disclosures of its cer-
tication to contain the precise product rating. Similarly, the NGO Consumer Reports
in the United States allows rms to post links to their online reports using neutral lan-
guage, but does not allow them to excerpt content selectively. Our results suggest that
restricting exibility improves average information transmission and redistributes rents
to naive consumers.
e imposition of precise disclosure is also taking root in science. For example, publish-
ing guidelines by the American Psychological Association require authors to disclose the
exact p-value, eect size, degrees of freedom, and statistical test underlying a given result.
Similarly, the eld of economics has undergone a general move toward precise disclosure.
For instance, authors of experimental studies increasingly commit to the exact specica-
tions of statistical tests in pre-analysis plans and thereby, among other things, reduce the
subsequent exibility in presenting their research ndings.
e self-incrimination clause of the h amendment of the United States constitution af-
fords defendants the right not to testify against themselves in criminal cases.2 In seings
in which lying is impossible (because testimony has to be backed up by hard evidence) or
undesirable (because the expected penalty of perjury exceeds its benets) the defendant’s
choice between testifying in her own trial or “pleading the h” constitutes a voluntary
disclosure game with the jury. Moreover, a majority of US courts take the position that
voluntarily waiving the right against self-incrimination opens a defendant up to cross-
examination on all issues relevant to the trial.3 e right not to self-incriminate therefore
imposes precise voluntary disclosure. In an inuential court ruling, the majority opinion
argues against allowing the defendant to “decide how far he will disclose what he has
chosen to tell in part […]” because “it must be conceded that the privilege is to suppress
the truth, but that does not mean that it is a privilege to garble it.”4 Our results highlight
2See Amar and Leow (1995) for a critical discussion of this privilege.
3See Yale Law Journal (1952) and Stanford Law Review (1962) for discussions of the waiver and how it has
and should be interpreted by the law.
4See the opinion by judge Hand in United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837 (2d circuit 1942).
58
Spin Doctors
a key distinction between suppressing the truth and garbling it by means of partial or
vague disclosure and speak to the wisdom in prohibiting the laer.
In the next section we discuss our relation to the literature, before presenting the model in
section 3.3. Section 3.4 describes experimental design and results and section 3.5 discusses
policy implications.
3.2 Related Literature
e Precise treatment is based on experiments by King and Wallin (1991) and Jin et al.
(2018). Our empirical contribution lies in being the rst to compare the eect of Precise
and Flexible language on senders’ communication strategies, receivers’ inference and
information transmission. To beer interpret our results, our model extends theory by
Eyster and Rabin (2005) and Hagenbach and Koessler (2017) to derive the welfare implica-
tions of the dierent language regimes. Taken together, theory and treatment comparison
allow us to speak directly to the merits of regulating vagueness in disclosure. Moreover,
our theory-guided design allows us to be precise about the nature of the bias in receivers’
inference we uncover and to test for several of its implications. ese features are likely
to improve the robustness of our ndings as well as their portability to other seings.
e exploitation of exibility in voluntary information disclosure has been documented
for car sellers describing their cars on ebay (Lewis, 2011), business schools referring to
third-party rankings (Luca and Smith, 2015), and researchers presenting their ndings
(Krawczyk, 2015; Brodeur et al., 2016). Relatedly, there is evidence that rms shroud
(Brown et al., 2010), obfuscate (Ellison and Ellison, 2009; Ferman, 2015), or complexify
(Ru and Schoar, 2016) unfavorable information about their products. In markets where
voluntary disclosure is necessarily precise, nondisclosure oen ensues. For example, pro-
ducers of salad dressings do not voluntarily disclose fat content if it is high (Mathios,
2000), poor health maintenance organizations do not obtain independent accreditations
(Jin, 2005), and movie studios avoid pre-release screenings to critics if a movie’s quality
is low (Brown et al., 2012, 2013). However, data limitations in the eld have thus far kept
researchers from studying the causal impact of dierent language regimes on information
transmission and from characterizing the exact nature of receivers’ misinference.5 On the
theoretical front, a series of papers following Gabaix and Laibson (2006) investigate the
circumstances under which rms fail to educate their own and other rms’ consumers
about unfavorable product aributes or add-on costs. However, the role of the exibil-
ity of language in rms’ communication with ‘behavioral’ consumers has been largely
5See Dranove and Jin (2010) for a review of the theory and empirics of disclosure in economic applications
and Loewenstein et al. (2014) for the psychological subtleties surrounding the analysis of disclosure games.
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neglected.
Our paper contributes to a small literature that studies information disclosure in the ex-
perimental laboratory. While no previous experiment features the treatment comparison
and theory-guided design that allows us to speak about the consequences of interven-
ing in the language at senders’ disposal, our precise language treatment follows Jin et al.
(2018), who provide evidence for both incomplete unraveling and receiver naivete. Ear-
lier studies by Forsythe et al. (1989), King and Wallin (1991) and Dickhaut et al. (2003)
nd evidence for full unraveling aer a suciently high number of repetitions, albeit in a
seing that features several receivers and auctioning mechanisms that potentially permit
other explanations for players’ behavior (Jin et al., 2018).6
ree contemporaneous experiments complement our ndings in the exible language
treatment. Jin et al. (2019) study a mandatory disclosure game in which senders can
complexify their disclosure by revealing their type as the sum of a string of numbers.
ey nd that low sender types make use of complexity and that some receivers are
fooled by it because they are overcondent in their ability to interpret complex messages.
In contrast, our results suggest that a lack of strategic sophistication leads to the loss in
information transmission associated with vague disclosure. Hagenbach and Perez-Richet
(2018) conduct an experiment that allows for vague messages. Instead of varying the
language at a sender’s disposal, they vary the sender’s incentive structure. Like us, they
nd that types who wish to be perceived as another type are more likely to use partial
or nondisclosure. ey also nd that receivers are beer o under acyclical incentive
structures, i.e. games in which masquerading incentives are not circular. Li and Schipper
(2020) study a voluntary disclosure game in which senders can disclose any set of types
that contains their actual type. eir experiment does not feature a treatment comparison
of imposed precision and their version of exibility. Still, senders use vagueness in a way
that is reminiscent of senders’ strategy in our experiment.
Strategic information revelation is also oen analyzed within the cheap talk framework
(Crawford and Sobel, 1982). In cheap talk games the sender is unconstrained in her choice
of messages and it is typically assumed that the sender’s and the receiver’s interests are
at least partially aligned. Even when all receivers are perfectly rational, full information
revelation does not obtain in equilibrium, i.e., communication is inherently vague. More-
over, while the presence of naive receivers may induce the sender to deceptively inate
her messages, it may also enhance type separation and overall information transmission
6Also see Benndorf et al. (2015) for an unraveling failure that is driven by senders’ bounded rationality and
Brown and Fragiadakis (2018) for a receiver misinference that is not based on a lack of strategic sophisti-
cation.
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(Oaviani and Squintani, 2006; Kartik et al., 2007; Chen, 2011).7 In the experimental liter-
ature, the benets of vagueness in cheap talk communication have been shown to arise in
various seings. In a public good game, Serra-Garcia et al. (2011) nd that vague commu-
nication can be socially valuable when truthful communication conicts with eciency.
In an coordination game, Agranov and Schoer (2012) show that a benevolent announcer
may resort to vague announcements of payo states to facilitate coordination. In an oth-
erwise canonical cheap talk game, Wood (2016) documents that information transmission
is higher when the message space consists of coarse rather than precise messages.
3.3 e Model
3.3.1 Setup
A sender (S) and a receiver (R) play a persuasion game in which R wants her guess to be
as accurate as possible, while S aims at maximizing R’s guess. When the state of nature
is ω and R’s guess is g, then S’s payo is US = g. R’s payo is UR = −(ω− g)2, which
implies that she nds it optimal to guess her expectation of the state. At the initial stage,
ω is drawn from a continuous uniform distribution with support Ω = [0, 1].8 S privately
observes her type ω and sends a message m before R makes a guess.
Since S cannot make false statements, her message must always include her true type.
Beyond this common requirement, we consider two alternative communication regimes,
which we refer to as precise and exible language. Under precise language, the set of
messages available to type ω is {ω, Ω}, i.e. S can either reveal her type exactly (m = ω)
or remain silent (m = Ω). Under exible language, the set of messages available to type
ω is the union of all convex and closed subsets of Ω containing ω, which also includes the
option to remain silent.9 While we represent the choice to remain silent with the coarsest
message (i.e. m = Ω) for ease of notation, in our interpretation this is conceptually
distinct from actively disclosing as in the case of other messages. us, we say that a given
type discloses only when she sends a message that conveys at least some information
7For similar reasons, information transmission may increase when messages get more vague due to an
external noise that perturbs sender’s communication (for example, see Board et al. 2007).
8Appendix C.2.2 considers non-uniform priors.
9An alternative specication of exibility might allow senders to disclose any set of types that includes their
actual type rather than constraining them to disclose an interval. We favor our modelling strategy for two
reasons. First, disclosure of a disconnected set of types is rarely observed in the eld, presumably because
it is less natural and would tip naive receivers o. Modelling this tipping o explicitly would require
that receivers’ degree of naivite depends on the message, an unnecessary complication of the exposition.
Second, imposing that disclosure has to take the form of an interval in the experiment helps to minimize the
dierence in complexity between precise and exible language and thereby facilitates the interpretation of
our treatment comparison.
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even if interpreted at face value. Likewise, we measure the amount of disclosure as the
probability that S sends a message other than m = Ω, i.e. any strict subset of Ω.
Key to the analysis is that R may lack strategic sophistication. In particular, we take the
posterior distribution of a fully naive R to coincide with the prior truncated over types
for which the message sent is available. Upon message m = Ω, the posterior of a fully
naive R hence coincides with the prior, since that message is available to all types. Upon
message m = ω, her posterior is degenerate at ω. And upon message m = [a, b] ⊂ Ω
with a < b, her posterior is uniform on [a, b]. Receivers’ insucient skepticism may
hence stem from a failure to take into account the dependence of a sender’s strategy on
her type, in the spirit of cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin, 2005).
We assume heterogeneity in sophistication as in Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and Hagen-
bach and Koessler (2017). In particular, we suppose that R is fully naive with probability
χ ∈ (0, 1) and fully sophisticated with complementary probability. In Appendix C.2.1 we
generalize the model by allowing for partially naive types and an arbitrary distribution
of sophistication in the population.
A pure strategy of S species a message m(ω) based on her type. A pure strategy of R
species a guess for a sophisticated and a naive type, which we denote respectively by
g(m) and gχ(m), based on S’s message. Our solution concept is a natural adaptation of
perfect Bayesian equilibrium which takes into account that S’s message is hard evidence
and that R may not be fully strategic. In addition to the usual requirements, upon any
o-the-equilibrium-path message, the support of R’s posterior should not include any
type for which that message is unavailable. Moreover, the guess of a naive R must be
optimal given her possibly wrong and at least partially exogenously given beliefs. We
restrict our aention to pure strategy equilibria and adopt the convention that S refrains
from disclosing whenever indierent.10
3.3.2 Predictions
When language is exible, S elects to disclose an interval that spans her type and the
highest type. As the equilibrium is necessarily fully separating,11 this strategy is optimal
in that it maximally inates the guesses of a naive R.
10Given R’s payo function, her optimal action is always unique. As for S, the set of types that can have
multiple optimal actions in equilibrium has zero measure.
11e reason for why full separation necessarily obtains is that, for any candidate equilibrium pooling mes-
sage, the highest type in the pool always has access to another message that would strictly raise the guess
of both a sophisticate and a naive R.
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Proposition 1 (Equilibrium under exible language). Under exible language, in equilib-
rium m(ω) = [ω, 1], g
(
[a, b]
)
= a and gχ
(
[a, b]
)
= (a + b)/2.12
Proof. See Milgrom and Roberts (1986).
When language is precise, S nds it optimal to disclose if and only if her type is su-
ciently high. e marginal sender is indierent between perfectly revealing her type and
remaining silent, which induces a higher guess from a naive R (the prior mean) but a
lower guess from a sophisticated R (the average silent type). en, higher types indeed
nd it optimal to disclose and lower types to remain silent. Also, the disclosure cuto is
lower than the prior mean and increases with the proportion of naives.
Proposition 2 (Equilibrium under precise language). Under precise language, there exists
a unique cuto ω∗ = χ1+χ such that in equilibrium:
m(ω) =
{
ω if ω > ω∗
Ω if ω ≤ ω∗
;g(m) =
{
ω if m = ω
ω∗
2 if m = Ω
; gχ(m) =
{
ω if m = ω
1
2 if m = Ω
.
Proof. See Eyster and Rabin (2005).13
Comparing the two propositions, we can derive the following predictions about dier-
ences in players’ behavior between the exible and precise language regime.
Proposition 3 (Predictions on dierences in behavior). For any given χ ∈ (0, 1)
1. Sender behavior:
(a) there is more disclosure under exible than under precise language;
(b) the average disclosing type is higher under precise than under exible language.
2. Receiver behavior:
(a) R’s expected guess is lower under precise than under exible language and in
both cases it exceeds S’s expected type;
(b) under both precise and exible language R’s expected guess increases with χ.
12e equilibrium is unique up to a multiplicity in beliefs and guesses of a sophisticated R upon o-the-
equilibrium-path messages. For ease of exposition, we are adopting the convention that these beliefs take
the same form as in the case of on-the-equilibrium-path messages. Any other belief and associated sequen-
tially rational guess which is suciently skeptical to deter S from sending a message [a, b] with b < 1 is
also part of an equilibrium.
13In Eyster and Rabin (2005), the disclosure cuto is ω∗ = 11+χ and it is types ω < ω
∗ who disclose, since S’s
payo is decreasing in R’s guess. Also, as detailed in Appendix C.2.1, R’s naivete takes a slightly dierent
form.
63
Spin Doctors
Proof. See section C.1.1 in the appendix.
Predictions on senders’ behavior hinge on the fact that all types disclose under exible
language while only suciently high types disclose under precise language. Predictions
on receivers’ behavior are driven by the guesses of a naive R, since, given the Bayesian
consistency of rational beliefs, the average guess of a sophisticated R always coincides
with the prior mean. For any realization of S’s type, the guess of a naive R is higher under
exible than under precise language, which explains the rst part of prediction 2a, and
always equal or higher than S’s type, which explains the second part. e average guess
of a naive is therefore higher than that of a sophisticate, which entirely drives prediction
2b under exible language. Under precise language, it is also the case that the average
guess of a naive increases with χ since, as S discloses less oen, the set of S’s types she
overestimates increases.
To consider players’ welfare, recall that the expected utility of S is simply the guess she
expects to induce in R, while the expected utility of R is the accuracy of her guess mea-
sured by the mean squared error.14 For a sophisticated R, this error boils down to the
expected residual variance upon S’s disclosure. For a naive R, the error also incorpo-
rates the systematic bias in her updating that S’s strategy introduces. roughout, we
will use the terms R’s expected payo and information transmission interchangeably.
Normatively, we take the stance that a social planer is interested in maximizing informa-
tion transmission.15 Moreover, the ex-ante and ex-post qualications refer respectively
to whether the expectation is computed unconditionally or conditionally on the player
in question having observed her type (i.e., the state for S and the sophistication level for
R).
Proposition 4 (Predictions on dierences in payos). For any given χ ∈ (0, 1)
3. Sender payo:
(a) the ex-ante expected payo of S is higher under exible language than under
precise language;
14While R’s preference ranking over exible and precise language can only be dened with respect to a spe-
cic loss function in our seing, our results are robust to the use of the mean absolute error, i.e., E|g−ω|.
When we present our experimental data we use this alternative measure, which is more directly inter-
pretable in that it assigns no heavier relative penalty to larger errors.
15Our main rationale for focusing on information transmission and for not also taking into account the
sender’s payos in our discussion of policy is that any surplus the sender obtains relative to the full-
rationality benchmark derives entirely from deception as opposed to an underlying economic fundamen-
tal. In common applications of persuasion games, such as sales or nancial disclosures by managers, the
sender’s payo can be thought of as a price or salary and therefore constitutes a pure transfer. On a practi-
cal note, results on the sum of sender and receiver payos would be sensitive to the exact scaling of players’
payos, which would introduce an element of arbitrariness.
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(b) the ex-post expected payo of S is higher under exible language than under
precise language if and only if S’s type is not too low (in particular, it is true for
all types who disclose under precise language).
4. Receiver payo:
(a) the ex-ante expected payo of R is higher under precise than under exible lan-
guage;
(b) the expected payo of a sophisticated R is higher under exible language and
the expected payo of a naive R is higher under precise language.
Proof. See section C.1.2 in the appendix.
Ex ante, S always prefers exible language because it allows her to more strongly inate
the expectation of a naive R and it also oers more opportunities to do so. In spite of
this, suciently low types still prefer precise language ex post, since it allows them to
pool with higher types even in the eyes of a sophisticate. By the same token, a naive R
prefers precise language, since it limits the scope for deceiving her, while a sophisticated
R prefers exible language, since it allows her to always perfectly infer the state.
e dierence in the preference of sophisticates and naives for precise and exible lan-
guage has been noted by Hagenbach and Koessler (2017).16 In the appendix we show that
this result, obtained in a seing of two extreme levels of sophistication, naturally extends
to seings where sophistication varies continuously in the population (proposition 5).
More importantly, our seing allows us to sign the overall eect of language on R’s pay-
os: R prefers precise language. Intuitively, since a naive R is deceived more frequently
and more severely under exible language, the resulting loss has a substantially larger
magnitude than the loss of both a naive and a sophisticate under precise language. Given
the opposing language preferences of naives and sophisticates, one may think that R’s
ex-ante welfare could be higher under exible language if the population of receivers is
mostly sophisticated. is is not the case because the presence of more sophisticates also
disciplines S’s disclosure behavior under precise language (i.e., as χ goes to zero, so does
the disclosure cuto ω∗), which fosters information transmission to both sophisticates
and naives.
In Appendix C.2.1, we show that R’s preference for precise language is robust to arbi-
trary distributions of naivete in the population. In Appendix C.2.2, we use numerical
simulations to demonstrate that it holds for a large class of non-uniform priors over the
16Our precise and exible regimes correspond respectively to simple and rich language in the terminology
of Hagenbach and Koessler (2017).
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state. ere, we also provide some quantitative measure of R’s welfare gains from precise
language and build some more intuition behind this result by identifying the features of
prior distributions that can give rise to rare counterexamples.
3.4 e Experiment
3.4.1 Design
e experiment was programmed in zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). A total of 158 subjects
participated in 8 sessions at the Munich Experimental Laboratory for Economic and So-
cial Sciences (MELESSA) in the spring of 2017.17 One session lasted for about 45 minutes
and the average earnings (including aAC4 show-up fee) wereAC15.05, with minimum earn-
ings of AC5.90 and maximum earnings of AC23.50. e instructions were read aloud by the
experimenter. Screenshots of the decision screens are gathered in Appendix C.6 and in-
structions and payo tables can be found in Appendix C.7.
e experiment featured a between subject design that compared two variants of a dis-
closure game. At the beginning of the experiment, subjects in both treatments were ran-
domly assigned to the role of a sender or the role of a receiver. A subject remained in
her assigned role for the duration of the experiment. All subjects played 15 rounds of
the disclosure game. In each round, a subject played the game with a randomly selected
anonymous partner in the opposite role.
It was common knowledge that a sender’s type ω was drawn in each round from the set
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and that each type was equally likely. Aer privately observing her type,
a sender decided on a message to send to the receiver. Our two treatments diered only
in the type of messages senders were able to send.
In the Flexible language treatment (80 subjects), the sender was allowed to send any in-
terval containing her type.18 In the Precise language treatment (78 subjects), the sender
could either disclose her precise type or do not disclose. In Flexible, senders were there-
fore able to send vague messages and while any feasible message in Precise was also
feasible in Flexible, the reverse was not true. In the case of nondisclosure, the receiver
was notied that “the sender did not send a message” in both treatments. Figure 3.1 de-
picts two messages a sender of type 2 might send in the dierent treatments.
17We piloted our design with 58 subjects in the winter of 2016. Here we organized the treatment variation in
a within-subject fashion and nd similar results.
18While sending an interval that contains all possible types was not allowed, the equivalent strategy of
nondisclosure was always at a sender’s disposal.
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(a) Precise Message (b) Vague Message
Figure 3.1 Examples of Messages
Aer seeing the sender’s message, the receiver stated her guess about the sender’s type,
i.e., g ∈ {0, 0.5, . . . , 4.5, 5}. e receiver’s action space was coarsened so that both sender
and receiver payos could be communicated in the form of digestible payo tables rather
than relying on subjects calculating their payos by themselves. While the sender was
incentivized to induce the highest possible guess in the receiver, the receiver was paid
for accuracy. Subjects were paid in probability points and for a single randomly selected
round. Aer each round, subjects received information about the receiver’s guess, the
sender’s type and the probability points they earned.
A receiver’s points depended on her guess and the sender’s type as follows
pR =
110− 20|ω−g1.37 |1.4
110
A sender’s points depended only on the receiver’s guess:
pS =
110− 20|5−g1.37 |1.4
110
e probability points p a subject earned in the payo-relevant round then determined
the likelihood of winning a AC8 prize. For example, a subject in the receiver role was
paid according to a loery that yielded a relatively high prize of AC8 with probability pR
and a lower prize of AC1 with the complementary probability 1− pR. Paying subjects in
probability points makes them less liable to the inuence of risk preferences (Roth and
Malouf, 1979; Hossain and Okui, 2013; Harrison et al., 2014). To make sure that subjects
understood the incentive structure we provided them with payo tables that mapped any
constellation of receiver guess and sender type into the relevant probability points and
let them solve comprehension tasks before the experiment.
Aer the main part of the experiment, we elicited subjects’ “out-of-sample” beliefs about
behavior in the pilot experiment. Senders stated the distribution of receiver guesses upon
nondisclosure and receivers stated their belief distribution over non-disclosed sender
types.19 Subjects were paid for being close to a variable’s empirical distribution in the
19In additional unincentivized elicitations in Flexible, we asked senders about the average receiver guess in
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pilot sessions (see Appendix C.7.4 for details). ese elicitations facilitated a rationality
check for senders (see Appendix C.5) and a consistency check for our naivite classica-
tion of receivers. Finally, a very short post-experiment survey collected some additional
sociodemographic data.
3.4.2 Results
We rst describe participants’ behavior in the two treatments and then analyze informa-
tion transmission. Our analysis is based on data that pools observations across rounds.
Appendix C.3 provides results on how player behavior evolves over time. For all statis-
tical tests we report p-values from a two-sided t-test that comes from a regression-based
approach with robust standard errors clustered at the subject level.
Behavior
Flexible Language Treatment. According to the theory, a sender in the Flexible treat-
ment discloses an interval that spans her type and the upper bound of the type space.
Figure 3.2a depicts the average lower and upper bounds of the messages sent by dierent
sender types. Observed messages are in line with the predictions of the model. Upper
bounds are close to the highest type and lower bounds increase with the type. Modal
messages, also depicted in the gure, almost perfectly coincide with the theory’s predic-
tions. e only exception is provided by senders of type 1, who remain silent more oen
than they send their predicted message.
As a rst step toward analyzing receiver behavior, we normalize guesses. Given a guess
g and a message with lower bound ω and upper bound ω̄ > ω, the normalized guess is
gn =
g−ω
|ω̄−ω| .
e normalization allows for the comparison of guesses induced by dierent messages.
Normalized guesses range from 0 to 1 and are only dened for nondisclosure or vague
disclosure. A fully naive normalized guess always takes a value of 0.5. e theoretical
prediction for a sophisticated normalized guess in Flexible is 0 for all messages.
Figure 3.2b shows the distribution of normalized guesses. e bimodal distribution with
mass points at 0 and 0.5 vindicates our model’s assumption that there are two distinct
the pilot session aer receiving the messages {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, {2, 3, 4, 5}, {3, 4, 5}, and {4, 5} and receivers
about the most likely message of all six possible sender types.
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Figure 3.2 Behavior in the Flexible Treatment
Notes: (a) Solid lines show the avg. lower and upper bounds of all messages sent. Diamonds show the
model’s predicted lower and upper bounds; diamonds are black when predictions coincide with the modal
message in the experiment and hollow if not. Average and modal messages include nondisclosure. (b) Bars
show the distribution of normalized guesses.
receiver types: sophisticates and fully naive receivers.20 We nd that receivers’ average
belief upon observing nondisclosure or receiving a vague message is upwardly biased.
While the average normalized guess is at about 0.25, senders’ average normalized type is
signicantly lower at 0.13 (p-value < 0.001).21 Instead, all receivers are able to rationally
interpret singleton intervals, i.e., a precisely disclosed type.
Precise Language Treatment. In the presence of naive receivers, our model predicts
that precise language will give rise to a threshold equilibrium with nondisclosure on be-
half of low types and disclosure on behalf of types above the threshold. Figure 3.3a depicts
disclosure rates by sender type. In line with an equilibrium threshold of around 2, the dis-
closure rate is almost zero for the lowest two types, 40% for type 2, and above 80% for
the highest three types. Note that disclosure rates of less than 100% for the highest types
imply a slight departure from our hypothesis of sender rationality.22
All receivers are able to rationally interpret a precisely disclosed type. Figure 3.3b de-
picts the distribution of normalized receiver guesses upon nondisclosure. We observe a
bimodal distribution with mass points around 0.2 and at 0.5.23 Because of the threshold
strategy, the sophisticated guess upon nondisclosure is now larger than zero. In par-
ticular, a receiver’s empirical best response is equal to the average non-disclosing type,
whose normalized value is equal to 0.25. erefore, the histogram’s rst mode reects
20We can reject the null hypothesis of unimodality using the Dip Test introduced by Hartigan and Hartigan
(1985) (pDip-value < 0.001).
21e normalized type is the sender counterpart of the normalized guess and is given by ωn = ω−ω|ω̄−ω| .
22However, aer the initial ve rounds the disclosure rate of high types increases markedly, e.g., for sender
type 5, it increases from 70.8% to 92.9%.
23We can reject the null hypothesis of unimodality using a Dip Test (pDip-value < 0.001).
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Figure 3.3 Behavior in the Precise Treatment
Notes: Graph (a) shows 95% condence intervals around the avg. disclosure rates. Graph (b) shows the
distribution of normalized guesses.
the accurate beliefs of sophisticated receivers, whereas the second mode corresponds to
the beliefs of a fully naive receiver.
Receivers average normalized guess upon observing nondisclosure is 0.33, which reects
a signicant overestimation of the average normalized non-disclosed type of 0.25 (p-value
= 0.007).24
Treatment Comparison. Disclosure rates are higher in Flexible, where senders dis-
close 75% of the time, than in Precise, where they disclose 51.5% of the time (p-value
< 0.001). is result seems to be driven by dierences in disclosure strategies, as the
average disclosing sender type is signicantly higher in Precise than in Flexible (3.59
versus 3.08; p-value < 0.001).25
We observe that the average receiver guess is slightly lower under Precise than under
Flexible (2.66 in Precise versus 2.85 in Flexible; p-value = 0.095). is dierence
suggests that, as the theory predicts, the average sender is beer o in Flexible.
24Appendix C.5 depicts senders’ out-of-sample predictions of the pilot’s receivers’ guesses upon non-
disclosure. Results are reective of high average sender rationality and an unbiased understanding of
receiver behavior. Matching actual receiver behavior in the experiment, senders’ predictions feature a
modal normalized guess of 0 in Flexible and 0.2 in Precise as well as substantial weight on high, naive
guesses. erefore, the average sender appears to be best-responding to unbiased beliefs about receiver
behavior.
25Although not signicantly dierent, results also agree with the predicted direction for the dierences in av-
erage non-disclosing types: 1.26 in Precise treatment versus 1.07 in Flexible language (p-value = 0.310).
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Information Transmission
We measure information transmission by receivers’ mistakes, which themselves are given
by the absolute dierence between a receiver’s guess and a sender’s type. Perfect infor-
mation transmission corresponds to a mistake of zero.
Overall Information Transmission. Our model predicts that average receiver mis-
takes are lower in Precise. Table 3.1 shows the determinants of receivers’ mistakes. Col-
umn (1) depicts an OLS regression of receiver mistakes on the treatment and tells us that
the treatment eect of Precise on average mistakes is negative, but insignicant. e
insignicance of the treatment eect is driven by the minority of sender choices that do
not conform to our theoretical predictions. To test this hypothesis, we restrict the sam-
ple to the 828 observations that feature theory-conforming sender behavior. In Flexible,
such behavior takes the form of a message that spans the sender’s type and 5. In Pre-
cise, it takes the form of a threshold strategy, whereby only types of 2 or higher disclose.
Here, the threshold of 2 is the best response to the distribution of receiver guesses upon
nondisclosure.
Column (2) focuses on the 70% of interactions in which sender behavior conforms ex-
actly to the theory. In these cases, restricting our senders to the use of Precise language
leads to lower average receiver mistakes. e signicant treatment eect emerges be-
cause in focusing on theory-conforming behavior, our data restriction eliminates a very
small number of outlier observations driven by sender mistakes that disproportionately
occurred in Precise.26 Imposed precision therefore improves information transmission
in the absence of pronounced sender irrationality that is unbalanced across language
regimes.
A Typology of Players. e theory predicts that moving from Flexible to Precise de-
creases the average mistakes made by naive receivers and increases the average mistakes
made by sophisticated receivers. A corollary of this prediction is that the interaction ef-
fect of imposed precision and a receiver’s naivete on mistakes is negative. In order to
test these predictions, we use our experimental data to classify receivers as naives and
sophisticates.
A normalized guess is fully naive if it is equal 0.5. We arrive at our measure of individual
receiver naivete by dividing the number of rounds in which the receiver stated a fully
naive guess by the number of rounds in which the receiver did not encounter precise dis-
26In particular, the treatment eect on average information transmission is also signicant at the 10% level if
we merely drop the 12 observations (1% of total observations) that feature a sender of type 5 who does not
disclose and thereby generates a disproportionately large outlier receiver mistake. 11 of these observations
occurred in Precise.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. variable: Mistake Mistake Mistake Mistake Mistake Mistake
Precise (d) -0.0610 -0.159** -0.252*** -0.231** 0.140* 0.0250
(0.0676) (0.0746) (0.0754) (0.0856) (0.0787) (0.0826)
Round -0.0298*** -0.0207*** -0.0331*** -0.0342*** -0.0257*** -0.00932*
(0.00582) (0.00498) (0.00995) (0.00871) (0.00674) (0.00465)
Constant 1.647*** 1.742*** 2.168*** 2.322*** 1.259*** 1.277***
(0.106) (0.120) (0.165) (0.162) (0.115) (0.130)
Type dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incl. sender choices All eory- All eory- All eory-
conforming conforming conforming
Incl. receivers All All Naives Naives Soph. Soph.
R2 0.172 0.456 0.331 0.605 0.135 0.454
Observations 1185 828 510 360 675 468
Table 3.1 Regressions of the Treatment Eect on Receivers’ Absolute Mistakes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses; ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p <
0.01.
closure. If this ratio is smaller than 0.15, then we say that a receiver is “hardly ever naive”
or sophisticated. Otherwise, a receiver is deemed naive. Applying this classication pro-
cedure, we nd that 57% of the receivers in our sample are sophisticated.27
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.1 repeat the regression models of columns (1) and (2),
but include only naive receivers. Regardless of whether or not we only include theory-
conforming sender behavior, the treatment eect on naive receivers is negative and sig-
nicant. In column (5), we see that, as the theory predicts, the treatment eect on sophis-
ticated receiver’s mistakes is positive and weakly signicant. However, the result is not
robust to considering only theory-conforming sender behavior and therefore disappears
in column (6).28
27e fraction of naive receivers is higher in Precise (61.5%) than in Flexible (52.5%). However, this dier-
ence is not robust to dierent classication criteria. In general, the proportion of naives is slightly higher
in Precise if the classication is based on the frequency of fully naive choices (as in our main classica-
tion) and slightly lower if the classication is based on the proximity to best-response behavior, as some
classications in Appendix C.4. erefore, there is no reason to suspect that the treatment eect on over-
all information transmission is driven by dierences in the proportion of naives across treatments. To
validate our naivite classication, we may ask whether receivers’ out-of-sample beliefs, elicited aer the
experiment, about the type of non-disclosers in another experiment vary systematically according to their
classication. Indeed, we nd that the average normalized guess of naives is 1.28 whereas the average
guess of sophisticates is 0.86 (p-value = 0.022).
28Results in Table 3.1 are largely robust to adding session clusters as well as to using the probability points
earned by receivers as the outcome measure. When we cluster at the session level, results on informa-
tion transmission to average receivers and naive receivers remain unaltered, while sophisticated receivers
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In Appendix C.4 we repeat the regressions in columns (3) through (6) for several alter-
native classications of naivete and sophistication, including subjects’ high school math
grade and various notions of empirical best response. In the majority of specications,
naive receivers make signicantly smaller mistakes under precise language and sophis-
ticated receivers make insignicantly larger mistakes under precise language. e ap-
pendix also shows that the data bears out the corollary of our model’s predictions: for all
classications, moving from exible to precise language leads to relatively smaller mis-
takes for naive receivers, i.e., the interaction eect between the precise treatment and
naivete on mistakes is negative.
e negative coecient of the variable Round in all six regressions indicates that there is a
negative time trend in receiver mistakes. Appendix C.3 provides a more detailed analysis
of the evolution of play on behalf of both senders and receivers. Subjects in both roles
learn as rounds progress, but for the most part there is no time-varying treatment eect
on information transmission.
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
Our model and experimental data suggest that information transmission can be increased
by restricting senders’ exibility in disclosing private information to receivers. Moreover,
we nd that a move to precise voluntary disclosure is likely to disproportionally benet
naive receivers. Since sophisticated receivers are (weakly) harmed by restricting exi-
bility, while naive receivers benet, it is tempting to think that the eect of restricting
exibility on average receiver welfare is generally negative when there are many sophis-
ticated receivers. However, this intuition is wrong: restricting exibility improves infor-
mation transmission for a broad class of distributions of strategic sophistication. When
there are many sophisticates, precise language features (almost) full disclosure and still
beats out the exible language regime.
We have analyzed the disclosure game through the lens of sender rationality. In terms of
the applications we have in mind, it is plausible that professional marketers are able to
make cunning disclosure decisions and that high-paid aorneys are able to advise their
clients on optimal disclosure strategies. And while senders and receivers are oen drawn
from the same population in the case of research, authors of papers naturally devote sub-
stantially more time and cognitive resources to a paper than a paper’s readership is able
to. Our theoretical results can accommodate and are robust to some sender irrational-
no longer fare beer under exible language. Using probability points further increases the pull of out-
lier observations because of the convexity of the payment schedule. As a result, the treatment eect on
information transmission in column (2) is only signicant at the 10% level.
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ity. However, as our experiment shows, noisy behavior on behalf of senders can make it
dicult to detect the benets of precise disclosure in the experimental laboratory.
In our simple framework, an easy way to facilitate information transmissions is to leg-
islate the mandatory disclosure of information. Where mandatory disclosure is feasible
and unproblematic, our results suggest that it is crucial to also legislate precise language.
However, for a number of reasons mandatory precise disclosure may oen be infeasible
or undesirable where the mere imposition of precision is not.
First, mandatory disclosure may be deemed unfair. Consider a policy maker’s decision to
regulate the disclosure of college rankings by colleges. While informative, rankings also
contain an element of subjectivity and may be subject to dimensions, like students’ enter-
tainment facilities, that a college reasonably neglects. erefore, it may be deemed unfair
and invite resistance to force a college’s disclosure of a given ranking. Nonetheless, con-
ditional on a college’s voluntary disclosure, imposing precision by prohibiting disclosure
in selectively broad categories (e.g. “top 30”) is likely to be less contentious. Concerns
about fairness are also at the heart of arguments in favor of the self-incrimination clause
of the h amendment.
Second, it may be prohibitively onerous for a regulator to determine whether a rm chose
nondisclosure or simply lacked information. Consider a pharmaceutical company that
tests one of its products only to nd that the product has the unfortunate side eect of
hair loss in 9 percent of the study’s participants. In the case of nondisclosure, it may
be hard for the regulator to nd out whether a study was ever conducted. However, a
press release that claims that “less than 10 percent” or “a small minority” of participants
experienced hair loss could easily be agged for vagueness.
ird, mandatory disclosure may yield perverse incentives. For example, consider a de-
fendant’s right not to self-incriminate. In its absence, law enforcement has an incentive
to use coercion or even torture to extract an admission of guilt. In the case of markets,
Mahews and Postlewaite (1985) and Polinsky and Shavell (2010) demonstrate that forc-
ing rms to reveal their private information may ultimately hamper information trans-
mission once rms’ incentives to acquire information are taken into account.
e question of how the presence of naive receivers aects information transmission
when senders are not exogenously endowed with private information about their type
is an interesting avenue for future research. In particular, it is plausible that mandating
precise language has a disincentive eect on information acquisition, given that it sets
a limit on senders’ ability to use information to deceive receivers. is would limit the
benets of imposing precision. At the same time, in other seings, exible language may
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be even more harmful than our data suggests. Cain et al. (2005) show that the disclosure
of a conict of interest can lead advisors to give more biased advice by making them feel
morally licensed to pursue their private goals. Because exible language leads to both
less information transmission and more disclosure (i.e., moral licensing), it may lead both
to a greater underappreciation of an advisor’s conict of interest and to poorer advice.
Our results pertain to information transmission to an average receiver. But the ultimate
desirability of precise language may hinge on the weight society aaches to dierent re-
ceiver types. For example, in the case of research, society may deem that information
transmission to referees, who are mostly sophisticated, is initially more important than
information transmission to the general public, who is more likely to be naive. Yet re-
searchers may write up their ndings in an aempt to persuade both of these audiences.
It may then be the case that exible language and its superior information transmission
to sophisticated receivers ought to be favored. On a related note, in some seings vague
messages may serve a more benevolent purpose than the exploitation of naive receivers.
For example, an organisation or policy maker may resort to vagueness to communicate
uncertainty about the exact type. en, if precision were imposed, this would lead to
overprecise beliefs on behalf of receivers.
Finally, while focusing on information transmission is sensible in our general seing,
it is not always clear-cut how information transmission maps into welfare in specic
applications. For instance, Ispano and Schwardmann (2018) show that when vertically
dierentiated rms compete for sophisticated and naive consumers through quality dis-
closure, inated beliefs about low-quality products on behalf of naive consumers may
improve welfare by exerting competitive pressure on the prices of high-quality products.
Moreover, consumers might simply enjoy thinking of the Bordeaux region while drinking
a blended wine from Roussillon.
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Chapter 4
Complexity and Appropriation
Interact in Aecting Compliance
Behavior
*
4.1 Introduction
Compliance decisions are oen very complex, requiring that individuals process large
amounts of information and rules, and le ample paperwork. Complexity of tax rules
and the tax ling process are particularly cumbersome (e.g., Slemrod and Sorum, 1984;
Benzarti, 2020), causing inaentive decision making (Abeler and Jaeger, 2015) as well
as confusion (Feldman et al., 2016; Taubinsky and Rees-Jones, 2017). Tax payers in the
Canadian province of ébec for example need to le up to 43 forms using an instruction
guide of more than 100 pages (Vaillancourt et al., 2015). In the United States, the burdens
associated with ling taxes have been estimated to cost about 1.2% ($200 billion) of the
GDP (Benzarti, 2020).1
Governmental ocials all over the world have recently started discussing the hypothe-
sis that complexity contributes to the tax gap between tax that is owed and tax that is
paid (Government Accountability Oce, 2017; Lumer and Singhal, 2014). While these
ocial reports acknowledge that taxpayers may underclaim benets, it is still believed
that complexity triggers predominantly self-serving non-compliance, whether intended
or not. In contrast, inaentive decision making or confusion are more likely to gener-
ate random deviations from required levels of compliance. To our knowledge there is no
*is chapter is based on joint work with Charles Bellemare and Florian Englmaier.
1See Slemrod and Sorum (1984) or Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992) for corresponding estimates obtained
using survey data.
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direct evidence of factors responsible for the hypothesis that complexity contributes to
self-serving non-compliance.
In this chapter, we use a controlled experiment to investigate the eects of complexity on
compliance behavior. We focus on the question whether complexity eects are linked to
the appropriation of taxes (i.e, the purpose for which collected tax funds are spent). is
allows us to study whether complexity induces random deviations from compliance rules
or rather serves a selsh/prosocial purpose.
Subjects in our experiment rst generate income in a real eort task before being ran-
domly assigned into one of four treatments based on a 2×2 factorial design. is design
varies complexity of compliance decisions and appropriation. In all treatments, subjects
are asked to calculate the share of their generated income they should keep as take-home
pay, with the residual share to be donated to a designated charity. We vary complexity
by manipulating tax forms from the province of ébec (Canada). In Simple treatments,
subjects are asked to calculate the share of their generated income they are required to
keep by completing a single one page form requiring three data entries. In Complex
treatments subjects are required to complete seven forms requiring 34 data entries. All
forms (both in Simple and Complex) were calibrated such that subjects who make the
correct calculations would be asked to keep exactly half of their generated income, with
the remaining half to be donated to their designated charity. We vary the appropriation
of donations by randomly assigning two dierent existing and certied charities across
subjects. e rst charity raises funds to facilitate stem-cell donations to newborns with
blood cancer. e second charity is a luxury private yacht club located in Germany. Both
organizations are certied as charitable organizations under German law, and hence do-
nations to both are tax deductible. Yet, redistributing generated income to the yacht club
plausibly triggers a stronger perception that donations to this charity as less morally jus-
tied. All subjects were asked to keep their share as take-home pay, leaving the remaining
share in a closed envelope to be donated aer the end of the experiment. ere were no
risks or penalties for non-compliance, ruling out these considerations from our analysis.
We nd that complexity has no signicant eect on compliance when taxes are dis-
tributed to a deserving charity. is mirrors results in Dwenger et al. (2016) who found no
eects on compliance behavior when simplifying payment of Church taxes. Our results
add to this and related ndings suggesting a signicant share of taxpayers are intrinsi-
cally motivated to comply with complex rules when taxes are distributed to a morally
justied cause (Abeler et al., 2019). Conversely, complexity is found to have a signicant
eect on compliance when taxes are distributed to the luxury yacht club. We also nd
that, conditional on forms under Simple, subjects keep signicantly more of their gen-
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erated income when taxes are distributed to a (more) deserving charity. is eect is
consistent with a pure morality eect suggesting how taxes are used maers for com-
pliance. Related non-experimental evidence consistent with this nding is Torgler (2003)
who nds that distrust in governments is positively associated with acceptability of tax
evasion. Overall, we nd a signicant interaction eect between complexity and morality
– non-compliance is signicantly accentuated under Complex when taxes are distributed
to the yacht club.
One explanation for the interaction eect is that complexity serves to reduce psychologi-
cal costs from non-compliance. Alternatively, it might be the case that the appropriation
of taxes aects the subjects’ compliance motivation and hence makes them more sensi-
tive to complexity variations. We provide further evidence showing that eorts to le the
forms are largely independent from tax appropriation. Moreover, calculation mistakes on
complex forms appear highly correlated with non-compliance when taxes are donated to
the yacht club. is bias is not observable when the money is donated to the cancer char-
ity; here, mistakes induce random deviations from the compliance rule. Both observations
together are suggestive evidence that complexity facilitates self-serving non-compliance
behavior.
e interaction of complexity and appropriation has implications in many areas. To start,
ocials designing tax policy need to take into account the perception of taxpayers con-
cerning the eciency and appositeness of government spending. When perceptions are
favorable, taxpayers are able and willing to work through complex rules, oering a lever-
age for elaborate tax policy. Spiegler (2016) surveys a literature in behavioral industrial
organization arguing that rms may prot from strategically introducing complex rules
at the expense of customers who then have diculties making correct value comparisons
across market alternatives. Examples range from major industries such as insurance, re-
tail banking, or telecommunications to the mundane task of supermarket shopping where
the large variety of potential substitutes, nonlinear and frequently changing prices, and
incommensurable measurement units complicate choices. is complexity can be explicit,
for example, elaborate fee structures employed by retail banks, or long service contracts
loaded with impenetrable jargon or implicit as the arcane reimbursement practices of
insurance companies. While product complexity is hard to avoid in many cases, it is a
common intuition that part of the complexity is in fact strategic, designed by rms to take
advantage of consumers. Our results suggest such distributive unfair practices may aect
compliance in these industries. Insurees, for example, may withhold or distort informa-
tion when ling complex reimbursement claims, amplifying moral hazard problems in
insurance markets.
79
Complexity and Appropriation Interact in Affecting Compliance Behavior
e remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents the experi-
mental design used in the chapter. Section 4.3 presents our main results and discusses
the policy implications. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2 Experimental Design
At the beginning of an experimental session, each subject generated income by position-
ing sliders on their computer screens (Gill and Prowse, 2019). Each correctly positioned
slider generated AC0.40 for a subject. Subjects positioned the sliders over two rounds (120
seconds per round). In each round, the screen presented 48 sliders and was split in two
sections “No. 1-24” and “No. 25-48”. Subjects were informed that their nal payout from
the experiment would be monotonically increasing in the number of correctly positioned
sliders, but they were not informed of the exact share of the generated income they would
receive as a nal payment for the experiment. ey worked in isolation from one another
at separate computer terminals.
Aer completing the slider task, all subjects privately received their generated income,
wrien instructions, one envelope containing forms as well as two empty envelopes.
Wrien instructions indicated that they had to calculate the share of their generated in-
come they could keep as payment for the experiment using the forms supplied.2 ey
were further instructed to place their shares in the empty envelope labelled “your share”,
and the remaining shares in the second empty envelope labelled “remaining share”. e
instructions also indicated that the content of the “remaining share”-envelopes would be
donated to a designated charity.3 Subjects were informed that researchers would only
collect the envelopes labelled “remaining share” aer everybody le the room, and that
the content of these envelopes would be transferred to the designated charity. Subjects
were also instructed to leave behind the forms lled to calculate the respective shares.
Forms and content of “remaining share”-envelopes thus contained information to mea-
sure rule non-compliance as well as possible calculation mistakes. Risk aversion is ruled
out in the above design as subjects faced neither probabilisitc audits nor penalties for
non-compliance or mistakes.4 As a result, form calculations and content of the “remain-
ing share”-envelopes need not match. Moreover, no binding time restrictions were placed
on subjects to complete the experiment. Subjects were nevertheless presented a reference
2e full instructions, translated from German, can be found in Appendix D.1.
3An overview of the number of correctly positioned sliders in both rounds was displayed on the computer
screen. Screenshots can be found in Appendix D.2. Each workplace was equipped with a pen, sticky tape,
and a calculator. e sticky tape was used to seal all envelopes aer shares were allocated.
4We made sure that this was clear to subjects by allowing them to put the “your share”-envelopes in their
bags and by telling them that these envelopes must not be opened.
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time of 900 seconds which was reached by about 5% of subjects. Subjects le the labora-
tory aer answering some socio-economic questions.
e experiment is based on a 2x2 between-subject factorial design, interacting complex-
ity and the appropriation of the taxed money. Forms were either Simple (a one page
form with three items to ll) or Complex (seven forms with a total of 34 items to ll).
Under Complex, forms also incorporated if -conditions and required subjects to trans-
fer intermediate calculations across the dierent forms. We utilize abstract formats of
the tax forms used in the Canadian province of ébec to operationalize complexity.5
Forms (under Simple or Complex) were calibrated for the experiment such that subjects
who comply and make no calculation mistakes were asked to keep 50% of their gener-
ated income as payment for the experiment, with the remaining income to be placed in
the “remaining share”-envelope for later distribution to the designated charity. e sec-
ond treatment dimension varies the designated charitable organization the taxed money
is donated to. Half of the subjects were informed that the content of the “remaining
share”-envelope would be donated to the Deutsche Knochenmarkspende (in English: Ger-
man Bone Marrow Donation Registry; hereaer DKMS). e other half of subjects were
told contents would be donated to the Bayrischer Yachtclub (in English: Bavarian Yacht
Club; hereaer BYC). Instructions for subjects presented the mission statement of each
organization translated below:
“e main activity of the DKMS is to improve the healing potential of leukemia
and other life-threatening diseases of the blood-forming system by supporting
bone marrow donations. One major part of DKMS is the DKMS umbilical cord
blood bank, which collects, processes, stores, and mediates umbilical cord blood
stem cell donations for newborns. (Information from www.dkms.de)”
5Both a screenshot of the original ébec tax forms and the experimental versions can be found in Appendix
D.3.
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“e main activity of the BYC is to professionally promote sailing with all its
modern features and high standards. In addition, the social life outside the gates
of Munich is cultivated. e BYC also has an exquisite restaurant in its Club-
casino at the Lake Starnberg. (Information from www.byc.de)”
DKMS and the BYC are both classied as charitable organizations (“gemeinnützig”) under
German tax law, making them eligible for tax-preferred donations. While both organiza-
tions are legitimate recipients of donations, donating to DKMS appeals to higher moral
standards, while donations to BYC, an elite organization in Germany, is intended to in-
voke the idea of ineective or wasteful spending and rather low moral standards. In the
following section, Waste will denote treatment specic donations to BYC, while Moral
will denote donations to DKMS. Similarly, Simple and Complex will denote treatment
specic form complexity described above.
e experiment was programmed using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007). 320 subjects (80 per
treatment cell) were recruited with the help of ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) and participated
in 32 sessions of our experiment at the Munich Experimental Laboratory for Economic
and Social Sciences (MELESSA) in the summer of 2017. Every session was supervised by
the same experimenter. e core socioeconomic variables are balanced across treatments,
suggesting successful treatment specic randomization; see Appendix D.4.
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Data
Subjects on average generated AC16.86 of income in the slider task (3.88 std. dev., mini-
mum of AC0, maximum of AC28). e empirical distribution of generated income is similar
to what has been reported in other experiments using the same slider task (e.g., Gill and
Prowse, 2019; Abeler and Jaeger, 2015). Figure 4.1 presents the distributions of gener-
ated income for each of the four treatment groups. Average earned income across treat-
ments are similar, ranging fromAC16.45 inWaste/Complex toAC17.36 inMoral/Complex.
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Figure 4.1 Distribution of Income from Slider Tasks
Distributions are not statistically dierent, with no pairwise two sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests rejecting the null hypothesis at usual signicance levels (lowest p-value =
0.172). is is reassuring because subjects had no treatment-specic information avail-
able when generating their income.
296 of the 320 subjects completed all steps of the experiment and hence form our sample
of analysis. Of the 24 subjects that are excluded from the analysis, two did not position
a single slider correctly, 9 took home the forms, and another 13 le almost all items of
the forms empty. ese behaviors are not treatment-specic, reected in the fact that
our main results are similar when accounting for selective ling in a Heckman selection
model (when appropriate) as shown in Appendix D.5. e net number of subjects per
treatments are 75 in Moral/Simple, 72 in Moral/Complex, 73 in Waste/Simple, and 76
in Waste/Complex.
4.3.2 Compliance Behavior
Figure 4.2 presents the compliance behavior on the extensive margin. Compliers, over-
providers, and evaders are dened as subjects who respectively donate 50%, more than
50%, or less than 50% of their generated income to their designated charity. We nd that
the proportion of compliers is signicantly higher in Moral relative to Waste treatments
(χ2; p < 0.001). Pooling over morality dimensions, complexity has a negative eect on
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Figure 4.2 Compliance Behavior on the Extensive Margin
Notes: Compliers, overproviders, and evaders donate respectively 50%, more than 50%, or less than 50% of
their generated income to the designated charitable organization.
the number of compliers (χ2; p = 0.055).6 Testing for complexity eects separately,
we observe signicantly fewer compliers due to complexity under Waste but not under
Moral (χ2; pWaste = 0.061; pMoral = 0.463). ese results suggest that subjects are
willing to comply and work through form complexity when the designated charitable
organization is morally justied. Finally, we observe 4% of subjects being overproviders
under Moral irrespective of form complexity, reecting that prosocial subjects are not
bound to limit their donations to the rule set in the experiment.
Treatment eects on the intensive margin are presented in Figure 4.3. All graphs plot the
corresponding distribution of donations per treatment along with sample averages (verti-
cal lines). Under Moral, we nd small insignicant dierences between the distributions
of donations across complexity levels (Mann-Whitney-U test (MWU); p = 0.568). Eects
of complexity emerge when comparing donations under Waste. ere, we nd that dis-
tributions of donations under both levels of complexity are dierent (MWU; p = 0.076).
ese non-parametric results identify general dierences between distributions of out-
comes across treatments but say lile about measures of central tendency (e.g. conditional
means) across distributions.
Table 4.1 presents regression analysis of compliance at the intensive margin. We consider
6e eects are similar when looking at the number of evaders (χ2; pmorality < 0.001; pcomplexity = 0.068).
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Figure 4.3 Compliance Behavior on the Intensive Margin
Notes: Distributions of money donated to designated charities by treatment. Vertical lines plot average
contributions for each treatment.
two related models. e rst model, estimated as OLS in column (1) and as Tobit in column
(3), regresses donations (in AC) on treatment variables and generated income, taking into
account or not censoring of donations at 0, respectively.7 e second model, estimated
as OLS in column (2) and as Tobit in column (4), regresses the share of generated income
donated on the treatment variables alone.
OLS results suggest that subjects on average donate AC2.39 less under Waste/Simple rel-
ative to Moral/Simple, a decrease in donations of about 30%. While complexity has a
small and insignicant eect under Moral (0.36AC), the signicant interaction of com-
plexity with Waste suggests that complexity reduced donations by AC1.32 (or -18.5%)
only when the designated charitable organization was less deserving. is nding is ro-
bust to using shares of generated income as the dependent variable (column (2)) or to
controlling for censoring of the dependent variable.
ese ndings are consistent with results on the extensive margin. All suggest that sub-
jects generally donate more to plausibly more deserving charitable organizations, a pure
morality eect. e eects of complexity on donations to a deserving charitable organiza-
tions are minimal – subjects appear to be willing and able to perform complex calculations
7Donations are censored from below at 0 while the share of generated income donated is censored from
below at 0 and from above at 1, respectively. One should interpret the p-values on the interaction eect in
non-linear models with caution as described by Ai and Norton (2003) and Greene (2010).
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Donation (AC) Donation (%) Donation (AC) Donation (%)
Waste -2.394*** -0.133*** -2.575*** -0.145***
(0.215) (0.0169) (0.231) (0.0188)
Complex 0.360 -0.00142 0.407* 0.00144
(0.229) (0.0134) (0.241) (0.0141)
Waste × Complex -1.321*** -0.0549** -1.556*** -0.0673**
(0.459) (0.0261) (0.539) (0.0304)
Income 0.189*** 0.189**
(0.0658) (0.0746)
Constant 4.606*** 0.468*** 4.534*** 0.465***
(1.078) (0.00944) (1.224) (0.0104)
Sigma
Constant 3.451*** 0.206***
(0.234) (0.0176)
Observations 296 296 296 296
Model OLS OLS Tobit Tobit
Table 4.1 Regressions of Compliance Behavior on the Intensive Margin
Notes: Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the amount and share of generated income donated to
the designated charity. Here, estimation results do not take into account the censoring of the data. In the
last two columns, censoring is taken into account. Clustered standard errors (session level) in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
in order to comply with morally justied donation requests. Notably, complexity reduces
donations only when the laer are made to less deserving charitable organizations.
4.3.3 Mistakes
261 subjects out of 296 (88%) correctly indicated on their forms that they should do-
nate 50% of their generated income. Figure 4.4 breaks down by treatment the propor-
tion of subjects incorrectly reporting the share of generated earnings they should do-
nate. We nd that this proportion is 7% under Moral/Simple and increases to 18% under
Waste/Complex. Inaccuracies appear to be higher under Waste than Moral for both
levels of form complexity.
Accurate reporting on forms does not automatically lead to compliance, as subjects who
correctly indicated on their forms they should keep half of their generated income could
do otherwise and leave the experiment with a dierent share. Selsh subjects for example
may decide to keep more of their income than what is prescribed. Selshness is directly
revealed by subjects themselves in this case given they leave behind a clear proof of their
understanding of the rules.
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Figure 4.4 Inaccurate Reporting
Notes: Bars show the proportion of subjects inaccurately reporting the share of generated earnings to
be donated by treatments. Vertical caps show the 95%-condence interval that is calculated based on a
standard normal distribution.
Figure 4.5 presents by treatment the average share of generated income donated for sub-
jects having inaccuracies on their forms. Overall, we observe that selshness occurs along
with inaccurate reporting; subjects with inaccurate reports donated 14%-points less than
accurately reporting subjects (MWU, p < 0.001). is paern appears across all treat-
ments. Admiedly, conditional on forms are complex, we nd that inaccurate reporting
is not associated with sizeable selshness when donations are sent to a moral charita-
ble organization – average donations hover near the targeted 50% and are comparable
to average donations for subjects having accurately lled out the forms. is is sugges-
tive evidence for the idea that form complexity per se did not lead to systematic devia-
tions of donations from the prescribed rule. A dierent reporting paern emerges under
Waste/Complex where average donations of subjects with reporting inaccuracies are
signicantly lower relative to subjects without reporting inaccuracies. Moreover, con-
ditional on reporting inaccuracies, we nd that subjects donate signicantly less under
Waste/Complex relative to Moral/Complex (MWU, p = 0.002).
An important question that arises from these observations is whether subjects willingly
report self-serving inaccuracies to facilitate non-compliance. Figure 4.6 plots the shares
to be donated as well as the shares kept by subjects as they have been reported on the
forms. We see no evidence of self-serving mistakes from this gure as one would expect
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Figure 4.5 Inaccurate Reporting and Donations
Notes: Bars show donations in % of income conditional on inaccurate and accurate reports, respectively.
Vertical caps show the 95%-condence interval that is calculated based on a standard normal distribution.
the reports to be biased favoring the share kept by the subject (or inversely discriminat-
ing against donating money to one of the charities). However, it should be noted that
strategically creating self-serving mistakes in our seing is costly as it would require, es-
sentially, the subject to work backward through our forms to slip in a convenient mistake
at some point. Hence, our reading of the data is that subjects in all treatments managed
to gure out how much to donate given their private preferences. If calculating the pre-
scribed compliance level did not work out smoothly and le subjects with uncertainty
about the rule, they were able to self-servingly interpret the uncertainty.
4.3.4 Decision Time
We examine decision times to further substantiate the behavioral mechanisms underly-
ing our results. In our design, subjects read the wrien instructions together before being
allowed to open envelopes that included their forms and the instructions related to cal-
culating the shares and the donation procedures. Decision times were measured from
that point onwards. Subjects were shown the results from their slider tasks in order to
allow them to ll out the forms correctly. We stop the time measurement when the en-
velopes have been sealed and the subjects end this part of the experiment by clicking on
88
Complexity and Appropriation Interact in Affecting Compliance Behavior
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0 .5 1 0 .5 1
MORAL/SIMPLE MORAL/COMPLEX
WASTE/SIMPLE WASTE/COMPLEX
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 S
ub
je
ct
s
Donations (in % of Income) Reported on Form
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0 .5 1 0 .5 1
MORAL/SIMPLE MORAL/COMPLEX
WASTE/SIMPLE WASTE/COMPLEX
Fr
ac
tio
n 
of
 S
ub
je
ct
s
Share Kept by Subject Reported on Form
Figure 4.6 Reporting on Forms
Notes: is gure shows histograms of reported donations (in % of income) (le) and the share kept by
subjects (right) for all treatments. Subjects that reported shares higher than 100% are not reected in the
histograms. is includes three subjects in the le and four subjects in the right gure.
the respective buon. Figure 4.7 presents the distributions of decision times in all four
treatments, where horizontal axes measure decision times in seconds.
We observe that decision time distributions under Complex treatments are clearly shied
to the right relative to corresponding distributions under Simple. Table 4.2 presents for-
mal OLS regression analyses of decision times on the main treatment variables of the
experiment. We nd signicantly longer decisions times due to complexity (average in-
crease of 279 seconds) and when the BYC is the recipient (average increase of 32 seconds).
ere also exists a positive interaction of Waste and Complex of close to 54 seconds,
which is signicant at the 10% level. Once we control for inaccurate reporting (see col-
umn (2)), the treatment interaction gets more precisely measured and remains robust at
about 52 seconds. At the same time, not reporting accurately is associated with a time
increase of 141 seconds. As shown in column (3), albeit not being statistically signicant
we observe that decisions are quicker in Waste/Complex when inaccuracies occur as
compared to when reporting is accurate.
ese observations are in line with our interpretation that ling mistakes induced by
complexity are an important facilitator of non-compliance. e decision time data how-
ever remains unclear whether the time premium in Waste/Complex is due to strategic
ling eorts or the time required to cope with the uncertainty about the compliance rule.
4.3.5 Discussion
Bénabou et al. (2018) develop a model where compliance decisions weight intrinsic duty to
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Notes: is gure shows histograms of the distributions of decision time in all treatments. e distribution
is approximated using a kernel density function.
comply against the moral costs of deviating from the compliance rule.8 ey show that
decision-makers can alter the informativeness of the signal that an action sends about
their prosocial type, and will do so only if it is eective in maintaining a self- or social-
image. Somewhat in line with the model mechanism, compliance in our experiment is
signicantly related to moral costs of non-compliance. One explanation for our ndings
is that subjects justify non-compliance in seings where moral costs are low. is conclu-
sion is suggested by the fact that calculation mistakes under the same level of complexity
do not bias donations in a specic direction when donations are made to a more deserv-
ing charitable organization. However, our subjects did not leave traces behind that could
reect self-serving manipulations of forms as predicted by the model.
In related experiments, Konow (2000) provides evidence on the malleability of fairness
perceptions from a set of simple dictator game decisions without relating to complex-
ity as a potential modulating factor. Exley and Kessler (2019) observe that subjects do-
nate less money to a charity when the transferred amount is calculated by, for example,
55+55+55+0 rather than by 55+55+55. When subjects were asked about the result of this
sum, they act as if they did not understand how to add a 0 to a sum. However, they
8Appendix D.6 presents a simple theoretical framework that illustrates how our design enables the identi-
cation of interaction eects. e model however remains agnostic about the underlying mechanism driving
the interaction process.
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(1) (2) (3)
Time Time Time
(in Seconds) (in Seconds) (in Seconds)
Waste 31.84* 23.85 12.30
(17.24) (14.61) (19.03)
Complex 279.4*** 273.16*** 267.3***
(20.25) (15.94) (21.54)
Waste × Complex 53.99* 51.66** 67.09**
(28.30) (24.60) (30.09)
Inaccurate 141.15*** 126.1***
(32.33) (35.96)
Waste= 0 × Inaccurate -126.5
(96.93)
Complex= 0 × Inaccurate -81.30
(115.6)
(Waste × Complex)= 0 × Inaccurate 151.5
(137.6)
Constant 257.3*** 247.90*** 252.7***
(13.93) (13.18) (16.52)
Observations 296 296 296
Model OLS OLS OLS
R2 0.535 0.581 0.585
Table 4.2 Regressions of Decision Times
Notes: Dependent variable captures decision time of subjects in seconds. Clustered standard errors
(session level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
have no problem in doing so when the money is split between two charities, i.e. when
the tradeo between money for themselves and money for a charity is eliminated. In
contrast to our seing in which the induced complexity was really complex, in Exley and
Kessler (2019) it was easier to self-servingly generate mistakes. Exley (2020) uses a related
design in which charity performance metrics (in particular the program expense rate) are
used by lab participants to construct excuses not to donate. A low program expense rate
can be interpreted as the less purposeful appropriation that is related to the yacht club
versus the cancer charity. Haisley and Weber (2010) show evidence that experimental
subjects in simple ambiguous dictator games have self-serving beliefs about ambiguity
which permits justications to realize unfair allocations in the game. In our experiment,
the strong but unbiased correlation between reporting inaccuracies and donations might
reect a similar justication eect that is based on the uncertainty that evolves from
complex forms. While selsh behavior in our experiment has been facilitated by ling
mistakes, our subjects did not exhibit a tendency to make more self-serving rather than
self-hurting mistakes as reported by Leib et al. (2019).
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In order to provide more real world context for our lab ndings, we exploit data from a
representative survey of 1,501 citizens living in the US provided by the PEW Institute.
Data contain opinions about tax complexity as well as aitudes towards the fair income
share of federal taxes to be paid. We nd that 29% of respondents indicating not being
bothered by tax complexity report that they pay more than a fair share of their income
for taxes. In contrast, more than 50% of respondents indicating being bothered signi-
cantly by tax complexity perceive their share of taxes as unfair. is dierence remains
statistically signicant below the 1%-level when controlling for core socio-economic vari-
ables (gender, age, income), party preferences, and ideological views.9 Additional survey
evidence from Gallup suggests that about 50% of tax payers in the US perceive their tax
payments as wasted money rather than money spent for the public good.10 is com-
bined evidence suggests that tax complexity may aect aitudes towards tax perception
and redistribution, consistent with our experimental ndings.
In contrast, charity specic compliance motivations are unlikely to explain our results
as we focus on subjects that ll in all forms completely. If the subjects motivation was
aected by the appropriation of the taxed money, we would have expected that we see
strong responses on the ling margin. We also nd no dierence across treatments with
respect to selective or incomplete llings (see Appendix D.5). Moreover, it is unlikely
that our results are driven by depletion eects that have been shown to increase uneth-
ical behavior by reducing self-regulatory resources of experimental subjects (e.g., Mead
et al., 2009; Gino et al., 2011). While subjects may have been depleted by ling complex
forms, depletion along the moral treatment dimension is unlikely. In addition, longer de-
cision times due to complexity are inconsistent with impulsive decisions that are usually
observed in the depletion literature.
4.4 Conclusion
Tax systems serve to achieve a myriad of social and political goals.11 Achieving these
goals simultaneously oen requires complex tax codes and ling procedures for many
individuals. In return, complexity imposes costs that should be taken into account to
determine eectiveness of tax systems. Costs of complex taxation have mostly been as-
9Estimation results are available upon request. Similar tax complexity interactions can be observed for the
aitudes towards increases or decreases of the federal budget to assist low income individuals in the US
and in the world, respectively.
10See hps://news.gallup.com/poll/232361/less-half-say-taxes-high.aspx.
11See Heich and Winer (1988) for a model how the intricacies of observed tax systems can be viewed as
the outcome of optimizing political and economic behavior in the context of, potentially divergent, goals.
Hence, tax structure is a system of related parts in equilibrium, not merely a collection of separate and
ill-designed components.
92
Complexity and Appropriation Interact in Affecting Compliance Behavior
sociated with compliance costs (e.g., Benzarti, 2020). We showed that increasing moral
costs of non-compliance increases compliance rates. We further documented a signicant
interaction of morality and complexity eects. In particular, complexity has negative ef-
fects on compliance behavior only when moral costs of non-compliance are low. Our data
appear consistent with subjects using complexity as a means to decrease psychological
costs from non-compliance. Complexity can thus be used to motivate non-compliance
and erode the eectiveness of policies which are not perceived as eective or morally
justied. is calls for intensied eorts in reducing the overwhelming complexity of tax
ling processes in many countries.
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A.2 Instructions
You are a member of a group of three, consisting of anonymous participants in this study.
All participants are randomly selected employees of [COMPANY]. e combination into
groups of 3 occurs randomly. e payouts for you and the other group members in this
section depend on your decisions and the decisions of the other members of your group.
Decision-making situation
Each member of the group must decide on the use of 10 tokens each. You and the other
group members can put the 10 tokens into a private account, or you can deposit them in
whole or in part into a common account. Any tokens that you do not deposit into the
common account are automatically added to your private account.
Income from the private account
You earn exactly one euro for each token you put in your private account. For example,
if you put 4 tokens into your private account, you will earn exactly AC4 from your private
account. No one but you receives income from your private account.
Income from the common account
For each token that is added to the common account, you will receiveAC0.5. e other two
group members also each receive AC0.5 for each token you contribute. Conversely, you
also earn money from the contributions of the other two group members to the common
account. e income of each member from the common account is determined as follows:
Individual income from the common account = Sum of the contributions of all three group
members to the common account times 0.5
For example, if the sum of all three group members’ contributions to the common account
results in 30 tokens, then you and the other two group members each receive 30 x 0.5 =
AC15 from the common account. If the three group members pay a total of 10 tokens into
the common account, you and the other two group members receive 10 x 0.5 = AC5 each
from the common account.
Total income Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account
and your income from the common account. So:
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Income from the private account (= 10 - contribution to the common account) + income from
the common account (=0.5 x sum of contributions to the common account) = Total income
As described above, you can use 10 tokens to fund your private account and the common
account. Each group member has to make two types of contribution decisions, which we
will refer to below as the contribution and the contribution table. You can nd a detailed
description of your entries on the entry screens.
A.2.1 Comprehension estions
Please answer the following questions to ensure that you have understood the instruc-
tions of the experiment. If you are unsure, you can return to the instructions by clicking
on “Back”.
1. Assume that none of the group members (even you yourself) pay a contribution
into the group account.
• How high is your total income?
• How high is the respective total income of the other two group members?
2. Assume that all three group members (also you yourself) each pay a contribution
of 10 tokens into the group account.
• How high is your total income?
• How high is the respective total income of the other two group members?
3. Assume that you deposit 0 tokens into the common account and that the other two
members of your group deposit 10 tokens each.
• How high is your total income?
• How high is the respective total income of the other two group members?
4. Assume that you pay 10 tokens into the common account and the other two mem-
bers of your group each pay 0 tokens.
• How high is your total income?
• How high is the respective total income of the other two group members?
100
Appendix A: Cooperation in a Company
A.2.2 Contribution Decisions
When choosing the contribution to the common account, you determine how many of
the 10 tokens you want to deposit into the common account. e deposit to your private
account is automatically the dierence between 10 tokens and your contribution to the
common account.
• Please enter the amount you would like to pay into the common account (any
whole-number value between and including 0 and 10 is possible): …
Now you will be asked to ll in a contribution table. In the contribution table, you should
specify how many tokens you want to pay into the common account for each possible
(rounded) average contribution of the other two group members to the common account.
So, depending on how much the others contribute on average, you must dene your own
contribution decision. For each average contribution of the other two group members,
please indicate the amount you would like to pay into the common account (any whole-
number value between and including 0 and 10 is possible; of course, you can also enter
the same amount several times):
What is your contribution to the common account if…
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 0 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 1 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 2 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 3 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 4 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 5 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 6 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 7 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 8 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 9 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 10 tokens.
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Help option: e numbers in the le column are the possible (rounded) average contribu-
tions of the other two group members to the common account. You now have to specify
how many tokens you want to deposit into the common account for each slider, provided
that the others contribute the specied amount on average. You have to make an entry
in each eld. For example, you are to specify how much you contribute to the common
account if the other group members deposit an average of 0 tokens into the common ac-
count; how many tokens you contribute if the others contribute an average of 1 token or
2 tokens or 3 tokens, and so on. You can enter any whole-number contribution from 0
tokens to 10 tokens in each eld and, of course, the same amount several times.
A.2.3 Incentive Compatibility
Payout relevance of your decisions
Aer all study participants have made their decisions, one member is randomly selected
in each group of 3. For the randomly selected member, only the contribution table lled
in by him/her is relevant for decision making and payout. For the other two group mem-
bers who have not been selected, only the contribution is relevant for decision-making
and payout. e average of the two contributions (rounded to the next whole number)
then determines the relevant conditional contribution from the third member’s contri-
bution table. Of course, you do not yet know which of your contribution decisions will
be randomly selected. You must therefore carefully consider both types of contribution
decisions, as both can become relevant to you.
e following graphic (Figure B.1) is intended to visualize the decision-making situation.
For the randomly selected person on the right, the conditional contribution from the con-
tribution table is relevant. For the other two group members, the contribution is relevant
for payout.
A.2.4 Belief Elicitation
In addition to your earnings from your private and common account, you will receive
a further payout for estimating the average contribution of the other two members of
your group to your common account. Your payout will depend on how accurately you
estimate the actual average contribution of your two group members. If you are exactly
right, you will receive an additional AC5. If your estimate diers by 0.5 or more tokens
from the actual average contribution, you will receive AC0. Please enter a number from 0
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Figure A.1 Incentive Compatibility
to 10 (each number is allowed in steps of 0.5).
What do you think is the average amount of tokens your two group members contribute
to the common account?
• … Average contribution of the other two members of your group
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A.3 Communication and Coordination of Employees
Employees could interrupt the experiments and continue at a later point in time. On av-
erage, employees nished the experiment and survey within approximately one and a
half days (mean=1.35 days). While employees in a public goods game group were anony-
mously selected and matched, one might be concerned about communication and coordi-
nation during the experiment as some teams in the company are seated in shared oces
(max four team members per oce). To alleviate this concern, we observe no correlation
between contribution behavior, beliefs and aitudes of employees with respect to the
variance of nishing times within work teams (Spearman Correlations; uncond. contri-
bution, ρ = −0.004, p = 0.905; belief about others’ uncond. contribution, ρ = −0.006,
p = 0.853; mean cond. contribution, ρ = 0.008, p = 0.827).
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A.4 Overview of Public Goods Game Measures
Our employee sample appears to be very cooperative as can be seen from Table 1.2. In
the unconditional contribution decision, they contribute on average 7.9 Tokens (which
corresponds to 79% of the endowment) in the public good. e average belief about the
public good contribution of the other group members equals 6.7 Tokens. e dierence in
actual contributions and beliefs is statistically signicant at the 1%-level (Wilcoxon Sign
Rank Test, p < 0.001). Reassuringly, we observe very similar responses in the public
goods games when comparing the variables collected from the experiments in 2017 and
2019. is holds for the data presented in Table A.4 – see column “Comparison”.
All Experiment 2017 Experiment 2019 Comparison
Count Mean SD Count Mean SD Count Mean SD P-Value
Unconditional
Contributions
910 7.89 2.93 438 7.90 2.97 472 7.88 2.90 0.890
Belief about
Others’ Con-
tributions
910 6.70 2.78 438 6.73 2.82 472 6.67 2.75 0.751
Mean Con-
ditional
Contribution
910 5.30 2.25 438 5.26 2.19 472 5.33 2.29 0.607
Slope Parame-
ter
910 0.71 0.43 438 0.71 0.43 472 0.70 0.43 0.818
Table A.4 Overview of Public Goods Game Variables by Wave
Notes: P-values rely on two-sample Mann-Whitney-U tests.
We observe that cooperative aitudes are highly predictive for unconditional contribu-
tions, also when we control for beliefs about other’s contributions (see Table A.5). Net-
Givers contribute more than Matchers and Matchers contribute more than Net-Takers.
Both dierences are highly statistically signicant.
e scaer plot in Figure A.2 shows a signicant variation in the average conditional
contributions and the reciprocity parameter of employees. e size of the bubbles repre-
sents the frequency of the observed combination of mean conditional contribution and
reciprocity. ere are several mass points that stand out.
Next to our cooperative aitudes, we also classify cooperation types as described by Fis-
chbacher et al. (2001) and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010). ese types are also visible in
the scaer plot. First, we observe employees that behave like perfect conditional coop-
erators ([1, 5]). Secondly, there are clusters of employees whose contributions are inde-
pendent of the contribution schedule. ey are either contributing nothing (free-riders)
or they contribute a strictly positive amount (unconditional cooperators). Most of the
unconditional cooperators contribute all their endowment. irdly, imperfectly condi-
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Uncond. Contribution
Belief About Others’ 0.642***
Undcond. Contribution (0.0269)
Net-Taker 0
(.)
Matcher 1.196***
(0.196)
Net-Giver 1.536***
(0.198)
Dummy (2019) 0.00693
(0.137)
Constant 2.520***
(0.282)
Observations 910
R2 0.509
Model OLS
Table A.5 Determinants of Unconditional Contributions
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure A.2 Relationship Between Mean Cond. Contributions and Slope Parameter
Notes: e graph contains data from all participating employees. Bubble sizes show the frequency of the
combination of both variables. Reciprocity is the slope parameter from an OLS regression between an
employees’ conditional contributions and the contribution schedule.
tional cooperators are split in two groups, conditional cooperators with a self-serving bias
(mean unconditional contribution below 5) and conditional cooperators with an other-
serving bias (mean unconditional contributions above 5). e remaining employees are
classied as Others.
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Figure A.3 Distribution of Cooperation Types
Notes: Bars show the fraction of all participating employees that belong to a particular cooperation type.
Bars are ordered by mean conditional contributions.
Figure A.4 Cooperation Types and Cooperative Aitudes
Notes: Bars show the fraction of participating employees that belong to a particular cooperative aitude.
Figure A.3 shows an overview of all types and Figure A.4 relates our cooperative ai-
tudes and the cooperation types. Cooperative aitudes subsume the classication types
reasonably well. We use cooperative aitudes because they prove handier for the statis-
tical analysis.
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Table A.6 shows an inverse U-shape relationship between cooperative aitudes and reci-
procity.
Slope Parameter
Net-Taker 0
(.)
Matcher 0.497***
(0.0328)
Net-Giver 0.134***
(0.0331)
Constant 0.456***
(0.0263)
N 910
R2 0.238
Model OLS
Table A.6 Reciprocity and Cooperative Aitudes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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A.5 Correlates of Cooperative Attitudes
In Table A.7, we present correlations of cooperative aitudes with socio-demographic
characteristics and behavioral measures. We account for the categorical scale of the de-
pendent variable by using a Multinomial Logit Regression Model.
Cooperative Attitude
Matcher Net-Giver Net-Taker
Age 0.00196 0.0252** Base Category
(0.0108) (0.0110)
Female -0.166 -0.418**
(0.192) (0.200)
High Education 0.102 -0.0451
(0.201) (0.205)
Patience 0.0191 0.0226*
(0.0131) (0.0136)
Competitiveness -0.286*** -0.391***
(0.103) (0.106)
Distrust -0.175* -0.278***
(0.103) (0.108)
Positive Reciprocity 0.368** 0.442***
(0.153) (0.161)
Negative Reciprocity 0.290*** 0.0965
(0.103) (0.109)
Dummy (2019) -0.00368 -0.198
(0.198) (0.201)
Constant -1.431 -1.716
(1.066) (1.115)
Observations 905
Pseudo R2 0.032
Model MnLogit
Table A.7 Cooperative Aitudes, Socio-Demographics and Behavioral Measures
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Five subjects missing because
they did not insert information on their socio-demographic status. High Education is an indicator for higher
than median education subsuming two out of ve education categories.
First, we observe an indication for age being positively related to the cooperativeness of
employees. Older employees are signicantly more likely to be Net-Givers rather than
Net-Takers. e share of Matchers is relatively stable across age cohorts. Second, female
employees are less frequently Net-Givers than Net-Takers and, again, the share of Match-
ers is very similar. Marginal eect calculations show that female employees are about
7%-points more likely to be Net-Takers rather than Net-Givers than male employees are.
ird, the competitiveness index correlates with cooperative aitudes. Intuitively, em-
ployees are more likely to be Net-Takers the more competitive they are. Moreover, we
nd that the agreement to the statement “You can’t trust strangers anymore” is highly
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predictive for the cooperative aitude. e likelihood of being a Net-Taker decreases with
reported distrust in strangers. Finally, we observe positive correlations between survey
measures for positive and negative reciprocity (agreement with “When someone does me
a favor, I am willing to return it” and “If I am treated unjustly, I will take revenge at the
rst occasion, even if there is a cost to do so”, respectively) and cooperative aitudes –
again, in the expected positive direction.1
In Table A.8, we present the correlations between cooperative aitudes and structural
variables from the company context. Here, the main observation is that the cooperative-
ness of employees is less pronounced in the individual performance pay scheme. While
we classify 20% of participants in the company performance pay scheme as Net-Taker,
the respective share increases to 27% in the individual performance pay. is increase in
the share of Net-Takers comes along with a decrease in the share of Matchers (from 41%
to 35%). e share of Net-Givers is not signicantly dierent between incentive schemes.
We do not observe signicant dierences in the distribution of cooperative aitudes with
respect to career levels, leadership responsibility, seniority, or the team work production
function.
Lastly, we use a short form of the big ve personality trait questionnaire validated by
Rammstedt et al. (2013) from our online survey. e traits consist of extraversion, agree-
ableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness. Table A.9 shows the correlation
between our cooperative aitude classication and the ve traits. Net-Takers are sig-
nicantly more extroverted and neurotic than Net-Givers, and more conscientious than
Matchers.
1Other studies report that female subjects (both employees and students) are more cooperative (e.g., Char-
ness and Villeval, 2009). Low cooperativeness of women compared to men in our context could be related
to the selection of women working in a male-dominated work environment.
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Cooperative Attitude
Matchers Net-Givers Net-Takers
Female -0.210 -0.415** Base Category
(0.200) (0.206)
High Education 0.127 0.0114
(0.209) (0.210)
Seniority 0.00382 0.0182
(0.0160) (0.0161)
Low Career Level 0.152 -0.105
(0.433) (0.459)
Medium Career Level 0.0924 0.403
(0.333) (0.343)
High Career Level 0 0
(.) (.)
Leader -0.133 -0.0317
(0.322) (0.319)
Ind. Performance Pay -0.511** -0.370
(0.232) (0.231)
Cloud 0 0
(.) (.)
Customer -0.163 -0.139
(0.218) (0.222)
Neither -0.387* -0.0336
(0.234) (0.231)
Dummy (2019) -0.0606 -0.303
(0.218) (0.217)
Constant 0.792 0.714
(0.539) (0.548)
Observations 861
Pseudo R2 0.014
Model MnLogit
Table A.8 Cooperative Aitudes, Socio-Demographics and Company Variables
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; 49 subjects are missing
be-cause they did not insert information of their socio-demographic status or there was no wage data
available. High Education is an indicator for higher than median education subsuming two out of ve
education categories. Career levels subsume several categories in each presented category.
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Cooperative Attitudes
Matchers Net-Givers Net-Takers
Age 0.00814 0.0316*** Base Category
(0.0106) (0.0109)
Female -0.0421 -0.291
(0.192) (0.200)
High Education 0.0749 -0.145
(0.201) (0.204)
Extraversion -0.136 -0.203**
(0.0927) (0.0949)
Agreeableness 0.0346 0.0957
(0.122) (0.125)
Conscientiousness -0.272** -0.129
(0.138) (0.143)
Neuroticism -0.134 -0.292***
(0.103) (0.107)
Openness 0.0323 0.149
(0.0984) (0.101)
Dummy (2019) -0.0274 -0.258
(0.195) (0.197)
Constant 1.972** 0.803
(0.984) (1.021)
Observations 906
Pseudo R2 0.018
Model MnLogit
Table A.9 Cooperative Aitudes, Socio-Demographics and Personality Traits
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Four subjects missing because
they did not insert information on their socio-demographic status. High Education is an indicator for higher
than median education subsuming two out of ve education categories.
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A.6 Description of Outcome Variables
In the following, we provide descriptive analyses of our main outcome variables. Com-
pany variables stem from the records as of 12/31/2017 for employees that were invited to
participate in the experiments in 2017. For employees invited to the second experiment,
we use record data as of 12/31/2018.
Table A.10 shows the data availability for our main outcome variables. We have data
on recognition awards from 2017 for employees that participated in 2017 and the data
from 2018 for the participants from 2019. Wage data covers 2016/2017 and 2017/2018
for the employees in the dierent roll-out phases, respectively. is allows us to look
at changes in wage over time. We do not have information on nancial awards in 2018
for employees from the rst experiments due to data restrictions at the company. In
addition, the company-wide budget for the nancial award allocation diered strongly
between 2017 and 2018 such that there is low comparability.
Wage Financial Awards Recognition Awards
2016 2017 2018 2017 2018 2017 2018
Participants from
Experiments 2017 X X X X X X X
Participants from
Experiments 2019 X X X X X X X
Table A.10 Overview of Record Data Used as Outcome Variables
Notes: Table shows the data availability of our main outcome variables for employees that could participate
in 2017 and 2019, respectively. e variables are retrieved from the company records at the 12/31/2017 or
the 12/31/2018, respectively.
Wages. Between 2016 and 2018, participating employees received an average yearly wage
increase (in percent of the previous year) of 4.5% with a standard deviation of 8.61% within
the range of -63.4% and 72.5%. Calculated as a full-time position equivalent, we observe
an average increase of 4.2% with a standard deviation of 3.58% within the range of -8.5%
and 33.9%. A full-time wage equivalent equals the nominal wage dived by the part-time
share. For example, if an employee receives a wage of AC50,000 but works part-time on
a 50% position, the full-time equivalent is 50,000/50% = AC100,000. Here, we assume a
linear relation between the part-time parameter and the wage level which might not be
true. In our analyses, we rely on the nominal compensation changes and levels (including
potential variations in the part-time parameter).
Financial awards. We measure the award value in percent of the wage in 2017. In this
year, conferred awards were worth up to 30% of the yearly wage. e average award
payment was about 6% (standard deviation of 5.5%). About 60.4% of employees received
an award payment larger than 0.
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Recognition awards. In total, we observe 354 recognition awards received by 225 (38.90%)
employees and 274 awards sent by 102 (11.21%) employees in 2017 and 2018.2 Conditional
on sending at least one award, we observe that employees sent up to 20 awards with the
median number being 2 and a mean of 2.69. Conditional on receiving at least one award,
employees received up to 7 awards with the median number being 1 and an average of
1.57.
2e number of received awards and the number of sent awards do not need to equalize because we only
have a subsample of employees and awards can, of course, be sent to non-participating employees.
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A.7 Part-Time Variations and Financial Rewards
Table A.11 shows robustness analyses of our main eects with regard to the part-time
share of employees.
(1) (2) (3)
Wage Fin. Award FTE-Wage
Increase Payment Increase
(in %) (in %of Wage) (in %)
Net-Takers 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Matchers 0.00568 0.000596 0.00128
(0.00403) (0.00506) (0.00319)
Net-Givers 0.00413 -0.00312 0.00218
(0.00289) (0.00547) (0.00275)
Ind. Perf. Pay 0.000506 -0.00326 -0.0000508
(0.00599) (0.00819) (0.00580)
Net-Takers × 0.0208*** 0.0270*** 0.0148**
Ind. Perf. Pay (0.00773) (0.0103) (0.00734)
Matchers × 0.00898 -0.00361 0.0128
Ind. Perf. Pay (0.00855) (0.00928) (0.00818)
Net-Givers × 0 0 0
Ind. Perf. Pay (.) (.) (.)
∆(Part-time Share) 0.0127***
(0.000541)
Part-time Share 0.0000577
(0.000215)
Constant 0.0909*** 0.0145 0.0979***
(0.0126) (0.0273) (0.0123)
b[Matchers] p=0.655 p=0.412 p=0.737
-b[Net-Givers]
b[Matchers | IPP] p=0.218 p=0.002 p=0.816
-b[Net-Takers | IPP]
Socio Demographics X*** X*** X***
Company Controls X X X
Career Dummies X*** X*** X***
Dep. Dummies X*** X** X***
Observations 831 857 831
R2 0.817 0.244 0.198
Model OLS OLS OLS
Table A.11 Regressions of Financial Appreciation Controlling for Part-Time Eects
Notes: Standard errors clustered on team-level in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; For
wage increases, we use data from 2016/2017 for participants in 2017 and data from 2017/2018 for participants
in 2019. We use the value of nancial award payments received in 2017 in percent of the 2017-wage level.
FTE-Wage Increase is the full-time equivalent of wage increases. Asterisks for the control variables show
the test result from an F-Test, testing the joint dierence from zero.
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A.8 Wage Levels and Cooperative Attitudes
Columns (1) to (3) of Table A.12 show that we nd no signicant relationship between
wage levels and cooperative aitudes. In columns (4) to (6), we additionally control for
an interaction of cooperative aitudes and age. It can be seen that in these regressions,
Net-Takers and Matchers earn less than Net-Takers but that this eect decreases with
age. is is likely related to the explanations mentioned by us in the main text such as
in-/outux of employees and leveling eects of collective bargaining agreements.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage) Ln(Wage)
2016 2017 2018 2016 2017 2018
Net-Takers 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Matchers -0.00136 -0.000917 -0.0217 -0.0360 -0.123 -0.402**
(0.0288) (0.0188) (0.0244) (0.120) (0.0950) (0.177)
Net-Givers 0.0161 0.00706 -0.0123 -0.0167 -0.154* -0.300*
(0.0276) (0.0156) (0.0218) (0.112) (0.0911) (0.174)
Age 0.0101*** 0.0108*** 0.0128*** 0.00956*** 0.00840*** 0.00758***
(0.00197) (0.00123) (0.00161) (0.00271) (0.00188) (0.00287)
Net-Takers × Age 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
Matchers × Age 0.000810 0.00276 0.00812**
(0.00278) (0.00202) (0.00353)
Net-Givers × Age 0.000758 0.00358* 0.00618*
(0.00253) (0.00199) (0.00355)
Constant 10.49*** 10.40*** 9.965*** 10.51*** 10.51*** 10.24***
(0.107) (0.0788) (0.213) (0.130) (0.0934) (0.218)
b[Matchers] p=0.378 p=0.604 p=0.655 p=0.853 p=0.719 p=0.507
-b[Net-Givers]
b[Matchers | Age] . . . p=0.983 p=0.647 p=0.516
-b[Net-Givers | Age]
Socio Demographics X*** X*** X*** X*** X*** X***
Company Controls X*** X*** X*** X*** X*** X***
Career Dummies X*** X*** X*** X*** X*** X***
Dep. Dummies X*** X*** X*** X*** X*** X***
Observations 367 857 467 367 857 467
R2 0.785 0.752 0.746 0.785 0.752 0.749
Model OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Table A.12 Regressions of Wage Levels on Cooperative Aitudes
Notes: Standard errors clustered on team-level in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; For
wage increases, we use data from 2016/2017 for participants in 2017 and data from 2017/2018 for participants
in 2019. We use the value of nancial award payments received in 2017 in percent of the 2017-wage level.
Asterisks for the control variables show the test result from an F-Test, testing the joint dierence from zero.
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A.9 Survey Outcomes and Cooperative Attitudes
In Table A.13, we show OLS regression models of both variables on the share of Net-
Takers, Matchers, and Net-Givers in a work team, estimated using regressions with ana-
lytical weights to account for team-specic participation rates . We detect no statistically
relevant relationship to the perception of team stability as shown in column (1). However,
in column (2), we nd that members of teams that perceive themselves as being in a more
cohesive team tend to be more cooperative in the experiment.
(1) (2)
Team Stability Team Cohesion
Net-Taker Share -0.0438 -0.192
(0.423) (0.397)
Matcher Share -0.0709 -0.103
(0.299) (0.285)
Net-Giver Share -0.282 0.651**
(0.338) (0.272)
Constant 2.950*** 4.333***
(0.258) (0.255)
Socio-Demographics X X**
Company Controls X*** X
Career Dummies X X
Department Dummies X X
Observations 299 299
R2 0.076 0.046
Model WLS WLS
Table A.13 Regressions of Team Cohesion on Team Composition
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; We use OLS with
analytical weights that emphasize averages of teams that participated with a higher share of team members.
We control for gender and age composition as well as average seniority. We do not control for career levels
or function compositions because of the large number of dierent categories.
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B.2 Instructions
Information that are only presented in Info are highlighted in italics.
B.2.1 Managers
As a manager, you are connected to a group of three employees which consists of anony-
mous participants in this study. e participants are randomly selected [Company] em-
ployees without management responsibility. e combination into groups of 3 occurs
randomly. Your and your group’s payouts depend on your and the group members’ deci-
sions. In addition, your decisions determine the payouts of up to six additional groups.
Decision-making situation of the group members
Each member of the group must decide on the use of 10 tokens each. You and the other
group members can put the 10 tokens into a private account, or you can deposit them in
whole or in part into a common account. Any tokens that you do not deposit into the
common account are automatically added to your private account.
Income of the group members
e total income of a group member is the sum of income from his/her private account
and his/her income from the common account:
• Income from the private account: He/she earns exactly one euro for each token
he/she puts in his/her private account. For example, if he/she put 4 tokens into the
private account, he/she will earn exactly AC4 from the private account. No one but
he/she receives income from his/her private account.
• Income from the common account: For each token that is added to the common
account, each group member will receive AC0.5. I.e., the other two group mem-
bers also each receive AC0.5 for each token contribute. Conversely, the contributing
group member also earns money from the contributions of the other two group
members to the common account.
Your income
You as a manager will receiveAC15 for your participation. In addition to thisAC15, you also
receivesAC0.50 for each token that your group members contribute to the shared account.
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You do not earn from the deposits of your group members into the private accounts.
Your Decision
Before your group members make the contribution decisions, you decide whether or not
to pay the group member with the highest contribution to the common account an ad-
ditional payment of AC3 to his / her private account. In the event of a tie, the AC3 will be
divided among all group members with the same contribution to the common account. If
you opt for this additional payment scheme, this will cost you AC5. If you decide against
this, you will not incur any costs and no additional payments will be made to the group
members.
What do the group members know about your decision?
Before making any decisions, all group members will be informed that you, the manager,
decide on the additional payment of AC3. Your group members also know that the addi-
tional payment is costly for you and that you earn from the deposits into the community
account.
Tip for you as a manager
369 employees have already made their decision to allocate the 10 tokens between the private
account and the common account. ere was no additional payment for these decisions in
place. On average, 2.10 Tokens were paid into the private account and 7.90 Tokens into the
common account.
Summary
• All group members decide how many of the 10 tokens they deposit into their private
account and how many of the 10 tokens they deposit into the common account.
• Each group member earns one euro for the tokens in the respective private account
and AC0.50 for each contributed token in the common account.
• You as a manager earn AC0.50 for each token contributed in the common account.
You cannot contribute tokens to the community account.
• e manager knows the average contribution of 369 other [Company] employees to
the common account. ere was no additional payment in place for these decisions.
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• As a manager, you have to decide whether to pay the group member with the high-
est contribution to the common account an additional payment of AC3 to their pri-
vate. e additional payment will cost you AC5.
• In decision-making situations without additional payment, 396 [Company] employees
paid an average of 2.10 tokens in the private account and 7.90 tokens in the common
account.
Comprehension estions
Please answer the following questions to ensure that you have understood the instruc-
tions for Part I of the experiment. If you are unsure, you can return to the instructions
by clicking on “Back”.
Assume that none of the group members pay a contribution into the group account.
• What is the total income (private account + common account) of a group member
in tokens?
• What is your income from the group’s common account in euros?
Assume that all three group members each pay a contribution of 10 tokens into the group
account.
• What is the total income (private account + common account) of a group member
in tokens?
• What is your income from the group’s common account in euros?
Assume that in a group, member A pays 0 tokens to the shared account, member B 5
tokens, and member C 10 tokens. Which member receives the additional payment of 3
tokens if the manager has selected this scheme? Member A / Member B / or Member C
Incentive Choice and Belief Elicitations
Please choose whether you want to pay the member with the highest contribution to the
common account the additional payment of 3 ACto his / her private account. is addi-
tional payment will cost youAC5. Yes. e additional payment is used. / No. e additional
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payment is not used.
In addition to your earnings from your private and common account, you will receive
a further payout for estimating the average contribution of the other two members of
your group to your common account. Your payout will depend on how accurately you
estimate the actual average contribution of your two group members. If you are exactly
right, you will receive an additional AC2.5 for each correct answer. If your estimate diers
by 0.5 or more tokens from the actual average contribution, you will receive AC0. Please
enter a number from 0 to 10 (each number is allowed in steps of 0.5).
• What do you think is the average contribution of your group members’ tokens to
the common account with additional payment?
• What do you think is the average contribution of your group members’ tokens to
the common account without additional payment?
• What is the average expectation of the group members about the contribution of
the other group members to the common account with additional payment?
• What is the average expectation of the group members about the contribution of
the other group members to the common account with additional payment?
B.2.2 Employees
You are a member of a group of three, consisting of anonymous participants in this study.
All participants are randomly selected employees of [Company]. e combination into
groups of 3 occurs randomly. Your group will be connected to a manager. e manager is
a randomly selected [Company] manager, i.e. a [Company] employee with management
responsibility.e payouts for you, and the other group members and your manager in
this section depend on your decisions, and the decisions of the other members of your
group, and the manager’s decision.
Decision-making situation
Each member of the group must decide on the use of 10 tokens each. You and the other
group members can put the 10 tokens into a private account, or you can deposit them in
whole or in part into a common account. Any tokens that you do not deposit into the
common account are automatically added to your private account.
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Total income
Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account and your income
from the common account:
• Income from the private account: You earn exactly one euro for each token you put
in your private account. For example, if you put 4 tokens into your private account,
you will earn exactlyAC4 from your private account. No one but you receives income
from your private account.
• Income from the common account: For each token that is added to the common ac-
count, you will receive AC0.5. e other two group members also each receive AC0.5
for each token you contribute. Conversely, you also earn money from the contri-
butions of the other two group members to the common account. For example, if
the sum of all three group members’ contributions to the common account results
in 30 tokens, then you and the other two group members each receive 30 x 0.5 =
AC15 from the common account. If the three group members pay a total of 10 tokens
into the common account, you and the other two group members receive 10 x 0.5
= AC5 each from the common account.
Income of you manager
Your manager will receive AC15 for his / her participation. In addition to this AC15, he / she
also receives AC0.50 for each token that you and your group members contribute to the
shared account. e manager does not earn from your deposits and the deposits of your
group members into the private accounts.
Decision of your manager
Before you and your group members make the contribution decisions, your manager
decides whether or not to pay the group member with the highest contribution to the
common account an additional payment of AC3 to his / her private account. In the event
of a tie, the AC3 will be divided among all group members with the same contribution to
the common account. If your manager decides on the additional payment, this costs the
manager AC5. If he / she decides against this, the manager incurs no costs and no addi-
tional payments are made to the group members.
What does the manager know when making a decision?
e manager received information about the average contribution decision of 369 other em-
ployees. ese employees have already decided on the allocation of the 10 tokens between
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the private account and the common account. ere was no additional payment for these
decisions in place. e manager also knows your decision-making situation. So he / she
knows how much you earn, what your decision looks like and he / she also knows that
you know about his / her decision. e manager doesn’t know how much you and your
group members are contributing when taking his/her decision on the additional payment.
Your entries
As described above, you can use 10 tokens to fund your private account and the common
account. Each group member has to make two types of contribution decisions, which we
will refer to below as the contribution and the contribution table. You can nd a detailed
description of your entries on the entry screens. When you make your decisions, you do
not yet know whether the manager has selected the additional payment or not. at is
why you make every decision for both scenarios - once with and once without additional
payment. Since both scenarios can be relevant to your payout, you should think carefully
about your decisions in both scenarios.
Summary
• All group members decide how many of the 10 tokens they deposit into your private
account and how many of the 10 tokens they deposit into the common account.
• Each group member earns one euro for the tokens in the respective private account
and AC0.50 for each contributed token in the common account.
• e manager also earns AC0.50 for each token contributed in the common account.
He / she cannot contribute tokens to the community account.
• e manager knows the average contribution of 369 other [Company] employees to
the common account. ere was no additional payment in place for these decisions.
• Before you take your decisions, your manager must decide whether he / she pays
the group member with the highest contribution to the common account an addi-
tional payment of AC3 to the private account or whether he / she does not pay any
additional payment. e additional payment costs the manager AC5.
• You do not yet know how your manager decides and make your apportionment
decision in the event that he / she pays the additional payment and in the event
that he / she does not pay any.
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Comprehension estions
Please answer the following questions to ensure that you have understood the instruc-
tions of the experiment. If you are unsure, you can return to the instructions by clicking
on “Back”. When talking about your total income, please think of the sum of the in-
come from the private account and the common account without the possible additional
payment.
1. Assume that none of the group members (even you yourself) pay a contribution
into the group account.
• How high is your total income?
• How high is the respective total income of the other two group members?
2. Assume that all three group members (also you yourself) each pay a contribution
of 10 tokens into the group account.
• How high is your total income?
• How high is the respective total income of the other two group members?
3. Assume that you deposit 0 tokens into the common account and that the other two
members of your group deposit 10 tokens each.
• How high is your total income?
• How high is the respective total income of the other two group members?
4. Assume that you pay 10 tokens into the common account and the other two mem-
bers of your group each pay 0 tokens.
• How high is your total income?
• How high is the respective total income of the other two group members?
Assume that in a group, member A pays 0 tokens to the shared account, member B 5
tokens, and member C 10 tokens. Which member receives the additional payment of 3
tokens if the manager has selected this scheme? Member A / Member B / Member C
Is the additional payment scheme costly for the manager? Yes. e manager incurs costs
of AC5. / No. e manager incurs no costs.
129
Appendix B: Cooperation, Free-Riding, and the Signaling Value of Incentives
Is your manager informed about other [Company] employees’ contributions before making
a decision on the additional payment? Yes. / No.
Contribution Decisions
When choosing the contribution to the common account, you determine how many of
the 10 tokens you want to deposit into the common account. e deposit to your private
account is automatically the dierence between 10 tokens and your contribution to the
common account.
Please enter the amount you would like to pay into the common account (any whole-
number value between and including 0 and 10 is possible), if …
• … the manager has not selected the additional payment
• … the manager has selected the additional payment
Now you will be asked to ll in a contribution table. In the contribution table, you should
specify how many tokens you want to pay into the common account for each possible
(rounded) average contribution of the other two group members to the common account.
So, depending on how much the others contribute on average, you must dene your own
contribution decision. For each average contribution of the other two group members,
please indicate the amount you would like to pay into the common account (any whole-
number value between and including 0 and 10 is possible; of course, you can also enter
the same amount several times):
What is your contribution to the common account if the manager has not selected the
additional payment and …
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 0 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 1 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 2 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 3 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 4 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 5 tokens.
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• … the other two group members deposit an average of 6 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 7 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 8 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 9 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 10 tokens.
What is your contribution to the common account if the manager has selected the addi-
tional payment and …
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 0 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 1 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 2 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 3 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 4 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 5 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 6 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 7 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 8 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 9 tokens.
• … the other two group members deposit an average of 10 tokens.
Help option: e numbers in the le column are the possible (rounded) average contribu-
tions of the other two group members to the common account. You now have to specify
how many tokens you want to deposit into the common account for each slider, provided
that the others contribute the specied amount on average. You have to make an entry
in each eld. For example, you are to specify how much you contribute to the common
account if the other group members deposit an average of 0 tokens into the common ac-
count; how many tokens you contribute if the others contribute an average of 1 token or
2 tokens or 3 tokens, and so on. You can enter any whole-number contribution from 0
tokens to 10 tokens in each eld and, of course, the same amount several times.
131
Appendix B: Cooperation, Free-Riding, and the Signaling Value of Incentives
Incentive Compatibility
Payout relevance of your decisions
Aer all study participants have made their decisions, one member is randomly selected
in each group of 3. For the randomly selected member, only the contribution table lled
in by him/her is relevant for decision making and payout. For the other two group mem-
bers who have not been selected, only the contribution is relevant for decision-making
and payout. e average of the two contributions (rounded to the next whole number)
then determines the relevant conditional contribution from the third member’s contri-
bution table. Of course, you do not yet know which of your contribution decisions will
be randomly selected. You must therefore carefully consider both types of contribution
decisions, as both can become relevant to you.
e following graphic (Figure B.1) is intended to visualize the decision-making situation.
For the randomly selected person on the right, the conditional contribution from the con-
tribution table is relevant. For the other two group members, the contribution is relevant
for payout.
Figure B.1 Incentive Compatibility
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Belief Elicitation
In addition to your earnings from your private and common account, you will receive
a further payout for estimating the average contribution of the other two members of
your group to your common account. Your payout will depend on how accurately you
estimate the actual average contribution of your two group members. If you are exactly
right, you will receive an additional AC5. If your estimate diers by 0.5 or more tokens
from the actual average contribution, you will receive AC0. Please enter a number from 0
to 10 (each number is allowed in steps of 0.5).
What do you think is the average amount of tokens your two group members contribute
to the common account?
• If the manager has selected the additional payment: …
• If the manager has not selected the additional payment: …
What percentage of managers chooses the additional payment scheme? Please enter a
number from 0% to 100% in steps of 5% points. If you are exactly right, you will receive
AC1.50. If your estimate is 5 percentage points or more away from the actual average value,
you will receive AC0.
Please enter a number from 0 to 10 for each of the next question (any number in steps of
0.5 is allowed). If you are exactly right, you will receive AC1.00 each. If your estimate is
0.5 points or more away from the actual average value, you will receive AC0.
What is the average expectation of the managers about the contribution of the group
members to the common account if …
• … the manager has not selected the additional payment
• … the manager has selected the additional payment
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B.3 Balance Tables
Info No Info P-Value
Age 44.83 (10.85) 43.13 (9.39) 0.678
Female 0.30 (0.47) 0.50 (0.51) 0.143
Seniority 12.31 (7.59) 11.17 (6.42) 0.523
Career Level
Low 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.21) 1.000
Medium 0.88 (0.28) 0.87 (0.34) 1.000
High 0.08 (0.28) 0.09 (0.29) 1.000
N 23 24
Table B.4 Balance Table Managers
Notes: P-values rely on two-sample Mann-Whitney-U tests for continuous variables or on Fisher Exact
tests for categorical variables. Career levels subsume several categories in each presented category. Job
functions are not shown in the table because there exists too many categories, but there are no signicant
dierences between treatment observable. Many managers have special bonus contracts such that I do not
show the variable Individual Performance Pay here.
Info No Info P-Value
Age 36.70 (8.65) 35.57 (8.00) 0.252
Female 0.30 (0.46) 0.36 (0.48) 0.168
Seniority 4.97 (4.14) 5.19 (3.62) 0.243
Career Level
Low 0.12 (0.33) 0.14 (0.35) 0.537
Medium 0.85 (0.36) 0.84 (0.37) 0.848
High 0.03 (0.17) 0.02 (0.12) 0.345
Indv. Perf. Pay 0.28 (0.45) 0.31 (0.47) 0.441
N 201 196
Table B.5 Balance Table Employees
Notes: P-values rely on two-sample Mann-Whitney-U tests for continuous variables or on χ2 -tests for
categorical variables. Career levels subsume several categories in each presented category. Job functions
are not shown in the table because there exists too many categories, but there are no signicant dierences
between treatment observable.
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B.4 Signaling Eects and Strategic Sophistication
(1) (2)
Belief Belief
I(Incentive) 2.106*** 2.188***
(0.242) (0.252)
I(Info) -0.406 0.242
(0.434) (0.506)
I(Incentive)× I(Info) 0.304 0.288
(0.394) (0.384)
Constant 4.954*** 5.474***
(0.314) (0.366)
Observations 406 396
R2 0.137 0.134
Table B.6 Treatment Eects on Beliefs by Self-Evaluation of Math Skills
Notes: For each employee and dependent variable two entries are observed: one entry under the incen-
tive and one without the incentive. Standard errors are clustered on the subject level and are shown in
parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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C.1 Proofs
C.1.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Prediction 1a and 1b follow straightforwardly from proposition 1 and 2. Next, let Eg f lex
and Egprec denote R’s expected guess under exible and precise language
Eg f lex = χEg f lexχ + (1− χ)Eg
f lex
1−χ
Egprec = χEgprecχ + (1− χ)Eg
prec
1−χ,
where the subscripts χ and 1− χ refer respectively to the expected guess of a naive and
a sophisticated R. Also, let µ = 1/2 represent the prior mean.
By the law of iterated expectations, Eg f lex1−χ = Eg
prec
1−χ = µ. us, proving prediction 2a
boils down to show that Eg f lexχ > Eg
prec
χ > µ. Let us denote by g
f lex
χ (ω) and g
prec
χ (ω) the
equilibrium guess of a naive R when the state is ω under precise and exible language,
respectively. For any ω, g f lexχ (ω) ≥ g
prec
χ (ω), with strict inequality unless ω = 0 or
ω = 1, so that Eg f lexχ > Eg
prec
χ . Moreover, under precise language g
f lex
χ (ω) ≥ ω with
strict inequality whenever ω ≤ ω∗, so that Egprecχ > µ.
As for prediction 2b, Eg f lex is strictly increasing in χ since Eg f lexχ and Eg
f lex
1−χ are indepen-
dent from χ and Eg f lexχ > Eg
f lex
1−χ. Eg
prec is strictly increasing in χ since Egprecχ > Eg
prec
1−χ
and, moreover, while Egprec1−χ is independent from χ, Eg
prec
1−χ is strictly increasing. Indeed
Egprecχ =
∫ ω∗
0
µ dω +
∫ 1
ω∗
ω dω = µ +
∫ ω∗
0
(µ−ω) dω,
which is strictly increasing since so is ω∗ and, as ω∗ < µ, µ − ω > 0 in the relevant
integration range.
C.1.2 Proof of Proposition 4
Prediction 3a follows directly from prediction 2a. Using the notation introduced in the
previous proof (section C.1.1), prediction 3b follows from the fact that for types ω >
ω∗, g f lexχ (ω) > g
prec
χ (ω) and g
f lex
1−χ(ω) = g
prec
1−χ(ω), while for types ω ≤ ω∗ precise
language is preferable if and only
χµ + (1− χ)ω
∗
2
≥ χω + 1
2
+ (1− χ)ω. (C.1)
138
Appendix C: Spin Doctors
e inequality is violated at ω = ω∗/2, veried strictly at ω = 0, and, since the le-hand
side and right-hand side are respectively independent from ω and strictly decreasing,
there is a unique ω̂ ∈ (0, ω∗/2) such that the inequality holds if and only if ω ≤ ω̂.
Next, if we denote the expected loss of R under exible and precise language as EL f lex
and ELprec, respectively, and we use the subscript χ and 1− χ to denote the expected
loss of a naive and a sophisticated R, respectively, we have
ELprec = χ
∫ ω∗
0
(µ−ω)2 dω︸ ︷︷ ︸
ELprecχ
+ (1− χ)
∫ ω∗
0
(
ω∗
2
−ω
)2
dω︸ ︷︷ ︸
ELprec1−χ
=
χ2(3 + χ)
12(1 + χ)3
EL f lex = χ
∫ 1
0
(
ω + 1
2
−ω
)2
dω︸ ︷︷ ︸
EL f lexχ
+ (1− χ) 0︸︷︷︸
EL f lex1−χ
=
χ
12
.
Prediction 4a follows from ELprec1−χ > EL
f lex
1−χ = 0 and
EL f lexχ >
∫ ω∗
0
(
ω + 1
2
−ω
)2
dω >
∫ ω∗
0
(µ−ω)2 dω = ELprecχ .
e last inequality holds because in the relevant integration range ω < µ < ω+12 .
Finally prediction 4a follows from analytical inspection, i.e., ELprec = cEL f lex with
c = χ(3+χ)
(1+χ)3 < 1.
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C.2 Extensions
C.2.1 General Distribution of Naivete
In this section we suppose the belief of a χ-naive R upon any given message is a mixture
of the posterior of a fully sophisticated receiver (with weight 1− χ) and a fully naive
receiver (with weight χ). Besides, we assume R’s type χ is drawn form a continuous
distribution h(χ) with full support on [0, 1], mean λ and variance σ2. e binary model
we use in section 3.3.2 hence obtains as limit and special case when h(χ) puts weight only
on 0 and 1. Likewise, the model in Eyster and Rabin (2005) corresponds to a degenerate
h(χ) that puts all weight on a single value of χ.
One can easily verify that proposition 1 still describes S’s behavior under exible lan-
guage, so that the guess of a χ-naive R upon message [a, b] with b ≥ a is gχ
(
[a, b]
)
=
χ(a+ b)/2+(1−χ)a. As for S’s behavior under precise language, it is as in proposition
2 except that S’s disclosure cuto now must solve
ω∗ =
∫ 1
0
(
χ
1
2
+ (1− χ)ω
∗
2
)
h(χ)dχ.
e unique solution is ω∗ = λ1+λ . e guess of χ-naive R upon nondisclosure is then
χ 12 + (1− χ)
ω∗
2 .
us, all results of section 3.3.2 generalize to this more exible model. In particular, we
formally establish an equivalent of predictions 4a and 4b.
Proposition 5. For any distribution of naivete in the population
B.a the ex-ante expected payo of R is higher under precise language than under exible
language
B.b ex-post, the expected payo of a χ-naive R is higher under precise language than
under exible language if and only if χ is above some cuto χ∗ ∈ (0, 1).
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Proof. e expected loss of R under exible and precise language are now
EL f lex =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
(
χ
ω + 1
2
+ (1− χ)ω−ω
)2
dω h(χ)dχ =
∫ 1
0
χ2
12︸︷︷︸
EL f lexχ (χ)
h(χ)dχ
ELprec =
∫ 1
0
∫ ω∗
0
(
χ
1
2
+ (1− χ)ω
∗
2
−ω
)2
dω h(χ)dχ
=
∫ 1
0
1
12
ω∗
(
(ω∗)2 + 3(1−ω∗)2χ2
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ELprecχ (χ)
h(χ)dχ,
where EL f lexχ and EL
prec
χ denote the expected loss of type χ. Prediction B.b follows from
EL f lexχ (0) = 0 <
(ω∗)3
12
= ELprecχ (0),
EL f lexχ (1) =
1
12
>
1
2
ω∗(3− 6ω∗ + 4(ω∗)2) = ELprecχ (1),
dEa f lex
dχ
=
χ
6
>
1
2
ω∗(1−ω∗)2χ = dEa
prec
dχ
.
As for prediction B.a, we may write
ELprec − EL f lex = 1
12
∫ 1
0
(
(ω∗)3 − (1− 3(1−ω∗)2ω∗)χ2
)
h(χ)dχ
∝
λ3 − (1 + λ2(3 + λ))E
[
χ2
]
(1 + λ)3
.
us, ELprec ≥ EL f lex if and only if
E
[
χ2
]
≤ λ
3
1 + 3λ2 + λ3
.
Using E
[
χ2
]
≡ λ2 + σ2, one sees that this is impossible as σ2 > 0 and λ2 > λ31+3λ2+λ3 .
C.2.2 General Distribution of the State of Nature
e equilibrium behavior described at proposition 1 and 2 naturally generalizes to any
arbitrary prior distribution f (ω) which is continuous and has full-support in the interior
of [0, 1]. Let F(ω) denote its cumulative distribution and µ the prior mean. Under exible
language, the equilibrium is identical except that the guess of a naive R upon message
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[a, b] with b ≥ a is now
gχ
(
[a, b]
)
= E
[
ω |ω ∈ [a, b]
]
=
∫ b
a ω f (ω)dω
F(b)− F(a) .
Under precise language, the equilibrium is again characterized by a disclosure cuto ω∗ ∈
(0, 1). For a given ω∗, the guess of a rational and naive R upon nondisclosure are now
respectively g1−χ(∅) = E [ω |ω < ω∗] =
∫ ω∗
0 ω f (ω)dω
F(ω∗) and gχ(∅) = µ, so that the
disclosure cuto now solves1
ω∗ = χµ + (1− χ)
∫ ω∗
0 ω f (ω)dω
F(ω∗)
. (C.2)
e expected loss of R under exible and precise language are then
EL f lex =χ
∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
ω t f (t)dt
1− F(ω) −ω
)2
f (ω)dω︸ ︷︷ ︸
EL f lexχ
ELprec =χ
∫ ω∗
0
(∫ 1
0
t f (t)dt−ω
)2
f (ω)dω︸ ︷︷ ︸
ELprecχ
+ (1− χ)
∫ ω∗
0
(∫ ω∗
0 t f (t)dt
F(ω∗)
−ω
)2
f (ω)dω︸ ︷︷ ︸
ELprec1−χ
.
All predictions of section 3.3.2 other than 4a easily extend to this seing and their proofs
at section C.1 intentionally rely on general arguments.2 In particular, prediction 4b ob-
tains since ELprec1−χ > EL
f lex
1−χ = 0 and
EL f lexχ >
∫ ω∗
0
(
E
[
ω |ω ∈ [ω, 1]
]
−ω
)2 f (ω)dω > ∫ ω∗
0
(µ−ω)2 f (ω)dω = ELprecχ ,
1e solution is not necessarily unique. A sucient condition for this to be the case is that f (ω) is log-
concave.
2For the sake of precision, prediction 2b now requires equation C.2 to have a unique solution and prediction
3b requires the equivalent of inequality C.1, i.e.,
χµ + (1− χ)E [ω |ω < ω∗] ≥ χE [ω |ω ≥ ω∗] + (1− χ)ω,
to hold with equality for a unique ω. Log-concavity of f (ω) guarantees both.
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where again the last inequality holds since in the relevant integration range ω < µ <
E
[
ω |ω ∈ [ω, 1]
]
.
As for prediction 4a, we investigate it by simulation. In detail, we use as family of priors
the beta distribution, which is dened on [0, 1] and can take a wide range of shapes
(u-shaped, hill-shaped, increasing, decreasing) depending on its parameters α > 0 and
β > 0.3 We numerically solve the model for dierent values of α and β, each ranging from
1/10 to 10, and of χ, ranging from 1/20 to 19/20, and check whether EL f lex− ELprec >
0.4
e inequality is veried for 2226 out of 2250 parameter combinations. e 24 counterex-
amples all obtain when α ≥ 3 and β = 1/10, i.e., when the prior mean ( αα+β ) is very
large and the probability mass concentrated around 1.5 e sender’s ability to make up-
wardly vague claims under exible language is then somehow limited by construction,
while the set of types who disclose under precise language can be very small. is ex-
plains why information transmission may eventually be higher under exible language.
is occurs for intermediate levels of naivete in the population (in all counterexamples
χ ∈ [13/20, 17/20]), so that the disclosure cuto under precise language remains large
while at the same time the welfare of sophisticates has non-negligible weight in aver-
age receiver’s welfare. Notice, however, that in all counterexamples the percentage re-
duction in information transmission that imposing precise language entails is small, i.e.,
EL f lex−ELprec
EL f lex
< −4%, while in ”‘regular”’ instances the correspondent percentage gain is
typically larger (larger than 20% in 95% of the regular instances, and as high as 99%).6
3e density of a beta distribution with shape parameters α > 0 and β > 0 is
f (ω) =
ωα−1(1−ω)β−1∫ 1
0 t
α−1(1− t)β−1dt
.
4When α < 1 or β < 1, equation (C.2) can in principle have multiple solutions. Since ELprec is increasing
in the disclosure cuto, we programmed both a more stringent test which uses the largest solution and a
weaker test which uses the smallest one. is precaution proved unnecessary as in all instances ω∗ turned
out to be unique.
5When α > 1 and β < 1, the density of the beta distribution is hyperbolic increasing with a vertical
asymptote at 1 and, as α/β increases, the distribution gets steeper at high values of ω and aer elsewhere.
6Interestingly, the highest percentage gains from imposing precise language obtain for the same distribu-
tions that generate counterexamples but for dierent fractions of naives, namely, for χ very small. is
suggests that imposing precise language might still be on average preferable even for these prior distribu-
tions if the regulator faces some uncertainty about the level of sophistication in the population.
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C.3 Evolution of Play
Aer each round, each subject receives feedback about the sender’s type and the re-
ceiver’s guess in her pair. Tables C.1 and C.2 summarize how sender behavior evolves
over rounds in Flexible and Precise, respectively. We split the total number of rounds
in three phases of ve rounds each, i.e phase 1 (rounds 1 to 5), phase 2 (rounds 6 to 10)
and phase 3 (rounds 11 to 15). In Flexible, the most frequent messages of types 3, 4,
and 5 coincide with the theoretical predictions in all phases. Types 1 and 2 in rounds 1-5
use most frequently nondisclosure rather than their theoretically predicted message, i.e.,
respectively {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and {2, 3, 4, 5}. However, over time their behavior get closer
to the theoretical predictions. In particular, in rounds 6-10 and 11-15 types 2 most fre-
quently send the predicted message. Likewise, in rounds 11-15, the predicted message of
type 1 is almost as frequent as nondisclosure (14 subjects of type 1 do not disclose, 12
subjects send {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and 2 subjects send {1, 2, 3, 4}).
In Precise, we observe that over time disclosure rates generally increase for high types
and decrease for low types. e sharp increase in the disclosure rate of types 2 is likely
to reect a shi in the disclosure threshold, i.e., a strategic response to the increase in
receiver skepticism documented below. Instead, the increase in the disclosure rate of
types 5 is likely to be the result of learning, i.e., a reduction in noisy behavior.
type=0 type=1 type=2 type=3 type=4 type=5
rounds 1-5 nondiscl. nondiscl. nondiscl. {3, 4, 5} {4, 5} {5}
rounds 6-10 nondiscl. nondiscl. {2, 3, 4, 5} {3, 4, 5} {4, 5} {5}
rounds 11-15 nondiscl. nondiscl. {2, 3, 4, 5} {3, 4, 5} {4, 5} {5}
Table C.1 Modal Sender Messages Over Time in the Flexible Treatment
type=0 type=1 type=2 type=3 type=4 type=5
rounds 1-5 6.3% 10% 20.6% 71.1% 83.8% 70.8%
rounds 6-10 3.5% 3% 38.9% 92.1% 93.1% 93.3%
rounds 11-15 5% 3% 66.7% 85.2% 93% 92.9%
Table C.2 Disclosure Rates Over Time in the Precise Treatment
On the receiver side, the average normalized guess decreases over time, suggesting that
receivers become more skeptical (see also prediction 2b). In Flexible, the average nor-
malized guess is 32% in rounds 1-5, 23.1% in rounds 6-10, and 19% in rounds 11-15. In
Precise, it decreases from 38.2%, to 33.7% in rounds 6-10, and to 27% in rounds 11-15. e
regressions in Table 3.1 show that there is also a negative time trend in receiver mistakes.
However, receivers keep signicantly overestimating sender types in all phases (two-
tailed t-tests with clustering on subject and on pair level, for all phases p-value< 0.001).
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Columns (1) to (4) in Table C.3 document no dierential treatment eect on information
transmission across phases. In column (5), we observe that the treatment eect for so-
phisticated receivers signicantly increases in the direction predicted by theory in rounds
11-15. Column (6) conrms the estimation from Table 3.1 and shows no signicant varia-
tion over time. However, we acknowledge that the analysis of interactions between time
eects and treatment may suer from a lack of power.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mistake Mistake Mistake Mistake Mistake Mistake
Precise (d) -0.115 -0.196* -0.227* -0.316*** -0.0267 -0.0404
(0.0911) (0.101) (0.126) (0.0993) (0.110) (0.108)
Rounds 1-5 (d) 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Rounds 6-10 (d) -0.257*** -0.188** -0.302*** -0.314*** -0.284*** -0.148
(0.0692) (0.0757) (0.107) (0.0990) (0.0768) (0.0919)
Rounds 11-15 (d) -0.349*** -0.276*** -0.328** -0.434*** -0.380*** -0.128
(0.0785) (0.0922) (0.130) (0.142) (0.0841) (0.109)
Precise × Rounds 1-5 (d) 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Precise × Rounds 6-10 (d) 0.0694 0.0959 0.0247 0.113 0.209 0.177
(0.107) (0.0989) (0.160) (0.134) (0.132) (0.113)
Precise × Rounds 11-15 (d) 0.0911 0.0641 -0.103 0.148 0.292** 0.0423
(0.124) (0.111) (0.186) (0.173) (0.141) (0.118)
Constant 1.624*** 1.757*** 2.120*** 2.319*** 1.270*** 1.299***
(0.102) (0.119) (0.165) (0.156) (0.113) (0.133)
Type dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incl. sender choices All eory- All eory- All eory-
conforming conforming conforming
Incl. receivers All All Naives Naives Soph. Soph.
R2 0.173 0.457 0.338 0.608 0.136 0.454
Observations 1185 828 510 360 675 468
Table C.3 Regressions on Receivers’ Absolute Mistakes Over Time
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses; ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p <
0.01.
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C.4 Alternative Classication of Naives and Sophisti-
cates
is appendix demonstrates the robustness of results in columns (3) through (6) of Table
3.1 by repeating the analysis using dierent classications of sophistication and naivete.
In columns (1) and (2) of Table C.4, receivers are classied as sophisticated if they are
“rarely naive”, i.e., if they make the fully naive choice in less than 30 percent of the rounds
in which they face either vague disclosure or nondisclosure. In columns (3) and (4) of
Table C.4, receivers are classied as sophisticated if they are “never naive”, i.e., if they
never make a fully naive choice in the rounds in which they face either vague disclosure
or nondisclosure. In columns (5) and (6) of Table C.4, we use a measure that is exogenous
to receiver’s choices in the experiment for the classication: we classify receivers with
a high school math grade (Abitur) of 1 or 2 as sophisticated and receivers with a math
grade of 3, 4, 5 or 6 as naives. is classication is equivalent to a median split.
When we use the “rarely naive” criterion, we nd that naives make signicantly smaller
mistakes under precise language and that sophisticates make insignicantly larger mis-
takes under precise language. is mimics our ndings when we use the “hardly ever
naive” criterion in the main text. When we use the “never naive” criterion (columns (3)
and (4)), naives make insignicantly smaller mistakes under precise language, while so-
phisticates make signicantly larger mistakes. e “never naive” criterion results in a
more selective pool of sophisticates who are hurt by moving from exible to precise lan-
guage. When we classify receivers based on their high school math grade (columns (5)
and (6)), we nd that naives do signicantly worse and that sophisticates do insigni-
cantly beer under precise language.
e above criteria, except for the math grade, are based on the incidence of naive choices
and therefore pool all other choices under the label of sophisticated behavior. Alterna-
tively, we may call a receiver sophisticated if her choices line up well with empirical best
response behavior. Table C.4 uses three notions of empirical best response behavior to
classify receivers. Consider the criterion “best response 1”. As in section C.3, we divide
our experiment into phase 1 (rounds 1 to 5), phase 2 (rounds 6 to 10) and phase 3 (rounds
11 to 15). For each phase and each possible message, including nondisclosure, we calculate
the average type that actually sent this message. e use of phases allows us to arrive at
a more precise measure of average behavior. We call a receiver’s guess a noisy empirical
best response if it lies less than 0.5 above and less than 0.5 below the average sender type
conditional on a given message. e criterion “best response 1” then classies a receiver
as sophisticated if her guess is a noisy best response in more than 75 percent of rounds
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mistake Mistake Mistake Mistake Mistake Mistake
Precise (d) -0.186* 0.0294 -0.0856 0.188*** -0.343*** 0.0265
(0.0971) (0.0762) (0.0853) (0.0633) (0.0928) ( 0.0822)
Round -0.0202 -0.0319*** -0.0333*** -0.0207** -0.0491*** -0.0250***
(0.0138) (0.00607) (0.00755) (0.00852) (0.0106) (0.00653)
Constant 2.189*** 1.445*** 1.977*** 1.008*** 2.411*** 1.432***
(0.250) (0.112) (0.136) (0.0961) (0.142) (0.112)
Type dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incl. receivers Naives Soph. Naives Soph. Naives Soph.
Criterion Rarely naive Never naive Math grade
R2 0.361 0.138 0.265 0.116 0.375 0.130
Observations 300 885 750 435 330 855
Table C.4 Regressions on Receivers’ Absolute Mistakes by Naivite Classication
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses; ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p <
0.01.
that featured either vague disclosure or nondisclosure. e criterion “best response 2” is
laxer and classies an individual as sophisticated if her guess is a noisy best response in
more than 50 percent of rounds that featured either vague disclosure or nondisclosure.
e criterion “best response 3” is dened like “best response 1” except that is allows for
a 1-unit deviation from the true average type in dening the empirical best response.
In Table C.4, columns (1) and (2) feature the criterion “best response 1” and columns (3)
and (4 )the same criterion, but only theory-conforming sender behavior. Columns (5) and
(6) feature best response 2, whereas columns (7) and (8) feature best response 3. In all
cases, naives are found to make signicantly smaller mistakes under precise language,
while there is no treatment eect on sophisticates. A direct implication of our model’s
prediction that naives are beer o and sophisticates are worse o under precise language
is that the negative treatment eect of imposing precise language on receiver mistakes is
larger for naives, i.e., that there is a signicant interaction eect between treatment and
sophistication. Table C.5 conrms that the data bears out this prediction for all criteria
we have introduced above.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mistake Mistake Mistake Mistake Mistake Mistake Mistake Mistake
Precise (d) -0.257*** 0.125 -0.359*** 0.0297 -0.311*** -0.0775 -0.257*** 0.00789
(0.0810) (0.0814) (0.0873) (0.0482) (0.0811) (0.0746) (0.0932) (0.0439)
Round -0.0280*** -0.0339*** -0.0198*** -0.0206*** -0.0178 -0.0361*** -0.0219*** -0.0185***
(0.00774) (0.00852) (0.00670) (0.00572) (0.0105) (0.00634) (0.00762) (0.00439)
Constant 2.050*** 1.220*** 2.179*** 1.219*** 2.240*** 1.458*** 2.286*** 1.238***
(0.132) (0.115) (0.144) (0.111) (0.174) (0.110) (0.164) (0.0975)
Type dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Incl. receivers Naives Soph. Naives Soph. Naives Soph. Naives Soph.
Criterion Best response 1 Best response 1 Best response 2 Best response 3
Sender choices All eory- All All
conforming
R2 0.264 0.134 0.532 0.569 0.359 0.124 0.550 0.592
Observations 720 465 519 309 420 765 410 418
Table C.5 Regressions on Receivers’ Absolute Mistakes by Best Response
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses; ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p <
0.01.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mistake Mistake Mistake Mistake Mistake Mistake Mistake
Precise (d) -0.255*** 0.213 -0.209** -0.0824 -0.256*** -0.326*** -0.161*
(0.0785) (0.157) (0.102) (0.0852) (0.0814) (0.0915) (0.0891)
Round -0.0299*** -0.0299*** -0.0299*** -0.0299*** -0.0299*** -0.0299*** -0.0299***
(0.00583) (0.00582) (0.00582) (0.00582) (0.00583) (0.00583) (0.00583)
Hardly ever naive (d) -0.471***
(0.0684)
Precise x Hardly naive (d) 0.384***
(0.111)
Math grade 0.100*
(0.0515)
Precise x Math grade (d) -0.132**
(0.0615)
Rarely naive (d) -0.366***
(0.0774)
Precise x Rarely naive (d) 0.229*
(0.127)
Never naive (d) -0.419***
(0.0666)
Precise x Never naive (d) 0.247**
(0.107)
Best response 1 (d) -0.448***
(0.0732)
Precise x Best resp. 1 (d) 0.345***
(0.111)
Best response 2 (d) -0.398***
(0.0830)
Precise x Best resp. 2 (d) 0.229*
(0.118)
Best response 3 (d) -0.448***
(0.0733)
Precise x Best resp. 3 (d) 0.205*
(0.108)
Constant 1.907*** 1.450*** 1.908*** 1.765*** 1.888*** 1.995*** 1.892***
(0.0978) (0.148) (0.100) (0.105) (0.105) (0.102) (0.106)
R2 0.208 0.177 0.192 0.197 0.205 0.189 0.213
Observations 1185 1185 1185 1185 1185 1185 1185
Table C.6 Robustness Check on Receivers’ Absolute Mistakes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses; ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p <
0.01.
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C.5 Senders’ Out-Of-Sample Beliefs
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Figure C.1 Senders’ Out-Of-Sample Predictions
Notes: Senders’ out-of-sample predictions of receivers’ distribution of guesses conditional on observing
non-disclosure (by treatment). Senders made predictions about receiver behavior in a pilot experiment.
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C.6 Decision Screens
Figure C.2 shows the decision screen in Flexible. e sender could freely specify the
interval to send by clicking on and herewith selecting the respective types to be included.
A preview window showed how the message would appear on the receiver’s screen.
Figure C.2 Senders’ Decision Screen in the Flexible Treatment
Figure C.3 shows an example if a sender decision screen in Precise. Here, the senders
were provided with the two options in random order.
Figure C.3 Senders’ Decision Screen in the Precise Treatment
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C.7 Instructions
C.7.1 Flexible Treatment
is experiment is composed of 15 rounds. At the beginning of this experiment, it will
be determined randomly whether you are player S or player E. You will keep this role
in all 15 rounds. In each round you play a game with a randomly chosen participant in
the opposite role. It is very unlikely, that you are paired up with the same participant in
two consecutive rounds.
e Game
In each round, player S receives a number on the range 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 via the computer.
All the numbers are equally likely. Player E does not see which number player S receives.
However, player S can send a message regarding his or her number to player E. Player E
must guess the number of player S. At the end of each round both players are informed
about the number of player S and the guess of player E.
Decision of player S
Aer receiving the number, player S can decide about whether or not he or she would like
to send a message to the recipient. Player S can decide which message he or she would
like to send. In doing so, three rules must be complied with:
1. e sent message must contain the true number of the sender
Example: If the sender receives number 3, he can only send messages that contain
the number 3.
2. e sent message must not contain gaps.
Example: e sender with number 3 must not send the numbers 2, 3, 5 as possible
numbers because the 4 is missing in this row.
3. e send message may contain maximum ve numbers.
Example: e sender with the number 3 may only send 5 of is possible numbers in
total. e sender may not send all six numbers (i.e., 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5).
When player S has received, for example, the number 3, he or she can send a message
that contains the true number and no gaps or send no message at all. is, for example,
applies to the message “My number is 3.”. Graphically, the message “My number is 3” will
be depicted by a green box above number 3 and red crosses above 0, 1, 2, 4 and 5:
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Probability Payo
PP% 8 Euro
(100-PP)% 1 Euro
Decision of player E
Player E either sees the message sent by player S or he or she will see the note “Player S
has not sent you a message.” if player S has decided not to send a message. en, player
E must enter his or her guess about the actual number of player S. Here, every number
can be entered in 0.5-intervals (0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5, 5).
Payo
e payment is determined by the following rules: e higher the guess of player
E, the higher the payment of player S. And the closer the guess of player E is to
the true number of player S, the higher the payment of player E.
Hereaer, the mechanism which determines the payment is explained in detail.
In each round you can earn between 0 and 100 probability points (PP). e more prob-
ability points you earn, the higher the probability that you win the subsequent loery:
If you gain 0 probability points you receive with certainty (with 100%) 1 Euro. If you
gain 100 probability points you receive with certainty (with 100%) 8 Euro. If you gain
e.g. 70 probability points, you receive, with the probability of 70%, 8 Euro and, with the
probability of 30% 1 Euro. e more probability points you gain, the more probable it is
that you receive 8 instead of 1.
us, you should try to gain as many probability points as possible.
e amount of your probability points in one round depends on both the number of player
S and the guess of player E. e payo table, which you can nd at your spot, makes
this clear. If player S e.g. receives the number 3 and player E guesses number 4.5, player
E gains 79 probability points and player S 96 probability points. But, if player E guesses
that the number of Player S is 1, player E gains 69 probability points and player S only 19
probability points.
Only one of the 15 rounds is chosen randomly and then is actually relevant to the payo.
Your probability points in this round determine the loery that is played by the computer
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at the end of the experiment. Since you do not know, which of the 15 rounds is relevant
to the payo you should think carefully about your decisions in each round.
Summary
• Player S receives a random number that is unknown to player E.
• Player S decides whether or not to send a message to player E regarding the number.
e message must contain the number of player S.
• What the message contains is determined by player S.
• Player E must guess the number of player S.
• e higher player E guesses the number of player S, the higher the chances of
achieving a higher prot for player S.
• e more accurate the guess of player E for the number is, the higher the chances
of prots for player E.
C.7.2 Precise Treatment
is experiment is composed of 15 rounds. At the beginning of this experiment, it will
be determined randomly whether you are player S or player E. You will keep this role
in all 15 rounds. In each round you play a game with a randomly chosen participant in
the opposite role. It is very unlikely, that you are paired up with the same participant in
two consecutive rounds.
e Game
In each round, player S receives a number on the range 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 via the computer.
All the numbers are equally probable. Player E does not see which number player S
receives. However, player S can send a message regarding his or her number to player E.
Player E must guess the number of player S.
At the end of each round both players are informed about the number of player S and the
guess of player E.
Decision of player S
Aer receiving the number, player S can decide about whether or not he or she would
like to send a message to the recipient. If player S does send a message, player E will be
informed about the number. If player S does not send a message, player E will not be
informed about the number.
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When player S has received e.g. the number 3, he or she can send a message that contains
the true number or send no message at all. is, for example, applies to the message “My
number is 3”. Graphically, the message “My number is 3” will be depicted by a green box
above number 3 and red crosses above 0, 1, 2, 4 and 5:
Decision of player E
Player E either sees the message sent by player S or sees the note “Player S has not sent
you a message.” if player S has decided not to send a message.
en, player E must enter his or her guess about the actual number of player S. Here,
every number can be entered in 0.5-intervals (0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5, 5).
Payo
e payment is determined by the following rules: e higher the guess of player
E, the higher the payment of player S. And the closer the guess of player E is to
the true number of player S, the higher the payment of player E.
Hereaer, the mechanism which determines the payment is explained in detail.
In each round you can earn between 0 and 100 probability points (PP). e more prob-
ability points you earn, the higher the probability that you win the subsequent loery:
Probability Payo
PP% 8 Euro
(100-PP)% 1 Euro
If you gain 0 probability points you receive with certainty (with 100%) 1 Euro. If you
gain 100 probability points you receive with certainty (with 100%) 8 Euro. If you gain
e.g. 70 probability points, you receive, with the probability of 70%, 8 Euro and, with the
probability of 30% 1 Euro. e more probability points you gain, the more probable it is
that you receive 8 Euro instead of 1 Euro.
us, you should try to gain as many probability points as possible.
e amount of your probability points in one round depends on both the number of player
S and the guess of player E. e payo table, which you can nd at your spot, makes
this clear. If player S e.g. receives the number 3 and player E guesses number 4.5, player
E gains 79 probability points and player S 96 probability points. But, if player E guesses
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that the number of player S is 1, then player E gains 69 probability points and player S
only 19 probability points.
Only one of the 15 rounds is chosen randomly and then is actually relevant to the pay-
o. Your probability points in this round determine the loery which is played by the
computer at the end of the experiment. Since you do not know, which of the 15 rounds
is relevant to the payo you should think about your decisions in each round.
Summary
• Player S receives a random number that is unknown to player E.
• Player S decides whether or not to send a message to player E regarding the number.
e message must contain the number of player S.
• What the message contains is determined by player S.
• Player E must guess the number of player S.
• e higher player E guesses the number of player S, the higher the chances of prots
for player S.
• e more accurate the guess of player E for the number is, the higher the chances
of prots for player E.
C.7.3 Payo Tables
Guess of Player E
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Number of Player S
0 100 96 88 79 69 58 46 32 19 4 0
1 88 96 100 96 88 79 69 58 46 32 19
2 69 79 88 96 100 96 88 79 69 58 46
3 46 58 69 79 88 96 100 96 88 79 69
4 19 32 46 58 69 79 88 96 100 96 88
5 0 4 19 32 46 58 69 79 88 96 100
Table C.7 Payos of Player E
C.7.4 Out-Of-Sample Belief Elicitations
At the end of the experiment, subjects received the following questions based on their role
and treatment condition. Some questions, as indicated below, were incentivized using the
average behavior of subjects that participated in the pilot session as a benchmark.
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Guess of Player E
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
Number of Player S
0 0 4 19 32 46 58 69 79 88 96 100
1 0 4 19 32 46 58 69 79 88 96 100
2 0 4 19 32 46 58 69 79 88 96 100
3 0 4 19 32 46 58 69 79 88 96 100
4 0 4 19 32 46 58 69 79 88 96 100
5 0 4 19 32 46 58 69 79 88 96 100
Table C.8 Payos of Player S
Receiver beliefs in Precise
Please answer the following questions. You can earn additional money with your answers.
In you answers, refer to the rst round of an experiment that is very similar to today’s
experiment, but that took place with other participants, at MELESSA, several weeks ago.
Your answers will be compared to the data of the previous experiment. You will receive
100 probability points (PP) (equal to a 100% chance of winning) for a loery that gives
you either AC2 or AC0. en, 14 PP of the 100 PP are deducted for each incorrect answer.
An input is considered incorrect, if it diers by more than 5%-points from the true value.
Your input can be made without the %-sign. e sum of your inputs must be 100.
What percentage of players S who did not send a message to player E had the
following number?
0:[ ]; 1:[ ]; 2:[ ]; 3:[ ]; 4:[ ]; 5:[ ]
Sender beliefs in Precise
Please answer the following questions. You can earn additional money with your answers.
In you answers, refer to the rst round of an experiment that is very similar to today’s
experiment, but that took place with other participants, at MELESSA, several weeks ago.
Your answers will be compared to the data of the previous experiment. You will receive
100 probability points (PP) (equal to a 100% chance of winning) for a loery that gives
you either AC2 or AC0. en, 8 PP of the 100 PP are deducted for each incorrect answer.
An input is considered incorrect, if it diers by more than 5%-points from the true value.
Your input can be made without the %-sign. e sum of your inputs must be 100.
What percentage of players E guessed the following number when they did not
receive a message from player S?
0:[ ]; 0.5:[ ]; 1:[ ]; 1.5:[ ]; 2:[ ]; 2.5:[ ]; 3:[ ]; 3.5:[ ]; 4:[ ]; 4.5:[ ]; 5:[ ]
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Receiver beliefs in Flexible
Please answer the following questions. You can earn additional money with your answers.
In you answers, refer to the rst round of an experiment that is very similar to today’s
experiment, but that took place with other participants, at MELESSA, several weeks ago.
Your answers will be compared to the data of the previous experiment. You will receive
100 probability points (PP) (equal to a 100% chance of winning) for a loery that gives
you either AC2 or AC0. en, 14 PP of the 100 PP are deducted for each incorrect answer.
An input is considered incorrect, if it diers by more than 5%-points from the true value.
Your input can be made without the %-sign. e sum of your inputs must be 100.
What percentage of players S had the following number when they did not send
a message to player E?
0:[ ]; 1:[ ]; 2:[ ]; 3:[ ]; 4:[ ]; 5:[ ]
[On new screen:] Additionally, please answer the following questions. Refer again to the
rst round of the experiment that has already taken place at MELESSA.
What was the most common message sent to player E when player S had the
following numbers?
(Please always state the upper and the lower number of a message. Example: For the
message “My number is 3, 4, or 5”, “3” is the lower number and “5” is the upper number.
You should enter “3” in the le box and “5” in the right box. If a message only contains one
number, then this number should be entered as the lower as well as the upper number. If
no message is sent, leave both boxes blank.)
0:[ ] to [ ]; 1:[ ] to [ ]; 2:[ ] to [ ]; 3:[ ] to [ ]; 4:[ ] to [ ]; 5:[ ] to [ ]
Sender beliefs in Flexible
Please answer the following questions. You can earn additional money with your answers.
In you answers, refer to the rst round of an experiment that is very similar to today’s
experiment, but that took place with other participants, at MELESSA, several weeks ago.
Your answers will be compared to the data of the previous experiment. You will receive
100 probability points (PP) (equal to a 100% chance of winning) for a loery that gives
you either AC2 or AC0. en, 8 PP of the 100 PP are deducted for each incorrect answer.
An input is considered incorrect, if it diers by more than 5%-points from the true value.
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Your input can be made without the %-sign. e sum of your inputs must be 100.
What percentage of players E have guessed the following if they had not received
a message from player S?
0:[ ]; 0.5:[ ]; 1:[ ]; 1.5:[ ]; 2:[ ]; 2.5:[ ]; 3:[ ]; 3.5:[ ]; 4:[ ]; 4.5:[ ]; 5:[ ]
[On new screen:] Additionally, please answer the following questions. Refer again to the
rst round of the experiment that has already taken place at MELESSA.
What was the average guess of player E when player S sent the following mes-
sage?
“My number is 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5.”:[ ] “My number is 2, 3, 4, or 5.”:[ ] “My number is 3, 4, or
5.”:[ ] “My number is 4 or 5.”:[ ]
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D.1 Instructions
Introduction
Welcome to an experiment on decision-making behavior!
ank you for your participation!
During the experiment, you and all other participants are asked to make decisions. Your
payout will be determined according to the rules explained below.
Please do not speak with other participants of the experiment from now on. If you have
any questions aer the instructions or during the experiment, please press the red buon
on the keyboard in front of you. One of the experimenters will then come to you and
answer your questions privately.
e experiment lasts a maximum of 60 minutes. All your decisions and answers remain
anonymous. Neither the experimenters nor the other participants will know which deci-
sions you have made and which participant earns how much.
All payouts from the experiment will be handed over to you privately and in cash.
Slider Task
Your task
In each of the two consecutive rounds (round A and round B), you will see 48 sliders on
your screen. Your task is to bring as many of these sliders as possible to position 50:
Use both the computer mouse and the keyboard for positioning. You have 120 seconds
time for one round, so to position 48 sliders.
Your payment
Each correctly positioned slider yields AC0.40. e sum of all correctly positioned sliders
from both rounds gives you the total amount of money that is generated in this task.
However, this amount does not make your payout of this experiment. Only a share of the
total amount of money is your payout. You will learn how high your share of the money
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is aer we have nished the task. Note, however: the more sliders you position correctly,
the higher your payout of the experiment will be.
Practice round
Before you start your task, there will be two practice rounds. You will not receive any
money from the two practice rounds, but you can get to know your task.
[Aer the slider tasks have been processed, the experimenter pays out the money earned in
the slider tasks in random order.]
Compliance Decision
Your share
e share of the money you have earned from your task will be determined by the form(s)
[depending on the treatment] you received along with these instructions. Put your share
of the money in the envelope labeled “Your Share”.
e remaining share
e remaining share of the money you have earned from your task can also be determined
using the form(s) [depending on the treatment]. Put the remaining share in the envelope
labeled “Remaining Share”.
Moral Treatment
Usage of the remaining share money
e remaining share money will be used by the lab researchers. e researchers will do-
nate the money to the German Bone Marrow Donation Registry (DKMS). e main activ-
ity of the DKMS is to improve the healing potential of leukemia and other life-threatening
diseases of the blood-forming system by supporting bone marrow donations. One major
part of DKMS is the DKMS umbilical cord blood bank, which collects, processes, stores
and mediates umbilical cord blood stem cell donations for newborns. (Information from
www.dkms.de)
Waste Treatment
Usage of the remaining share of the money
e remaining share money will be used by the lab researchers. e researchers will
donate the money to the Bavarian Yacht Club (BYC). e main activity of the BYC is to
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professionally promote sailing with all its modern features and high standards. In addi-
tion, the social life outside the gates of Munich is cultivated. e BYC also has an exquisite
restaurant in its Clubcasino at the Starnberger Lake. (Information from www.byc.de)
e remaining amount of money will be donated by Marvin Deversi, a member of the
Chair of Behavioral Economics and Experimental Economic Research of LMU Munich,
on behalf of Prof. Dr. Florian Englmaier, head of the Chair of Organizational Economics
at LMU Munich, to the BYC/the DKMS. e verifying documents for the total amount of
donations, including the time of today’s experiment, will be posted on the White Board
in front of the MELESSA laboratory in the week of April 17, 2017 to April 21, 2017. We
will not post personal data.
End
Seal both envelopes using the sticky tape and then click “it Part I” to nish this part of
the experiment. You must not open any of the two envelopes during this experiment. All
your decisions remain anonymous. Aer the experiment is over, you take the envelope
labeled “Your Share” home and leave the envelope labeled “Remaining Share” on your
table. e experimenter will collect the remaining envelopes only aer every participant
has le the room.
As soon as you click on “Next”, your earnings summary from your task will be displayed
again on the screen and you will be able to start calculating your and the remaining share.
164
Appendix D: Complexity and Appropriation Interact in Affecting Compliance
D.2 Example Screens
Figure D.1 First Round of Slider Tasks
Figure D.2 Overview of Correctly Positioned Sliders
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D.3 Forms
Figure D.3 Clipping of a Tax Form in ebéc
Notes: Example for a complex tax form in ebéc showing that tax payers need to conduct complicated
multiplications, consider if-conditions, and carry numbers across dierent forms.
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D.4 Randomization Checks
Table D.1 shows that the treatment randomization was mostly successful. ere exist
signicant dierences with respect to subjects’ lab experience. Table D.3 shows the ro-
bustness of our main results when controlling for experience.
Controls Moral/ Waste/ Moral/ Waste/ F-test
Simple Simple Complex Complex
Gender 0.63 0.55 0.65 0.59 0.6008
Age 24.59 24.45 23.00 23.90 0.1112
Study 4.05 3.93 4.25 3.67 0.5316
Math score 2.04 2.18 2.18 2.30 0.5016
Monthly income 3.17 3.59 3.71 3.55 0.6880
Experience 2.31 2.45 2.58 2.65 0.0315
Know 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.21 0.3111
Table D.1 Randomization Checks
Notes: Randomization checks on main control variables. Study is a variable that described the eld of study.
Math score is the last high-school grade in math that subjects remembered. Monthly income describes a
category on monthly available income. Experience describes how oen a subject has taken part in laboratory
experiments. Know measures how many of the other participants in the laboratory the subject knows.
(1) (2)
Donation (AC) Donation (%)
Waste -2.338*** -0.129***
(0.233) (0.0178)
Complex 0.455* 0.00677
(0.236) (0.0136)
Waste × Complex -1.339*** -0.0574**
(0.466) (0.0267)
Income 0.202***
(0.0653)
Experience -0.404* -0.0296**
(0.210) (0.0126)
Constant 5.324*** 0.537***
(1.212) (0.0295)
Observations 296 296
Model OLS OLS
R2 0.251 0.185
Table D.2 Regressions of Compliance Behavior
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the subject level in parentheses; ∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p <
0.01.
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D.5 Eort to File the Forms
Nine out of 320 subjects took their forms home such that we cannot assure whether they
faced a moral tradeo when dividing the money. ese subjects could have taken home
their forms intentionally or mistakenly by puing them in the wrong envelope. ese are
three subjects in Moral/Simple, two in Moral/ Complex, four in Waste/Simple, and
none in Waste/Complex. is behavior is not specic to the treatments (Fisher Exact
Test; p = 0.260), hence we do not expect treatment specic eort cost functions or any
kind of reference points to drive our observed paerns. For the question at hand, overall,
subjects donated around 15% of the generated money.
e group of subjects that intentionally le most forms empty and hence did not face
the moral tradeo comprises of two subjects in Moral/Simple, ve in Moral/ Complex,
and three subjects in both Waste/Simple and Waste/Complex. Again, this paern is not
treatment specic (Fisher Exact Test; p = 0.756). ese subjects gave on average 20% of
the generated money away.
Overall, both groups spent signicantly less money to be donated than the overwhelming
majority of subjects that led every single item (MWU; p < 0.001). e distribution of
shares given is shown in Figure D.4.
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Figure D.4 Donations (in %) and Empty Forms
In our main text we view the eort supply decision to ll the forms as given. One may
however argue that the eort supply decision represents a selection into our sample of
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analysis. In order to address this point, we estimate a simple bivariate selection model
(also known as Heckman model, see Heckman (1979)). Here, we re-estimate our linear
regression model that presents our main interaction eect (see Table 4.1) by correcting
for treatment-specic selection into our sample. Table D.3 shows that the detected eects
remain robust. e eect measured using nominal donations slightly increases in level,
whereas the respective eect on donation shares decreases slightly.
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(1) (2)
Donation (AC) Donation (%)
Waste -2.221∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗
(0.286) (0.0170)
Complex 0.424 -0.00406
(0.297) (0.0125)
Waste × Complex -1.673∗∗∗ -0.0454∗
(0.544) (0.0240)
Income 0.191∗∗∗
(0.0711)
Constant 4.934∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗
(1.174) (0.0105)
Selection on I(sample)
Waste 0.0149 -0.152
(0.357) (0.290)
Complex -0.259 -0.196
(0.374) (0.248)
Waste × Complex 0.807∗ 0.683∗
(0.432) (0.380)
Income 0.0460 0.0262
(0.0287) (0.0391)
Constant 0.523 1.066
(0.596) (0.686)
athrho
Constant -1.371∗∗∗ 0.408
(0.205) (0.287)
lnsigma
Constant 1.206∗∗∗ -1.687∗∗∗
(0.0528) (0.0733)
Observations 318 318
LR-Test <0.001 0.156
Model Heckman Heckman
Table D.3 Regressions of Compliance Behavior and Selection Eects
Notes: Robustness of compliance behavior on the intensive margin. Notice that two subjects that did not
position a single slider correctly are excluded as the slider task was performed before knowing about
treatment-specic information. Clustered standard errors (session level) in parentheses. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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D.6 Identication
In the following, we state our hypotheses where the variables xA, xB, xC, xD (all ≥ 0)
represent the average amount of money to be donated to the recipient party in the re-
spective treatment groups (A: Moral and Simple, B: Moral and Complex, C: Waste and
Simple, D: Waste and Complex).
textbfDirect complexity eect
Subjects devote less money to be donated to the other party when the forms are complex
rather than simple, such that (xA + xC)− (xB + xD) > 0.
Appropriation eect
Subjects devote less money to be donated to the BYC compared to the DKMS, such that (xA +
xB)− (xC + xD) > 0.
Employing more complex forms induces incentives for non-compliance due to higher
cognitive eort costs which should lead to less compliance.1 We lower the moral costs
of non-compliance with donating money to the BYC as compared to the DKMS which is
also expected to have a negative eect on compliance.
Our hypotheses can be conceptualized within the following simple framework. A deci-
sion maker is assumed to maximize his utility U over the share of money to be donated
to the other party x ∈ [0, 1] .
max
arg x
U = (1− x) + F[C(i), m] · (−x)− t · G(x− g). (D.1)
e utility function consists of three parts. First, (1 − x) is the (consumption) utility
from the money kept. Second, F[C(·), m] describes the context eects on the agents
decision to optimally choose x. Here, m ∈ [0, 1] is the subject’s social concerns and C(·)
represents complexity as a function of the number of dierent items to le (i). irdly,
G(·) represents the duty to comply to the rule g with intensity factor t. e rst and
1Complexity is likely to be a hybrid of decision time, cognitive eort, and depletion that all aect compliance
in the same direction.
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second order conditions are, respectively:
FOC :
∂U
∂x
= −F[C(·), m]− t ∂G(·)
∂x
= 0 (D.2)
SOC :
∂2U
∂x2
= −t ∂
2G(·)
∂x2
< 0. (D.3)
We easily see that there is a tradeo between our context variables and the duty to comply
to the rule. Using the implicit function theorem we can show that our Hypotheses  and
 can be expressed by dxdC(·) =
∂F(·)
∂C(·)
−t ∂
2G(·)
∂x2
< 0 and dxdm =
∂F(·)
∂m
−t ∂
2G(·)
∂x2
< 0, respectively.
However, the exact treatment response depends on the functional form of F[C(·), m] that
we aim to beer understand with this paper. We cautiously formulate the following alter-
native hypothesis on F[C(·), m] when we conjecture that ∂2F∂C∂m < 0. I.e., the negative in-
teraction eect of complexity and appropriation gets weaker when moral costs increase.
We propose that the behavioral mechanism underlying this relation is that complexity
can reduce moral costs from non-compliance. In our simple decision framework, this is
reected by a negative complexity eect that diminishes with moral costs. An alternative
interpretation would be that the base motivation of employees is reduced by the appro-
priation of donations such that complexity eects loom larger when the money is used
for a wasteful purpose.
Interaction eect
e eects of complexity depend on the recipient (i.e., the moral context). In particular,
the negative eects of complexity are stronger for the BYC than for the DKMS, such that
[(xA − xB)− (xC − xD)] < 0.
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